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CHAPTER 1
THE SENATE - IN SEARCH OF A ROLE
The Senate committee system as it is currently 
structured has been operating now for just over 13 years. The 
introduction of the system was heralded with much chest-beating 
and optimism. The fnotion of the new Legislative and General 
Purpose Standing Committees was to extend the role of the Senate 
as a House of Review and improve the flow of information to 
Senators. It can now be said that the committee system of the 
Senate has revitalised (and some would say saved) the Senate. 
Committee activity is seen as synonymous with the Senate.
Notwithstanding their growth in power and authorityf 
committees have been hamstrung by numerous obstacles. These 
include: restrictions on the amount of time Senators are able to 
devote to committee work due to parliamentary, party and 
electorate commitments? lack of support staff; clashes with the 
Executive; and lack of information.
Perhaps not suprisingly then, debate still continues on 
how well committees work, how effective they are, and what 
Senators get: out of them. Using the results of a series of 
interviews with Senators themselves, this thesis intends to 
explore those questions, so that Senate committees can be 
understood in their proper context.
Searching for a Model of Government
During the constitutional convention debates of the 
1890s, the need for a bicameral system was never seriously 
questioned. All the State colonies had bicameral systems (in
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imitation of the mother country) and it was expected that, 
likewise, the Federal Parliament would have two Houses. 
Notwithstanding such unanimity, in the late 19th century there 
was much criticism of the various State Legislative Councils 
(Clark 1981) for being unrepresentative and delegates were 
determined that this environment would not be repeated in the 
federal system.
Initial enthusiasm for an Upper House was motivated by 
a desire to imitate the British parliamentary system and by a 
desire to provide a check on the House of Representatives; to 
‘check ... progress until such calm discussion has ensued as 
will really test the merits of any measure .. . f (quoted in
Hutchison 1976:34). While the Lower House was expected to be 
innovative, there was a danger that it could move too fast, and 
so be subject to defects. 'The instincts of the more 
conservative body will be caution - de3. iberation - resistive to 
change if not fairly and fully proved to be beneficial (quoted 
in Hutchison 1976:34).
Thus it was accepted from the beginning that the
parliamentary system that was to be adopted would be based on 
the Westminster system where the powers of Upper Houses tend to 
be limited to a Chamber of second thought - and where 
responsibility for the Executive resides in the Lower House.
However, as the constitutional debates continued, it
soon became clear that the need to accommodate the demands of 
the smaller States was becoming an overriding concern of
delegates and the longer the debates continued, the more it 
became clear that for federation to succeed, there needed to be 
safeguards to protect the interests of those States.
2
Thus t h e  d e l e g a t e s  t u r n e d  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
power fu l  American Sen a t e  which had a s t a t u s  t h a t  many d e l e g a t e s  
e n v i e d .  'The F e d e r a l  p r i n c i p l e '  as embodied i n  t h e  American 
S e n a t e ,  was seen  t o  f i t  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  and demands of  t he
s m a l l e r  S t a t e s  who s t o o d  i n  t h e  way of  f e d e r a t i o n .
In t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t h e r e  were i m p o r t a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  two Chambers t h a t  were t o  a f f e c t  t he
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e b a t e s  i n  A u s t r a l i a  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  t he  
S e n a t e .
1.  The method of  e l e c t i n g  t h e  two Chambers was d i f f e r e n t .
In t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  S e n a t e ,  S e n a t o r s  were elected by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e s  of  t h e  S t a t e s  co nce rned  (Since  1913,  U.S
S e n a t o r s  have been e l e c t e d  d i r e c t l y  by t he  p e o p l e ) ; 
t hough t h i s  method was r e j e c t e d  by d e l e g a t e s  a t  t h e
A u s t r a l i a n  Convent ion  d e b a t e s .
2.  Each S t a t e  had an eq ua l  number of  S e n a t o r s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
them, i r r e s p e c t i v e  of  p o p u l a t i o n .
3.  The t e n u r e  of  o f f i c e  f o r  Members and S e n a t o r s  was
d i f f e r e n t ;  2 y e a r s  f o r  Members of  Congress  compared t o  
s i x  y e a r s  f o r  S e n a t o r s .
4.  The s i z e  of  t h e  two Chambers was i n t e n d e d  t o  be
d i f f e r e n t .  I t  was a lways  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  would be t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l a r g e r
Chamber and t h a t  t h e  Sen a t e  w i t h  i t s  s m a l l e r  numbers 
would encou rage  a b e t t e r  s t a n d a r d  of  d e b a t e .
5.  The powers o f  t h e  two Chambers were d i f f e r e n t ,  w i th  t he
House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  on ly  a b l e  t o  i n i t i a t e
r e v e n u e - r a i s i n g  b i l l s .  The Sen a t e  was g iven  t h e  power 
t o  r a t i f y  t r e a t i e s  e n t e r e d  i n t o  by t he  s e p a r a t e
E x e c u t i v e .
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While the federal principle created many of these 
differences, they also reflected the different roles that were 
envisaged for the two Chambers. Madison saw the six year term as 
offering a sense of security so that they could 'develop the 
skills of politics and sense of responsibility, work hard and 
serve the people well* (Shackleton 1982:235). Senators would be 
able to stand back and reconsider matters. Because of these 
differences it was anticipated that the Senate would attract 
people of greater ability and distinction who would act as a 
watchdog over the Executive as well as over the Lower House.
Similar hopes were declared at the Australian 
constitutional convention debates. Yet while most of the 
differences were incorporated into the Australian Constitution 
(except Senate ratification of treaties and the method of 
election), the delegates at the Conventions still supported the 
adoption of the Westminster system rather than the United States 
Congressional system. Under the Congressional system the 
Executive was not responsible to the legislature because of the 
separation of powers between the two. Thus while there existed a 
powerful Upper Chamber, it did not pose a direct threat to the 
Executive.
Thus Australian Senators have to make their Chamber 
workable despite having these two seemingly contradictory 
methods of operating an Upper House fused into one. While the 
Senate attempts to operate as an Upper House in the American 
mould in working as a House of Review over the Executive, it is 
hamstrung by the fact that some of its members are also part of 
the Executive.
As well as differences in the relationship between the 
Executive and the legislature, other important areas of
differences between the Australian and American Parliaments lie 
in the method of election, the average tenure of
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parliamentarians and the nature and practice of political 
parties (Hutchinson 1976:447). The effect of such differences is 
to influence the way in which the two systems of governments 
operate. This is particularly significant for the subject of 
this thesis: the behavior and operations of parliamentary
committees.
One area where this is most marked is in the behavior 
and scope of committees. In the United States Congress, 
committees are more autonomous, self contained and independent 
than those operating within the Westminster system which tend to 
be limited in scope or power.
Both Houses in America use committees extensively. Each 
committee has its own committee room and has a strong support 
staff. Also, counsel may question witnesses. There is extensive 
use of television and radio and other Senators and Members often 
participate in committee hearings.
In his study of committee systems in democratic 
parliaments in the world shaw has argued that committees 
operating in the Parliaments of the United States, Italy and 
West Germany were more inclined to 'put their imprint on the 
substructure inputs of government . . . committees in the lower 
reaches of the rank order, (that is Westminster systems) on the 
other hand, are more likely to perform such non decisional 
functions as deliberation, representation, legitimation 
(they) exercise little independent discretion compared with that 
exercised by the stronger committees' (Shaw 1979:385).
He found a reluctance in Westminster Parliments to 
devolve authority from the legislature to committees. By 
contrast, in legislatures styled on the American model of 
Parliament, there was a strong commitment to devolution, in the 
form of permanent and specialised committees. Constitutional 
systems based on the Westminster model presuppose that political
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Executives will operate within the legislature and lead it 
whereas under the American system the Executive and the 
legislature are separate.
(, >v
Shaw also found that committees were strongest where 
the parties had a low level of influence in committees. This 
weakening of influence he found, was greatly assisted if the 
legislature was a multi-party one. This conclusion can help in 
understanding the Australian Senate. The composition of the 
Australian Senate has almost always been multi-party one and has 
frequently been in the position • where the government did not 
hold the balance of power. This could explain the success in the 
establishment of the Senate committees and their extensive use 
over their House of Representatives counter-parts as Shaw found 
that, generally, a strong unified dominant party in the Chamber 
was associated with weak committees. ‘ ... Unless non-party 
conditioners of unusual importance are present* (Shaw 1979:395) 
committees have little genuine impact on government. But it also 
raises questions about the way committees are run. In the 
Australian Senate, the government under standing orders will 
always have a majority of Senators on committees. However, is\ 
this a desirable feature? Should the majority of Senators on a 
committee be from the party in government and should the 
chairman automatically be a government Senator? If the Senate is 
to operate independently of the Executive, then would not this 
independence be enhanced if the chairman and the majority of 
Senators were not from the same party? If committees act in a 
truely bipartisan manner, then is it so important to stipulate 
in standing orders who shall be the chairmen and what shall be 
the party composition of the committees?
All governments can influence committees in various 
ways; they may determine their composition, choice of topic, and 
the restriction of the flow of information. It is up to the 
Senate and its committees to reduce this influence. The question 
is, are committees hindered by having a government chairman and
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a m a j o r i t y  of  S e n a t o r s  f rom t h e  government  p a r t i e s ?  In. a l l  t h e  
d e b a t e s  on t h e  commi t t ee  sy s t e m ,  no S e n a t o r  a rg u e d  a g a i n s t  
a d o p t i n g  s t a n d i n g  o r d e r s  s u p p o r t i n g  such  a r r a n g e m e n t s  nor  d i d  
S e n a t o r s  t h a t  I i n t e r v i e w e d  s u g g e s t  any v a r i a t i o n  t o  t h e s e  
a r r a n g e m e n t s .  However,  were  t h e y  we a r i ng  t h e i r  h a t s  a s  S e n a t o r s  
or  members o f  a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  i n  a g r e e i n g  t o  such  
a r r a n g e m e n t s ?
I n  s e a r c h  o f  a r o l e
The r o l e  t h a t  S e n a t o r s  s ee  t h e  S e n a t e  p l a y i n g  (and t h u s  
i n  p a r t ,  t h e i r  own r o l e s )  w i l l  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s u c c e s s  or  
o t h e r w i s e  of  any commi t t ee  sy s tem t h a t  o p e r a t e s  i n  t h e  S e n a t e .  
I f  S e n a t o r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  S e n a t e  i s  a S t a t e s  House t h e n  i t
would be e x p e c t e d  t o  be m i r r o r e d  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  c o m p o s i t i o n  
and b e h a v i o r  of  c o m m i t t e e s .  S i m i l a r i t y ,  i f  t h e  S e n a t e  i s  s e en  as  
a House of  Review,  t h e  co mmi t t e e s  w i l l  a l s o  r e f l e c t  such  an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h u s  t h e r e  i s  a need  t o  d e t e r m i n e  what  i s  t h e  
r o l e  of  t h e  S e n a t e .
As a S t a t e s  House,  t h e  S e n a t e  was e x p e c t e d  t o  e n s u r e  
t h a t  a l l  m a t t e r s  p a s s e d  by P a r l i a m e n t  would have  t he  c o n s e n t  of  
S t a t e s ,  as  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  S e n a t e ,  as  w e l l  as  t h e  c o n s e n t  of  
t he  p e o p l e ,  a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Yet  
a s  C r i s p  o b s e r v e s ,  ‘ t h e  emergence  of  t h e  two p a r t y  sy s t em by
19C8-09 ended any hope t o  which t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  l e n t  c o l o u r  
t h a t  t h e  Se n a t e  m igh t  be a ‘ S t a t e s  House'  ( C r i s p  1 9 7 3 : 3 3 0 ) .  By 
t hen  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  p o l i t i c a l  sy s t em had s e t t l e d  i n t o  wha t  we 
now r e c o g n i s e  as  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  sy s tem domina t ed  by two p a r t i e s  
-  l a b o r  and a n t i - l a b o r .
While  S e n a t o r s  may r e p r e s e n t  a c e r t a i n  S t a t e ,  t h ey  
never  l o s e  s i g h t  of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  was becc\use t h e y  g a i n e d  
p r e - s e l e c t i o n  f o r  a p o s i t i o n  on t h e  S e n a t e  p a r t y  t i c k e t  
( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  im p o r t an c e  of  b e i n g  ‘ a w a r d e d 1 f i r s t  or  s econd
p l a c e )  t h a t  t h ey  a r e  where  t h e y  a r e  t o d a y ;  and t h u s  any
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c on t em por a r y  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  Se n a t e  w i l l  no t  
t r e a t  t h e  n o t i o n  of  t h e  Se n a t e  a s  a S t a t e s  House s e r i o u s l y .  For 
example ,  S e na to r  Hamer s a ys  t h a t  t h e  S en a t e  i t s e l f  has  no
p a s t  and no f u t u r e  a s  a S t a t e s  Ho us e6 (Hamer 1982A:5 See Also  
Solomon 1982;  Emy 1974;  A i t k i n  and J i n k s  1980;  Greenwood 1 97 6 ) .  
R a t h e r ,  t h e  f o c u s  i s  on t h e  S e n a t e ’ s r ev i e w  c a p a c i t y  and 
p o t e n t i a l .  (For a l e n g t h y  a rgument  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  co nce p t  of  t h e  
Se n a t e  as  a S t a t e s  House,  see  Odgers  1 9 7 6 : 5 - 1 2 .  For a d e t a i l e d  
a rgument  a g a i n s t  such a r o l e ,  s e e  H u t c h i s o n  1976:  264 - 27 3 . )
As a House of  Review,  t h e  S e n a t e  i s  s a i d  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  
a second  o p i n i o n  ’ . . .  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  and o t h e r  
p r o p o s a l s  i n i t i a t e d  i n  t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ’ (Odgers  
1 9 7 6 : 3 ) .  C e r t a i n l y  p u b l i c  p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  S e n a t e  c e n t r e s  
a round  t h e  Se n a t e  b e in g  a House of  Review.  In  a s u r v e y  c a r r i e d  
o u t  by H u t c h i s o n  on t h e  p u b l i c ’ s p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  S e n a t e ,  she  
found t h a t  t h e  ’m a j o r i t y  of  a rgumen t s  [73%] f o r  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  
S e na t e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  House of  Review f u n c t i o n  . . . (H u t ch i s o n  
19 7 6 : 3 5 8 ) .
However,  Odge rs ,  w h i l e  n o n e t h e l e s s  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  t h e  
S e na t e  i s  s t i l l  a S t a t e s  House and a House of  Review,  a l s o  goes  
beyond t h e s e  two t r a d i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  i n  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
Se n a t e  a l s o :
1.  p r o b e s  and checks  ’ t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of  t h e  l a w s ,  t o  
keep i t s e l f  and t h e  p u b l i c  i n f o r m e d ,  and t o  i n s i s t  on 
m i n i s t e r i a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;
2 .  e x e r c i s e s  s u r v e i l l a n c e  ove r  t h e  E x e c u t i v e ’ s 
r e g u l a t i o n - m a k i n g  power ;
3.  p r o t e c t s  p e r s o n a l  r i g h t s  and l i b e r t i e s  which migh t  be 
en da n ge re d  i f  t h e r e  was a c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of  u n r e s t r a i n e d  
power i n  t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ;  and
8
4.  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  S e n a t e  i s  t h e  wa t ch -d o g  and t h e  s a f e t y  
v a l v e  of  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  f e d e r a l  sy s tem and o f  t h e  
n a t i o n  (Odgers  1 9 7 6 : 3 - 4 ) .
Yet  even i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h i s  r e v i e w i n g  f u n c t i o n  t h e  
p e r f o r m an ce  of  t h e  S e n a t e  ha s  been  i n c o n s i s t e n t .  H u t c h i s o n  
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  ' a  major  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  uneven r e c o r d  o f  t h e  
Se n a t e  a s  a House of  Review i s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of  p a r t y  p o l i t i c s *  
( Hu tc h in so n  1 9 7 6 : v ) .  The manner i n  which t h e  S e n a t e  o p e r a t e s  i n  
i t s  r ev i ew  of  t he  e x e c u t i v e  h a s  . a lways  been d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  comp lex ion  o f  t h e  S e n a t e .
The J o i n t  Commit tee  on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review a r g u e s ,  
i n e x o r a b l e  h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  o f  t h e  20 th  c e n t u r y  have
p r e c l u d e d  t h e  S e n a t e  f rom becoming t h e  p r a c t i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n  of  
t h e  fo u n d i n g  f a t h e r s ’ i n t e n t i o n s '  ( J o i n t  Commit tee  on
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review 1 9 5 8 : 1 1 ) .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  J o i n t  
Commit tee p l a c e s  t he  blame on t h e  emergence  of  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s .  'The l o y a l t y  of  S e n a t o r s  t o  t h e i r  p a r t i e s  ha s  been
l a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  s u b l i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  du a l  
c o n c e p t i o n  of  t h e  S e n a t e  as  a S t a t e s  House and a House of
Review'  ( J o i n t  Commit tee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review 1958:37)  ( s ee  
a l s o  Royal  Commission on t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  1 9 2 9 : 4 6 ) .
I t  i s  be cause  of  p a r t y  dominance  i n  t h e  Chamber t h a t  i t  
ha s  o f t e n  been s a i d  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t  does  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  p a r t  of  
t h e  r e g u l a r  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s .  Though i t  ha s  t h e  power t o  
n e g a t e  or  amend d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n  e l s e w h e r e ,  t h i s  i s  r a r e l y  
e x e r c i s e d  and i t  does  n o t  i t s e l f  p l a y  an i n i t i a t i n g  or  
f o r m u l a t i n g  r o l e  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  of  d e c i s i o n  making.  At b e s t  
S e n a t o r s  and Members s eek  t o  s c r u t i n i s e  and ,  i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  
i n f l u e n c e  t he  d e c i s i o n s  r e a c h e d  by t h o s e  b o d i e s  v e s t e d  w i t h  t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  make d e c i s o n s .
9
As one parliamentarian noted, an important function of 
parliament is 'to be both the great forum of the nation, where 
the major issues are debated, and a watch-dog scrutinising the 
details of legislation and administration in the public 
interest. It is in these things that Parliament has become 
increasingly inarticulate and inefficient, too often permitting 
policies to be framed in secret and implemented by stealth; too 
often allowing important details to pass without comment and 
without check (Commonwealth Backbencher 1966:175).
Yet parliamentary committees should not provide a
unique opportunity for backbenchers to carry out any function as 
a Senator that is not already available to him while he is in 
the Chamber. Questions without notice, motions, general debate, 
especially the first reading of a money Bill, and committee 
stages of a Bill should provide a Senator with the opportunity 
to achieve whatever he wishes without having to serve on 
committees. That this is not the case is apparent, and so
committees are seen as the means whereby Parliament can claw 
back some influence.
Ministers in both Chambers often treat question time 
with contempt, questions on notice can remain unanswered for 
unnecessarily long periods and general business can be
curtailed. Overall, Parliament is dominated by party politics
and this does not exclude the Senate. As the Joint Committee
noted, the Senate has for many years been as susceptible to
party political influences as the House of Representatives.
Most amendments that succeed in the Senate are
government amendments merely tidying up shoddy drafting. While 
the free vote is occasionally used, it is with issues which
political parties find too difficult on which to develop a 
policy.
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The history of Private Members' Bills in the Senate is
a poor one, with Bills not having the support of the Executive
having little chance of success„ While Private Members' Bills 
have been agreed to by the Senate, only 10 of 206 Private 
Members' Bills introduced since 1901 have been successful (152 
in the Senate, 54 in the House of Representatives) . Only 2 of 
these successful Bills, Disabled Persons Monies (1963) and 
Immioration Restrction (1912), we re initiated in the House of
Representatives (as at the end of 1983).
So if one did critcally examine all of the avenues 
available to Senators to carry out their roles, then only the 
functioning of committees would emerge with any credibility.
Development of the Current Committee System
Public perception of the Senate has fluctuated. For 
most of its life it has not enjoyed a high reputation, being 
seen as an anachronism or a retirement centre for the party 
faithful. Moreover, Gallup polls examined by Hutchison up to
1970 ‘demonstrate general ignorance about the functions and 
purposes of the Senate', with little understanding that the 
Senate should be functioning as a House of Review, or even what 
that term means (Hutchison 1976:339).
Nevertheless, the Senate has on occasions acted against 
the wishes of the government. The change in the voting system 
for the election of the Senate resulted in a Chamber in which 
the membership has undergone a gradual, but significant change. 
Thus as Solomon observes, 'by the 1960s ... few governments ... 
could be certain that they would have a majority in the Senate' 
(Solomon 1981:73).
That the Senate is able to undertake any of these 
functions seems in part from the reduced influence that the 
Executive is able to extend over the Senate, compared to the 
House of Representatives.
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The government between 1952 and IS 6 5 was defeated in 
the Senate on 17 occasions and there were a further 35 instances 
where Senators crossed the floor * In 1967 alone, the government 
was defeated on 24% of all divisions (Reid 1969:515). In 1975 it 
was defeated on 95% of all divisions.
It is in this environment that select committees in the 
Senate were being established throughout the 1960s and 
culminated in the report by the Standing Orders Committee on 
Legislative and General Purpose Committees in the Senate (1971) .
The Senate during this period showed signs of 
exercising its review function without incurring the wrath of 
the Executive. And it was perhaps not surprising that the level 
of committee activity also increased. Between 1949-60 five 
Senate select committees and one joint committee were 
established and from 1960-70 there were ten Senate select; 
committees and three joint select committees established.
Reports on Road Safety, Encouragement of Australian 
Productions on Television, Pollution, Medical Costs and other 
reports provided Senators with experience in committee work; if 
for some only limited experience. This contact with select 
committees, combined with the report of Odgers via the Standing 
Orders report to the Senate and behind the scenes work by such 
people as Senator Murphy, swung Senators around to the view that 
the use of standing committees was the way to bring the Senate 
into the 20th century.
By the early 1970s the Senate was no longer seen as a 
joke; ’it is alive and well* said Solomon in 1972. In two 
consecutive years (1967-68) the Senate established three select 
committees. Reid wrote optimistically at the time that ‘Senators 
may yet become the work-horses of the Australian parliament, 
(Reid 1969:516).
12
What Reid was implying here was that the House of 
Representatives was no longer operating as the legislative 
Chamber because of the total dominance of the government by the 
Executive. This dominance of the Executive over the Lower House 
has particularly affected the establishment of a committee 
system. While the House has similar committee powers to those of 
the Senate, it has resisted the creation of such a committee 
system as exists in the Senate.
Odgers first explored the possibility of an extensive 
committee system in the Senate in the first edition of his work 
Australian Senate Practice in 1953, He argued then that 
committees would relieve 'the Senate of functions which, in the 
opinion of the Senate, can be more conveniently and 
appropriately discharged by committees than the Senate itself' 
(Odgers 1953:167). By the 197Cs he viewed committees as offering 
substantially more than mere convenience. In the 5th Edition of 
Australian Senate Practice he argued that: ' . „ . no modern 
legislature can discharge its functions fully and effectively 
without the assistance of committees' (Odgers 1976:467); or as 
Shaw put it, as Cabinet could not operate without departments, 
nor can any contemporary legislature function without committees 
(Shaw 1977:419).
Odgers justified the establishment of the Senate 
Standing Committee system by arguing that such a system was 
required because of:
1. increasing governmental responsibilities and 
activities;
2. the impact of science and technology;
3. the complexity of legislation
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4. the inadequacy of opportunities and means on the floor 
of the House ... to probe and check the administration;
5. the inadequacy of present-day means for the ventilation 
of citizens' grievances against administrative 
decisions or acts;
6. growing Executive expertise and secrecy; and
7. the need, in an increasingly expert world, for
parliamentarians to be able to call upon scholarly 
research and advice equal in competence to that relied 
upon by the Administration* (Standing Orders Committee 
1971:33) .
Odgers maintained that time simply did not allow, (nor 
does the opportunity arise in the Senate today) for Senators to 
fully discharge the functions that were placed upon them; ’ . . . 
nor does the floor of Parliament lend itself to the 
investigatory role' (Odgers 1976:467-468). Thus committees were 
seen as part of the solution to restore these functions. The 
functions of the standing committee system would be to:
1. permit a continuing surveillance of defined fields;
2. c.. make progress reports on chosen matters ..<?
3. create an awareness, both within the Public Service and 
at large, of Senate 'watch-dog functions' in certain 
fields of government;
4. create within Parliament certain defined areas, as with 
regulations and ordinances, where there develops a 
willing disposition to 'leave it to the Senate', thus 
enhancing the status of the Upper House; and
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5. provide a unique opportunity for organisations and 
others to make presentations and submissions to 
Parliament regarding the administration of the laws 
coming within the jurisdiction of the committees 
(Standing Orders Committee 1970:7).
Odgers also suggested that certain factors should be 
taken into account in establishing standing committees. These
wer e:
1. that the role of committees is not one of policy making 
nor policy criticising ... rather of inquiry and 
counsel and of throwing light into dark corners thus 
emphasising the investigative role of committees;
2. hot and cold issues ... should be avoided and
3. neglected areas ... are particularly appropriate for
committee activity . . . (Standing Orders Committee
1971:8).
Odgers here emphasised the information seeking public education 
role* thus reducing the possibility of party politics dominating 
committee work.
The report of the Standing Orders Committee was 
considered by the Senate in June of 1970. The report recommended 
the establishment of six Legislative and General Purpose
Committees covering the activities of all Departments.
In anticipation of the report, the leaders of the major 
parties in the Senate, (Senators Anderson, Murphy and Gair) each 
gave notice of motions for the establishment of committee 
systems. Senator Anderson gave notice for the establishment of 
six Estimates Committees; Senator Murphy moved for the
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establishment of seven Legislative and General Purpose 
Committees; and Senator Gair, reflecting the concern of some 
Senators that a more gradual approach be adopted, moved that two 
Legislative and General Purpose committees be established 
immediately and that they report back to the Senate on their 
operations to determine the feasibility of establishing the 
other five committees. Much to everybody's surprise, all of 
these motions were agreed to.
In August 1970 a Standing Commitee on Health and 
Welfare and a Standing Committee on Primary and Secondary 
Industry and Trade were established along with the five 
Estimates Committees. On 6 October 1971 the remaining five 
Legislative and General Purpose Committees were established. 
These were: Education Science and the Arts; Social Environment; 
Foreign Affairs and Defence; Constitutional and Legal Affairs; 
and Finance and Government Operations. (For detailed discussion 
of the early development of the Committee system, see Odgers 
1976:479-484; Solomon 1982: Hutchison 1976.)
The current committee system has had its supporters and 
its opponents and the voices on both sides are as loud as when 
the committees were first introduced. Indyk for example, is 
unambiguous when he examines the course for committees. He sees 
Senators 'using the committees to revitalise their institution 
and thereby challenge the dominance of the Executive . . . they 
are trying to put the word "responsible" back into Australian 
government’ (Indyk 1980: 93). He might also have used the word 
accountable. The central tenet of the argument seems to revolve 
around the effectiveness of committees or, as Indyk saw it: 
influence.
Yet; while Senators may try to revitalize the Senate, 
Indyk nonetheless argues that committees are a waste of time if 
committees cannot make the Executive listen to their reports 
which he concludes, they cannot. 'While the Executive dominates
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Parliament, the Parliament cannot through its committee system 
hope to control the Executive' (Indyk 1980:108 See also Uhr 
1980; Weller 1979, 1982 and Indyk 1979).
While Indyk is sometimes highly critical of committees 
(because, in the end, their reports are 'shelved') at other 
times he can be overly optimistic? such as his vision of 
committees putting meaning back into the word responsible. That 
implies a greater control over the Executive. While some public 
servants may appear before committees with trepidation - and 
from observation that seems to occur infrequently - committees 
provide little threat to Ministers; firstly because the subject 
matter of committees is rarely threatening for a Minister, 
secondly, if a committee did threaten a Minister, sufficient 
pressure could normally be bought to bear on backbenchers to 
‘back-off; and thirdly, because the Executive takes little 
notice of committees. Mr Sinclair certainly did not seem 
perturbed that he had incurred the wrath of the Finance and 
Government Operations Committee and a previous Minister for 
Defence, Sir James Killen refused for seven years to co-operate 
with the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. This 
latter action did not result in one censure motion from either 
House and it did not appear to harm his standing in the 
electorate.
Thus Indyk is correct when, elsewhere in the same 
article he lamments that 'Committee members have learnt from 
their experience that they cannot control the Executive - they 
cannot make policy, they can only attempt to influence it' 
(Indyk 1980:106). One must never lose sight of the fact that it 
is up to the Executive to govern, for it is they who will be 
held to account for any action which a government undertakes. 
Even members of the governing parties realise that while they 
may belong to the ruling group, they do not constitute part of 
the government. As Crick says, parliamentary 'control means
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influence, not direct power; advice, not command, criticism not 
obstruction, scrutiny, not initiation; and publicity, not 
secrecy* (Crick 1970:80).
(' A
While authors have focused on the effectiveness of the 
committee report and the government's response, there has also 
been discussion on other aspects of the workings of committees. 
Other limitations and problems of committees that have been 
noted include:
. the unnecessary restriction (for some) on public 
servants in being unable to comment on government 
policy ?
. the apparent lack of administrative review;
. frequent staff shortages;
. Ministers being reluctant to provide evidence;
. fragmentation of committee activity;
. overwork of Senators;
. the fact that Senators serving on committees are first 
and foremost members of a political party;
. reports being couched in general 'soft* terms so as to 
not offend members of the committee nor Senators 
generally (Evans 1982, Hawker 1979, Indyk 1980, Skene 
1982, Solomon 1979, Weller 1979, 1982).
These criticisms relate both to the subject matter of 
reports, the procedures by which they are written and the 
problems that committees face.
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However it is noticeable that these are outsiders* 
criticisms. There have also been a number of Senators who have 
commented on the workings of committees.
Senators Discussing Committees
During discussion on the establishment of the committee 
system in 1970 (4 June, 11 June and 18 June 1970) , a number of 
Senators were fulsome in their praise of the committee system 
that they were ushering in. The committees would provide the 
Senate with an avenue to undertake short, sharp inquiries into 
matters that would be of concern to Senators and ipso facto, to 
the electorate; to examine Bills in far greater detail as we 11 
as providing an avenue for citizens to voice disapproval of 
aspects of such Bills; and to enable Senators to more 
effectively scrutinize the Executive and its administration. It 
was universally agreed that the Senate Chamber could be made 
more effective in operating as a House of Review with an 
extensive committee system that could concentrate more 
thoroughly on investigating the important issues that they 
believed faced the nation.
A number of Senators did express reservations. These 
focused on the added workload that would be placed on Senators 
and the need for staff who would be up to the task of assisting 
the committee; the danger of taking Senators away from the 
Chamber; and concern that references should not 'cover a wide 
field and involve a tremendous amount of research and study* 
(Anderson 1970:1974). Senators Anderson and Devitt also 
suggested that a particular time during the week be set aside 
for committee meetings. Only Senator Greenwood warned, that the 
committees would come up against 'the rigours of the party 
system* (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1970:2349).
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Having agreed to immediately introduce two standing 
committees, the President of the Senate was requested to present 
a report to the Senate on the operations of these committees. 
The President cited the very favourable press coverage of the 
new committee system as proof of its success. Public interest 
and participation was high. The President also reported that:
With the specialised knowledge acquired by 
Senators at committee hearings, debate is 
noticeably more penetrating. There is a new 
and valuable rapport with officers of the 
Public Service. And, with all-party goodwill, 
there is a recognition of the role of 
committees in the strengthening of the 
Parliamentary system (President of the Senate 
1971:15) .
The President's report did, however, note several 
problems that arose from the new committee system. In 
particular, the staffing of committees was seen to be a problem 
as w as the need to establish guidelines for the rights of 
witnesses appearing before committees.
In the debate in the Chamber after the tabling of the 
President's report, a number of Senators also expressed concern 
over the staffing arrangements and the increased workload for 
Senators. It was agreed that in the resolution establishing the 
committees there should be included a paragraph providing for 
committees to be 'adequately staffed'. They argued that staff 
were 'grossly overworked' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1971:525). Sir Magnus Cormack warned that without proper support 
facilities there would be too great a burden placed on Senators 
(526).
To ease the workload of Senators it was agreed that the 
number of Senators on standing committees would be reduced from 
Ö (as existed for the 2 standing committees introduced in 1970) 
to 6, though this did not stem the fears by some that the 
workload would still be excessive (500, 524, 529). To help ease
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this workload, it was suggested that perhaps one afternoon a 
fortnight should be set aside, for committee work while the 
Senate was meeting (529) .
(' A
However, few Senators took up this suggestion with any 
enthusiasm. Similarly, there was no support for committees 
meeting while the Chamber was in progress. As Senator Young 
said, ‘it is physically and politically impossible for
committees to sit continuously' (529) .
Senators said that staff1 should be of high caliber and 
that consultants should be used regularly. Cormack said that by 
using academics as consultants, committees could provide a link 
between the academic world and the active world of politics„
Senator Poyser warned in these debates that if 
governments continued to ignore committee reports as they had 
the select committee reports, then the system of committees 
'will break down' (410). He cited the committee on the 
Australian Constitution (1958) and the Select Committee on 
Australian Television (1962-3). What was needed, said Senator^ 
Keeffe, was a system with teeth and he argued that committees 
should have Ministers appearing before them (522).
Some Senators v/ere critical of the two standing 
committees already in operation. Senator Davidson said that ' the 
references put to them are too wide and too complex and require 
too long a period to be dealt, with adequately and effectively1 
(500) . He did not exclude some of the references that went to 
select committees from his remarks. Others made the point that 
standing committees were for quick references only and should be 
of immediate concern. A matter that required longer
consideration should be referred to a select committee. Interim 
reports v/ere also suggested to help maintain the interests of 
witnesses, the public and Parliament.
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Despite these reservations, Senators generally
expressed optimistic sentiments, believing that they would 
enable the Senate to retain control of business of government 
and provide the Senate with enormous prestige* The high 
objective in establishing committees was * to make the parliament 
as effective as possible and to expand and develop its functions 
to meet the demands of the times' (411). As well, because of the 
intensity of the work, Senators quickly became specialists in 
their fields of interest.
In 1974, there was another lengthy debate on the 
committee system after the government moved to establish a 
series of joint committees as well as the standing committees. 
The Opposition, with the assistance of Senator Hall, defeated 
this proposal. Comments similar to those in 1970 and 1971 were 
made by Senators, referring to the enhanced reputation of the
Senate, committees being indispensable in the proper functioning 
of Parliament and allowing Senators to gain knowledge in new
areas. Senator Simm saw committees as providing an opportunity 
for Parliament to put forward a view point that ’might, well
differ from our Executive view* (Parliamentary Debates 
1974:1154) .
Senator Withers also pointed out that committee work 
could lead to a better understanding of those Senators on the 
opposite side of the Chamber. As a result of being on committees 
’I made a number of friends, I hope, on the other side of the
Chamber. Without having been engaged in committee work and the 
occasional interstate travelling which is involved, that would 
never have come about and I would never have understood 
honourable Senators opposite as people or understood why they 
hold certain views which I have learned to respect although I 
disagree with them* (Parliamentary Debates 1974:1133-4).
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There was a further reassessment of the standing 
committees in 1976, This debate arose out of the resolution for 
the re-appointment of the committees after the 1975 
Double-Dissolution. During the debate a number of observations 
were made.
1. There are a higher percentage of Senators on their 
Senate party ticket at No 1 or 2 position than Members 
of the House of Representatives in safe seats. Thus 
more Senators than Members can significantly contribute 
to the workings of committees (Senators Withers and 
Cormack).
2. Senators have a ‘greater capacity* to exert independent 
action than Members in the House of Representatives 
(Senators Withers and Missen).
3. There have been occasions when Ministers have withheld 
submissions to Cabinet pending the completion of a 
committee inquiry (McClelland).
4. Inquiries undertaken by standing committees are more 
expeditious and less costly than Royal Commissions 
(Cormack).
5. Senators, because they serve six year terms, can take a 
tougher line if a difficult situation arises, 'without 
being responsive to pressure of one sort or another 
from the electors' (Parliamentary Debates 1976:313); 
although Senator Keefe noted that 2 Liberal Tasmanian 
Senators did not regain endorsement because of their 
opposition to the blocking of the supply Bills and 
Senator Missen was dropped to the bottom of the party 
ticket in Victoria because of his comments.
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S e na to r  Hamer made h i s  maiden spe ech  i n  t h e  Chamber on 
13 Sept ember  1978«. The sp e e c h  was d e v o t e d  e n t i r e l y  t o  r e f o r m  of  
t h e  Senate«. Hamer saw t h a t  comm i t t e e s  would be an i n t e r g r a l  p a r t  
of  t h e  r e v i s e d  Chamber t h a t  he o u t l i n e d .  A f t e r  s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  
t h e  S e n a t e ' s  p r o p e r  r o l e  s h o u l d  be t o  a c t  a s  a House of  Review,  
he u r ged  t h a t  more B i l l s  be r e f e r r e d  t o  s t a n d i n g  c o m m i t t e e s .  He 
a l s o  a rg ue d  t h a t  f o r  t h e  Se na t e  t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  f u n c t i o n  a s  a 
House o f  Review and so p r o v i d e  a b a l a n c e  t o  t h e  d o m i n a t i n g  
E x e c u t i v e ,  M i n i s t e r s  s h o u l d  be e x c l u d e d  from t h e  Chamber.  ‘The 
f i v e  M i n i s t e r s  a r e ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  f i v e  T r o j a n  h o r s e s  h e r e  on b e h a l f  
of  t h e  E x e c u t i v e 1 . To s t r e n g t h e n  - t he  c o m m i t t e e s ,  Cha i rmen would 
be g i v e n  t h e  pay ,  p r i v i l e g e s  and s t a f f  t h a t  would o t h e r w i s e  be 
p r o v i d e d  f o r  M i n i s t e r s  ( P a r l i a m e n t a r y  Deba t e s  -  Se n a t e  
1 9 7 8 : 5 4 5 - 5 4 9 ) .
S e na to r  Hamer c o n t i n u e d  t h i s  theme when, i n  F e b r u a r y  
1979,  he moved t h a t  M i n i s t e r s  s h o u l d  no l o n g e r  be i n  t h e  S e n a t e  
and t h a t  cha i rmen  of  t h e  s t a n d i n g  c om m i t t e e s  ' s h o u l d  be g r a n t e d  
a l l o w a n c e s ,  s t a f f  and o t h e r  e n t i t l e m e n t s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  
c u r r e n t l y  g r a n t e d  t o  M i n i s t e r s  . . . *  ( P a r l i a m e n t a r y  D eb a t e s  -  
S e n a t e  19 7 9 : 2 2 9 ) .  The mo t ion  was s u p p o r t e d  by S e n a t o r s  Thomasv 
( L i b e r a l  P a r t y  -  Wes t e rn  A u s t r a l i a )  and  Mason ( A u s t r a l i a n  
Democrat s  -  New Sou th  W a l e s ) . S e n a t o r  Ta t e  o f f e r e d  q u a l i f i e d  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  co n ce p t  bu t  s a i d  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  c o n s i t u t e  p a r t  
of  an o v e r a l l  package  of  changes  t h a t  s h o u l d  be i n t r o u d c e d .  A l l  
S e n a t o r s  spoke of  t h e  need t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  S e n a t e ' s  r o l e  a s  a 
House of  Review.
As w e l l  as t h e  above major  d e b a t e s  on v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  
of  t he  commi t t ee  sy s t em ,  t h e r e  have  f r e q u e n t l y  been  r e f e r e n c e s  
made t o  t h e  commi t t ee  sys tem by S e n a t o r s  d u r i n g  p r o c e e d i n g s  of  
t h e  S e n a t e .  The most  f r e q u e n t l y  d i s c u s s e d  t o p i c  ha s  been  t h e  
Gove rn men t ' s  r e s p o n s e  t o  commi t t ee  r e p o r t s .  When t h e  gove rnmen t  
i n f o r med  t he  Se n a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  would be a r e s p o n s e  t o  commi t t e e  
r e p o r t s  w i t h i n  s i x  months ,  on ly  Se n a to r  B u t t o n  spoke  t o  t h e  
s t a t e m e n t .  In  welcoming t h e  d e c i s i o n  he s a i d  t h a t  i t  would  g i v e
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Senators a 'slightly stronger feeling' of participation in an 
area that had relevance to .the proceedings of Parliament 
(Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1978:1933).
Since this statement was made, Senators on a number of 
occasions have pointed out that governments have frequently not 
responded to reports within the six months. Senator Tate, for 
example used the adjournment debate on 8 March 1979 to criticise 
the Attorney-General for failing to provide a response to the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee's report on 'Priority 
of Crown Debts' , nine months after it was tabled. In 19 80 the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee tabled an Assessment 
of the Government's Responses to Reports. During the debate that 
followed, a number of Senators warned of the effect of the 
increasing disillusionment that was developing among Senators as 
a result of governments ignoring committee reports.
Following concern by Senators that governments were 
taking too long to respond to committee reports, the President 
of the Senate now annually tables a list of outstanding 
government responses to parliamentary committees reports. The 
debate that follows the tabling of these reports warns that 
committees will become meaningless if governments continue to 
ignore the reports. As Senator Gietzelt said, 'the Government 
has to accept the responsibility for failing to carry out the 
work of the Parliament as distinct from the work of the 
Executive' (Parliamentary Debates 1982:1947).
Senators have also raised the question of whether
committees should meet while the Senate is sitting. In 1980, 
this was referred to the Standing Orders Committee. Those who
were for committees meeting while the Senate was sitting
(Senators Sibraa and Davidson) argued that committees were just 
as much part of a Senators work as any other facet. Those 
against the motion (Senators Cavanagh and Colston) argued that 
it would detract from the workings of the Chamber:
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’Parliamentarians are elected for the purpose of performing 
functions in the Senate . ..' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
198013:460). The Senate came down against committees meeting 
while the Senate was sitting arguing that there was already 
provision in the standing orders for committees to meet during 
sitting hours with the permission of the Chamber.
The matter was again raised when in September and 
October 1983 the Joint Committee of Public Accounts sought leave 
to enable Senators who were members of the committee to attend a 
series of meetings during the sitting of the Senate. During the 
debates that followed this motion, Senator Chaney said that ’ the 
Opposition ... is opposed in general to the proposition that 
Senate committees should meet during Senate sitting hours 
(they) will take from Senators the ability to participate in 
what happens in this place’ (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1983:357). This view was also supported by the Australian 
Democrats (see also Parliamentary Debates - Senate
1983:1306-1311).
Senators have been less willing to write about their 
perceptions of the committee system outside the Senate Chamber. 
In 1972, Sir Magnus Cormack wrote that committees had allowed 
Senators to specialise and gain expertise in particular areas. 
They were bringing Parliament closer to the elector. He also 
suggested that committee hearings could be televised (Cormack 
1972) .
Parliament and Bureaucracy (Nethercote 1982) represents 
the most significant single contribution to the writings on 
committees with Senators Evans, Martin, Missen and Rae all 
writing about various aspects of committee work. Senators Missen 
and Martin in separate articles expressed disappointment that 
more legislation was not referred to committees. Before 
legislation can be referred to these committees there needs to 
be an increase in the number of Senators and more staff. Senator
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Missen also argued that the low stature of parliamentarians in 
the community had discouraged the type of people with the 
ability and the background that the Senate needed. Senator Rae 
said that the role of comittees should be to scrutinize 
government activity and make it accountable to Parliament. The 
difficulty arises however,- when one tries to measure the 
effectiveness of this scrutiny. As Senator Evans asks 'what is 
success in the context of Executive monitoring and scrutineering 
committee activities' (Evans 1982:83).
Information
Among the general discussion of what role committees 
serve, there is also another underlying theme: the use of
information.
Access to the proper understanding of and the best use 
of knowledge is essential for Parliament in its effort to make 
government more accountable and so allow the Senate to undertake 
its responsibility to act as a true House of Review. As McMillan 
says ’Knowledge will forever govcern ignorance; and a people who 
mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the 
power that knowledge gives' (McMillan 1981:4) . Without 
information, the effectiveness of all backbenchers is
drastically reduced. In the immediacy that dominates the world 
of parliamentary politics, information plays a prime role ’in 
determining the balance of power’ (McMillan 1981:4).
The sources of information for Senators can be vast and 
cover institutions, background briefings, general reading,
discussions with coilegues, official statistics, academic 
articles, the media and other 'reliable sources'.
But this debate on information has often been lacking 
in focus. There is a danger in attempting to stereo-type 
politicians in assuming that there is a consistency in their
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rationale in their endeavour to obtain this information. 
Senators can be seen to be filling different roles at different 
times.
Parliament has been described as being composed of such 
a wide variety of political elements that it hardly amounts to a 
single political institution at all. It is rather a cluster of 
political institutions all of which relate to each other, but 
most of which are seen to be quite different' (Ovenden 
1977:173). When we talk about the power of Parliament, for 
example, the power of the President or the power of the media, 
we are talking about distinctly different things.
Similarly, when we talk about the backbencher and his 
information, information provided to him to participate in a 
censure motion will be fulfilling a different purpose to 
information given to him in order to ask a question on a 
parliamentary committee, which will be different again to the 
information he may be seeking from a question on notice.
In the Chamber, information is used primarily to attack 
the opposing parties to gain political advantage. Whilst there 
may be a technical aspect to information, this is not always the 
reason for acquiring it. Barker and Rush argue that 'he needs
information only partly for his own intrinsic sake ... beyond 
that he judges it in the practical political terms of what good
it does him and his position to take the trouble to absorb it
...' (Barker and Rush 1979:20). Senators will use information 
differently when representing a political party, to that when
acting out the role of a Senator assisting constituents, and 
differently again as a Senator scrutinising Qangos.
Question time in particular has always been seen as the 
classical means for Senators to elicit information. Yet because 
of the environment in which question time is held, a highly
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electric partisan atmosphere, it has all too often failed in 
this task. As Chalmers and Hutchison point out, 'question time 
provides the great blood sport of Parliament ... Ministers 
flagrantly use question time for the purposes of political 
propaganda, and particulary the leader of the Opposition, is 
supposed to embarrass the government . . . ' (Chalmers and 
Hutchison 1983 : 186) . For many commentators, this was one of the 
most important 'reasons for establishing parliamentary 
committees . .., to overcome the shortcomings inherent in the 
functioning of debates and question time' (Indyk, 1980:33).
In contrast, Crossman saw the reason for obtaining 
information on committees as 'enabling ... members to formulate 
pertinent questions about policy before decisions had actually 
been made, and also in the building up within the House of a 
body of members with greater knowledge and experience of 
particular fields of government activity' (Morton 1981:130).
When a study of a matter is required in greater detail 
than Parliament as a whole is capable of or willing to 
undertake, referral of that matter to a parliamentary committee 
for examination is by no means automatic. A Minister, with the 
considerable backing of his department, may ensure that all 
relevant backbenchers receive the adequate briefing that fulfils 
such a need, a judicial inquiry may be initiated, or a royal 
commission may be established.
That the matter is referred to a parliamentary 
committee indicates that it will be a different inquiry to any 
of the alternative methods of examining the reference if for no 
other reason than the people conducting that inquiry are 
politicians. But what else do we know about parliamentary 
committees?
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The circumstances surrounding Senators acquiring and 
processing information in committees are in many cases different 
enough to provide a unique forum for information to be digested» 
The fact that there are only six Senators, little public 
interest in their deliberations and that the process involves 
the writing of a report produces an environment, some would 
suggest (Indyk, Yeend, Weller) where partisanship is normally at 
a lower level. Should we automatically assume that Senators 
behave in the same manner on committees as they do in the 
Chamber? Should we assume information is persued for the same 
purposes?
The contrast between committee work and Chamber work 
has been appreciated for many years. In 1930, the Senate Select 
Committee on the advisability of establishing standing 
committees heard evidence from the then President of the Seriate, 
Senator W. Kingsmill. He was asked (Senator R.D. Elliott): 1 Is
not the individual ability of members availed of to a greater 
extent when discussing matters round a table than when they are- 
debated in the Parliament?1 Answer: ‘There is no doubt about
that. In a committee, knowledge is gained which would not be 
gained on the floor of the House* (Standing Committee System 
1930:3).
This is not to deny that committees still operate 
within a political environment. As Senators themselves noted 
during the course of the interviews, because they, and not 
judges, academics, or other such learned people are 
investigating a matter, their report will contain that taint 
created by its authors; it is a political document being 
conceived in the womb of Parliament, born in Parliament, and 
some would suggest, destined to die in Parliament. That the 
report has emerged from such a political environment and yet 
appears to be bipartisan is a surprise to many. Yet should we be 
so surprised?
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We know what  o u t s i d e r s  t h i n k  co m m i t t e e s  ou gh t  t o  do -  
and what  p rob l ems  t h ey  have  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n .  But we know much 
l e s s  a b o u t  S e n a t o r s ’ a t t i t u d e s .  As 1 o b s e r v e d  e a r l i e r ,  m e  
dange r  f o r  o b s e r v e r s  i s  i n  a s suming  t h a t  S e n a t o r s  w i l l  a lways  
have  on l y  one m o t i v e ,  and n o m i n a t i n g  t h a t  m o t iv e  w i l l  be 
c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t h e  a u t h o r s '  p e r c e p t i o n  of  how S e n a t o r s  a c t  or  
ough t  t o  a c t .  The f o c u s  o f  t h i s  T h e s i s  i s  on t h e  S e n a t o r s ?  t h e i r  
a p p r oa ch  t o  Commit tees  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e i r  own 
p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e m s e lv e s  a s  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s .
T h i s  T h e s i s  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  two t h em es .  F i r s t ,  
g e n e r a l l y ,  what  do t h ey  e x p e c t  of  co m m i t t e e s  and why do t h e y  
s e r v e  on them? how do t h e y  r a t e  t h e i r  s u c c e s s ;  what  do t h e y  s ee  
a s  t h e  commi t t ee  o b j e c t i v e s  and hew do t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  
c o - i n c i d e  w i t h  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  co mmi t t e e  
sys tem?
S e c o n d l y ,  why and how do t h e y  want  t o  use i n f o r m a t i o n .  
For example  do t hey  use  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  a s s i s t  i n  t h e i r  p a r t y  
work on p a r t y  commi t t e e s  or  even i n  t h e i r  a m b i t i o n s  t o  be 
M i n i s t e r s ?
Whi l e  commi t t e e s  c o u l d ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t ,  r e p l a c e  
d e b a t e s  and q u e s t i o n  t ime  i n  t h e  Chamber,  I would s u g g e s t  t h a t  
t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  co mmi t t e e s  a r e  f a r  b r o a d e r  t h a n  t h i s .  I t  may 
be t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  of  o b t a i n i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a r e  an end i n  
t h e m s e l v e s .
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CHAPTER 2
WHY CHOOSE THE SENATE
The public perception of Parliament is that this is 
where the government hides for most of the year, Indeedf 
Parliament and government are synonymous. That the institution 
of Parliament may perform other equally important functions 
appears to be lost on most of the electorate. To them it is 
simply a monolithic institution in which, while there seems to 
be lots of action little is actually happening.
This perception is continually reinforced by the image 
that is portrayed through the media. It is the government which 
outlines how it will allocate its finances via its budget each 
year and it is nearly always the government which initiates 
legislation that appears to assist in the management of the 
country. Of course, one occasionally hears of other members of 
Parliament but this is mainly through the shadow ministry which 
may, one day, be the government. Certainly, when one hears from 
the shadow ministry, it is in terms of 'when we start governing 
the country ...'
Parliament is also seen by most as a training ground 
for our future governments. Somehow, Members and Senators while 
away their time learning how to become good Ministers or Prime 
Ministers.
Of course, this impression of Parliament as consisting 
solely of the government is far from accurate. Parliament is 
made up of 184 Members and Senators, of which on]y 27 
representatives from the government side have come together to
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form an E x e c u t i v e  commi t t ee  t o  g o v e rn ,  and a s i m i l a r  number f rom 
th e  O p p o s i t i o n  o f f e r  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  E x e c u t i v e  
c o m m i t t e e s
( ,  -v
What t h e n  of  t h e  S e n a t o r s  and Members who a r e  n o t  i n  
t h i s  m i n o r i t y ?  While  some may i n  f a c t  d i r e c t  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  
of  t h e i r  e n e r g i e s  t o  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  a m b i t i o n  of  j o i n i n g  t h e i r  
c o l l e a g u e s  on t h e  f r o n t b e n c h ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  of  b a c k b e n c h e r s  
d i r e c t  t h e i r  e n e r g i e s  a t  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  normal  d u t i e s  t h a t  a r e  
r e q u i r e d  of  a l l  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  -  what  i s  i t  
t h a t  t h e y  do?
To p r o v i d e  a comp le t e  p i c t u r e  of  S e n a t o r s  we need  t o  
know how th ey  p e r c e i v e  t h e i r  j o b s ,  wh ich  t h ey  c o n s i d e r  t o  be 
i m p o r t a n t  and why t h ey  a r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  spend  v a l u a b l e  t ime  b e i n g  
a b a c k b e n c h e r .  I f  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  becoming a f r o n t b e n c h e r  i s  
s t i l l  i n  t h e  f a r  d i s t a n t  f u t u r e ,  or  t h e y  have been p a s s e d  ov e r  
a l r e a d y ,  why have t h ey  d e c i d e d  t o  s t a y  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  d e v o t i n g  
t h e i r  e n e r g i e s  t o  b e i n g  a S e n a t o r .
The Role  o f Se n a t o r s
What t h en  i s  t h e  r o l e  of  a S e n a t o r ?  I t  i s  r a r e  f o r  
S e n a t o r s  t o  d e v o t e  a l l  of  t h e i r  t ime  a c t i n g  o u t  one r o l e .  There  
can be i d e n t i f i e d  3 normal  r o l e s .  F i r s t l y ,  S e n a t o r s  may spend 
p a r t  of  t h e i r  t ime  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  be p o l i c y  makers  by a c t i n g  a s  a 
watchdog o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  or t r y i n g  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e i r  
d e c i s i o n s .
S e co nd l y ,  w h i l e  a S e n a t o r ' s  e l e c t o r a t e  i s  t h e  S t a t e  as  
a who le ,  t h i s  does  n o t  mean t h a t  he i s  n o t  i n v o l v e d  i n  
e l e c t o r a t e  d u t i e s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  e l e c t o r a t e  a c t i v i t y  be tween  
h i s  c o l l e a g u e  i n  t h e  l ower  House and h i m s e l f  i s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  of  
work.  T h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  i s  a l s o  a f f e c t e d  by 
t he  s i x  y e a r  t e rm t h a t  t hey  e n jo y  compared t o  t h e  t h r e e  y e a r ,  or
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l e s s ,  t e rm f o r  Members i n  t h e  Lower House.  A l l  S e n a t o r s  a r e  
a l l o c a t e d  an a r e a  i n  t h e i r  s t a t e  t o  p a t r o l ;  e s p e c i a l l y  where  t h e  
l o c a l  Member i s  from t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y .  Se n a to r  S i b r a a ,  f o r  
example ,  i s  t h e  du ty  o f f i c e r  f o r  t h e  N or th  C o a s t .
T h i r d l y ,  w h i l e  S e n a t o r s  a r e  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  b e ca u se  t h e y  
were e l e c t e d ,  a l l  ( e x c e p t  S e n a t o r  H a r r a d i n e ,  an i n d e p e n d a n t  f rom 
Tasmania)  a r e  a l s o  i n  t h e  S e n a t e  be ca u se  t h ey  g a i n e d  
p r e - s e l e c t i o n  by a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y .  As a p a r t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  
t hey  a r e  t h e r e  t o  advance  t h e  cause  of  t h e  p a r t y .
Emy a rg ue s  t h a t  a p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n ' s  t o t a l  wo rk lo ad  
n o r m a l ly  w i l l  i n v o l v e  a mix o f  a t  l e a s t  two of  t h e  t h r e e  ma jo r  
a r e a s  o f  work ( P a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  p a r t y  and t h e  e l e c t o r a t e )  t h a t  
occupy t h e i r  t ime (Emy 1 9 7 4 : 4 7 4 ) .  T h i s  b a l a n c e ,  however ,  i s  
l i k e l y  t o  be a f f e c t e d  by t h e  House i n  which  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n  
s e r v e s ;  f o r  t h e  r o l e  p e r c e p t i o n  i n  t u r n  may be i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  
Chamber f o r  which t hey  g a i n e d  s e l e c t i o n .
What i s  t h e d i f f e r e n c e  be tween a S e n a t o r  and a MHR?
A c a n d i d a t e  who want s  t o  e n t e r  P a r l i a m e n t  ha s  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  n o m in a t i n g  f o r  e i t h e r  t h e  S e n a t e  or  t h e  House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and wo r k i n g s  o f  
t he  two Chambers s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  w i t h  a c l e a r  
c h o i c e ,  w i t h  d i s t i n c t  r e a s o n s  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e i r  c h o i c e  o f  t h e  
Sena te  over  t h e  House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  What i s  r e q u i r e d  of  
S e n a t o r s  i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  MHR* s ,  so i t  m igh t  be r e a s o n a b l e  t o  
e x p e c t  t he  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r o l e s  t o  have  been c o n s i d e r e d .
Yet among S e n a t o r s  t h a t  I  i n t e r v i e w e d ,  t h e r e  d i d  n o t  
appea r  t o  be a common r e a s o n  m o t i v a t i n g  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  choose  t h e  
S e n a t e .  Only a sma l l  number saw t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  two 
Houses a s  t h e  f a c t o r  which f i n a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e i r  c h o i c e  o f  
becoming a S e n a t o r .  In  such c a s e s ,  S e n a t o r s  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e y  
would en jo y  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  more i n  t h e  S e n a t e  ( see  pages  36,  
40) .
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Only two S e n a t o r s  ( J , N , )  s p e c i f i c a l l y  m en t i oned  t h e  
commi t t ee  sy s t em a s  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  e n t e r i n g  t h e  S e n a t e :  i t  
i s  t h e  most  c o n s t r u c t i v e , ,  c r e a t i v e  and i n t e r e s t i n g  f a c e t  of  a 
b a c k b e n c h e r ’ s work '  (J)  . Th i s  S e n a t o r  q u a l i f i e d  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  
t ho ug h ,  by s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h i s  was t h e  o n l y  c o n s t r u c t i v e  t h i n g  
t h a t  t h e  Sen a t e  d i d .  Most d i d  n o t  m en t i on  any s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  
of  t h e  S e n a t e  which p e r s u a d e d  them t o  s eek  p r e s e l e c t i o n .
Emy, i n  h i s  s t u d y  of  75 MKRs d i d  n o t  f i n d  any s p e c i f i c  
des j  r e  ( i n  t e rm s  of  r o l e  p e r c e p t i o n )  t o  e n t e r  one Chamber ove r  
t h e  o t h e r .  The r e a s o n s  t h a t  Members gave f o r  e n t e r i n g  t h e  House 
of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  co u ld  e q u a l l y  be used  a s  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
j o i n i n g  t h e  S e n a t e .
Yet  a major  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween t h e  two Houses can be 
seen  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  Members a r e  
more bu r den ed  by a s t y l e  of  work t h a t  ha s  been d e s c r i b e d  a s  
be in g  a k i n  t o  an ombudsman; l o o k i n g  a f t e r  t h e ' immedia te  c o n c e r n s  
of  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  Most a c t i o n s  and d e c i s i o n s  a r e  t a k e n  i n  t h e  
l i g h t  of  p o s s i b l e  e l e c t o r a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s .
R a r e l y  do S e n a t o r s  s ee  t h i s  as  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  
a s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r ,  nor  do t hey  f i n d  i t  s t i m u l a t i n g .  
H u t c h i s on  a l s o  found  t h a t  most  would have  p r e f e r r e d  t o  a v o i d  
such d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  c o n s t i t u e n t s  (Hu t ch i so n  
1976:  1 9 6 ) .  When t h i s  c o n t a c t  d i d  occu r  i t  was b e ca u se  t h e  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  demanded and e x p e c t e d  i t .  I n  t h e  eyes  o f  t h e  
e l e c t o r a t e  t h e r e  was no d i f f e r e n c e  be tween a S e n a t o r  and an MHR. 
As a r e s u l t ,  S e n a t o r s  e x p r e s s e d  a d e s i r e  t o  H u t c h i s o n  t o  e d u c a t e  
t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  abou t  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  S e n a t e  which t h e y  f e l t  
t h e  p u b l i c  was i g n o r a n t  o f .  As i t  was,  H u tc h i s o n  d e s c r i b e d  
S e n a t o r s  a s  ’ r e l u c t a n t  ombudsmen* (H u tch i s o n  1 9 7 6 ) .
35
T h i r t e e n  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  ha s  n o t  ch anged ,
w i t h  some S e n a t o r s  s e em in g ly  im p l y i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  was so m e th i n g  
unsavou ry  abou t  work ing  an e l e c t o r a t e :  ' I n  t h e  S e n a t e  you a r e  
l e s s  p r one  t o  t h e  51% i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c u l t i v a t e 1 (K) .
In c o n t r a s t ,  Emy found t h a t  40% o f  Members o f  t h e  House
o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  ' d i s p l a y e d  t h e  p r i m a r y  r o l e s  of  e i t h e r
ombudsman or  p a r o c h i a l s  and more t h a n  one h a l f  of  t h e  sample  
r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  t h ey  must  m a i n t a i n  a c l o s e ,  c o n t i n u o u s  c o n t a c t  
w i t h  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  . . .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a
d i chotomy be tween  n a t i o n a l  and l o c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n s ,  . . .  Members 
s e e  p o l i t i c s  f rom ma in ly  a l o c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e *  (Emy 1 9 7 4 : 4 7 5 ) .  
Some Members d i d  compla in  of  t h e  b u r d en  t h a t  c o n s t i t u e n c y  work 
i n v o l v e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o n t i n u a l  need  f o r  e x c e s s i v e  t r a v e l ;  
even d u r i n g  s i t t i n g  weeks .  T h i s  was e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  f o r  Members 
i n  m a r g i n a l  s e a t s .
The di lemma f o r  many Members i s  i n  t h e  r e c o n c i l i n g  of  
n a t i o n a l  and l o c a l  i n t e r e s t s .  A t y p i c a l  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  
c l a s h  of  i n t e r e s t s  i s  by t h e  use  of  such  a rgum en t s  as  ‘ n a t i o n a l  
a f f a i r s  and l o c a l  a f f a i r s  a r e  t h e  same.  They a r e  m i r r o r  images  
of  one a n o t h e r  . . .  l o c a l  p rob l ems  a r e  i n d i c a t i v e  of  n a t i o n a l
n e e d s ,  and i f  I speak  f o r  t h e  one I a l s o  speak  f o r  t he  o t he r *  
(Emy 1 9 7 4 : 4 7 5 ) .
S e n a t o r s  do n o t  s u f f e r  f rom t h i s  need  t o  r a t i o n a l i s e  
t h e i r  a r e a s  of  i n t e r e s t .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t hey  do d i s p l a y  a 
Se n a t e  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  i t  i s  one t h a t  h a s  b r o a d e r ,  more n a t i o n a l
i n t e r e s t s  t h a n  t he  ombudsman r o l e  t h a t  Members w i t h  s m a l l e r  
e l e c t o r a t e s  a p pe a r  t o  be f o r c e d  t o  a d o p t .  S e n a t o r s  a r e  a b l e  t o  
d i s p l a y  a g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  i n  b r o a d e r  p o l i t i c a l  d e b a t e s  t h a n  
t h e y  would be a b l e  t o  i f  t h e y  were  a Member of  t h e  House of
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  As one S e n a t o r  s a i d ,
I t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  e x t r a  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i n
b e i n g  a Member were  f a i r l y  e r r o n e o u s  and I am 
more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c e r t a i n  i d e a s  and p o l i c i e s  
t h an  day t o  day e l e c t o r a t e  work ( C) .
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Thus it is clear that Senators' interests are not so tightly 
localised as those of Members.
This difference especially emerges in their approach to 
parliamentary work with Senators spending more time in Canberra 
and devoting more time to committee matters. In contrast, their 
colleagues in the House are concerned that they should spend as 
much time as possible in their electoral offices and undertaking 
constituency duties.
As a result of this difference in emphasis, a Senator 
who previously was a Member in the House said that Senators were 
better informed. A Member tends to concentrate on areas of
interest that directly affects his electorate. This restricts
your approach to national concerns. Senators can look beyond 
such small regional interests’ (E).
Why do Senators enter the Senate?
The reasons for entering Parliament that Senators and 
Members gave to Emy, Hutchison and myself bear a marked
similarity. Those Senators that did see a difference between the 
two Chambers, saw it from the level of involvement with the
electorate that was required. For these Senators their desire to 
enter Parliament derived from a perspective of Australia which, 
they maintained, they would not be able to cultivate if they 
were to represent a smaller and more demanding electorate. The 
effect of not being as intimately involved in the electorate 
was, these Senators argued, that it produced a Senate
environment that was seen as somewhat more sedate or at least 
more subdued than in the House of Representatives. The Senate is 
seen as more leisurely. One Senator argued that it takes a 
certain type of personality to run for the House seat. ’My 
temperament was not, as I then thought, suited to hard
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campaigning and I thought my particular background and 
temperament was more suited to the reviewing functions of the 
Senate. My view now (after more than two years in the Senate) 
has changed somewhat' (N)«.
In contrast, a number of Senators made it clear that 
the difference between the two Chambers came down to obtaining 
pre-selection. It was simply seen as easier to win a seat in the 
Senate than in the House of Representatives. There are currently 
four Senators serving in the Senate who have also served in the 
House of Representatives, most making the transition after they 
lost their seats in the House, or because their seats became so 
unstable that a loss was inevitable (Senators Chipp, Jessop, 
Coates and Hamer) .
One Senator said openly that the only reason he was in 
the Senate was because he could not get a seat in the House of 
Representatives. If a seat did become available then he would 
certainly move to the Lower House (J) . Three Senators also 
volunteered the information that they first sought pre-selection 
for a House seat and it was only after having failed to secure 
pre-selection that they then sought pre-selection for the Senate 
(M.J.P.). Senators also said to Hutchison that it was easier to 
obtain nomination for the Senate, and once in the Senate, ' it 
was an easier place from which to make a reputation in the 
party* (Hutchison 1976:196).
Thus having decided to run for Parliament, it was a 
matter of which House offered the first vacancy for entry into 
political life. At that stage, Senators appeared to have little 
understanding of Senate roles and functions as enunciated by 
Odgers. Their perception has more an expectation of working as a 
politician rather than fulfilling a role that would be expected 
of them specifically as Senators (see also Hutchison 1976:192). 
As Senator Martin said, some members of Parliament 'do not want 
to be in Parliament for parliamentary reasons. They go there for
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p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s  (Mar t i n  1 9 8 2 : 2 2 7 ) .  They c o n t i n u a l l y  r e f e r r e d  
t o  t h e  p a r t i s a n  r o l e  t hey  e x p e c t e d  t o  f o l l o w  (or  were e x p e c t e d  
t o  f o l l o w )  w i t h  most  S e n a t o r s  e n t e r i n g  t h e  Se n a t e  by a c c i d e n t  
r a t h e r  t han  by i n t e n t .  T h e i r  g o a l  was s im p ly  t o  ‘ ga i n  a s e a t  i n  
P a r l i a m e n t  and so make a r e p u t a t i o n  i n  t h e  p a r t y  ( 0 ) . '  They saw 
i t  a s  a chance  t o  p romote  p a r t y  p h i l o s o p h y  -  ' t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
p a r t y  and t o  f o r m u l a t e  p o l i c y '  (M) ? t h e y  s im p ly  had ' l i b e r a l  
a m b i t i o n s  more t han  a n y t h i n g  e l s e '  ( F ) , a l t h o u g h  one S e n a t o r  saw 
i t  a l i t t l e  more p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ?  * . . .  from my u n i v e r s i t y  days  I 
have been  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  l i b e r a l i s m  so I saw go ing  i n t o  t h e  
S e n a t e  a s  a chance  t o  promote  i t  a t  a h i g h e r  l e v e l *  ( C ) .
Level  o f  P a r t i s a n s h i p  in. t h e  S e n a t e
These comments s h o u l d  n o t  come as  a s u r p r i s e .  As 
W.C. Wheare a r g u e s ,  any Upper House t h a t  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
p r o c e s s i n g  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r t a k i n g  a r ev i e w  of 
gove rnment  a c t i v i t y  c an n o t  b u t  h e l p  be an a r e n a  f o r  t h o s e  w i t h  
p a r t i s a n  a s p i r a t i o n s :
. . .  i f  s e cond  Chambers a r e  t o  be a n y t h i n g  
more t han  d e b a t i n g  s o c i e t i e s  or d i s c u s s i o n  
c i r c l e s  -  and,  i f  t h e y  a r e  t h i s ,  t h ey  w i l l  
c e r t a i n l y  n o t  be v a l u e l e s s  -  p a r t y  i s  bound 
t o  come i n  . . .  There  i s  n o t h i n g  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  
t h i s .  The second  Chamber i s  i n v i t e d  t o  g ive  
i t s  o p i n i o n  upon m ea su re s  and p o l i c i e s
i n i t i a t e d  and pushed  f o rw a rd  by a p a r t y  
government ,  s u p p o r t e d  by a m a j o r i t y  p a r t y  or 
a c o a l i t i o n  of  p a r t i e s  and c r i t i c i s e d  by a 
m i n o r i t y  p a r t y  or p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  Lower House.
How can i t  a v o id  p o l i t i c s  and p a r t y  p o l i t i c s  
a t  t h a t ?  And why s h o u l d  i t ?  A s econd  Chamber 
i s  p a r t  of  a p o l i t i c a l  sy s t em ;  i t s  b u s i n e s s  
i s  p o l i t i c s  ( q uo t ed  i n  H u t c h i s o n  1976:108)
!re t  i t  was on ly  i n  1977 t h a t  S e c t i o n  15 of  t h e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  was amended t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  words  * . . .  (where t h e  
no mina t ed  S e n a t o r )  was p u b l i c l y  r e c o g n i z e d  by a p a r t i c u l a r  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  a s  b e i n g  an e n d o r s e d  c a n d i d a t e  of  t h a t  p a r t y
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Until this section on casual vacancies was altered, 
political parties were not recognised in the Constitution; 
though they are an essential ingredient in any study of 
Australian politics. To win a seat in Parliament a candidate 
must gain pre-selection through the structure of a party 
organisation; and it is on this basis that he is elected to 
Parliament - as the Labor or Liberal Member of Parliament; as 
Fred Willy, in 'The Honourable Member* (Willy 1974) said, 'first 
and last, a Member of Parliament is a member of a political 
party.' This also relates to Senators.
Membership of a political party is a requirement for 
any Senator if he wants to win a place in Parliament. Upon 
election, he will become known as the 'Liberal Senator from . 
Inclusion on the party ticket is especially important, as the 
difficulty of campaigning throughout a State has precluded 
independents (except in Tasmania). This need for pre-selection 
by a party is a strong sobering influence on the behaviour of 
almost all Senators.
Notwithstanding that the authors of the Constitution 
failed to take account of political parties in its drafting, the 
emergence of parties has had a profound and permanent effect on 
parliamentary behaviour and procedures. In the House of
Representatives party composition determines which party, or 
coalition of parties, will form a government. Party organisation 
in Parliament competes with Parliament itself for the attention 
of the elected member. The member may be involved as the Party 
Whip, a member of one or more backbench party committees, 
perform specific roles in the Chamber on behalf of the party, to 
which he owes his pre-selection, and may even be elected as 
leader of the party; and so it is not hard to see why a member’s 
loyalty lies first with the party and, for some, the government.
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The influence of the party is not restricted to the
House of Representatives, Hutchison, for example, found that 
party politics affected the Senate* s ability to act as a House 
of Review. ‘Senators see themselves as pre-eminently party men; 
and their political allegiance has determined the manner in 
which legislative review and executive scrutiny has occurred* 
(Hutchison 1976:v). All Senators agreed that there was a need 
for some degree of party discipline.
Nor is the dominance of the party confined to the
Australian or British Parliament. Writing of the New Zealand 
Parliament, Jackson argues that the influence of caucus * is the 
most potent influence upon the day to day workings of the House* 
(Jackson 1978:75).
However, one must be careful in applying such a comment 
to the Australian Senate. While it is clear that Senators are
Party men the Executive fails to exert the all embracing 
influence that occurs in the Lower House, with crossing the
floor being one obvious feature of the Chamber that does not 
occur in the House of Representatives. Without the concern that 
the government will fall from such an action, Senators take the 
opportunity to express their feelings against their own party 
viewpoint, though this action would only be taken after a bitter 
struggle in the party committees and the party room.
Also, the fact that the Executive often does not have 
the 'numbers* in the Senate will create an environment that 
allows for a functioning of the Chamber that will be different 
to the lower house. Private Members* Bills are more likely to be 
introduced and passed by the Senate, question time will go 
longer, the Senate will sit for more days and select committees 
will be established more regularly.
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Perhaps more important is the provision in the 
Constitution that provides for Senators to be elected for six 
years compared with, at best, three years for his colleagues in 
the lower house. The MUR deals with a smaller, more homogeneous 
electorate, is more concerned with his image in the electorate 
and the occasional battle to ensure pre-selection. In contrast, 
the Senators' party concerns are more concentrated.
The Constitution (Sections 7 and 24) also encourages a 
different environment to be fostered between the two Chambers. 
With only 64 Senators in the Senate compared to 125 Members in 
the lower House, the pressure to be noticed is less competitive. 
There is twice the chance to get the call in question time, take 
part in an urgency debate or speak on a piece of legislation. 
The sheer weight of numbers in the House means that aggression 
is required to gain attention.
The primary difference may be simply that as the House 
of Representatives is the Chamber where governments are made and 
unmade, and where most senior Ministers and the Prime Ministers 
reside, the conditions are created for an environment that will 
attract the attention of the media which simply does not exist 
in the Senate. The press gallery, suffering from limited 
resources, will direct its resources to coverage of the most 
'interesting* Chamber. Because the media is present, Ministers 
and Members use the opportunity to gain easy publicity on 
matters that may only by chance have any relevance to 
Parliament.
This lower level of partisanship in the Senate allows 
for a greater development of individual personalities. As I have 
noted, Members in the House were seen to be more interested in 
politics as such, while Senators were more interested in the 
broader aspects of legislation and issues. This, of course, is 
assisted by the less stringent party discipline that pervades
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the Senate; though any Senator from the ALP who voted against 
the wishes of the party would almost certainly not gain 
pre-selection for the next elections.
Yet for all the differences,, Senators are, as Hutchison 
observed, still members of parties operating in a political 
environment. The style may be different, but the substance is 
still the same. Point scoring, trying to catch Ministers out, 
interjections and censure motions are all actions that are 
common to politicking that occurs in both Chambers. Divisions 
which occur on Bills at second reading, committee of the whole 
or third reading stages, urgency motions and when Senators are 
ejected for unparliamentary language; these are all part of 
partisan atmosphere that pervades the Senate Chamber.
So we now have a picture of Senators as people who are 
interested in politics, are basically concerned about the party, 
and are on the whole not overly concerned about which Chamber 
they are in. The next question to ask, therefore, is what 
influence Senators may have on policies; that is, on the output 
of the Executive.
Power_Ip.r is it even influence?)
The concept of power involves a motive, the resources 
to carry out these motives and the capacity to secure changes in 
their environment (McGregor Burns 1981:8). Yet being a
backbencher usually means that they have 'virtually no place in 
the government of the day, little influence over policies and 
only occasionally, any access to the share of real power' 
(Solomon 1978:11) (see also Indyk 1978, Indyk 1980).
This lack of real power for a backbencher is by no 
means limited to Australia. There is widespread dispondency in 
many other parliaments of the world. A graphic example of this
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is in a speech made by Mr Ian Watson, a member of the Canadian 
House of Commons, made concerning the futility of work in the 
Commons:
They [the electors] believe that by 
constructive criticism we can influence the 
direction of government policies and 
government initiatives, and that we can do 
all this right here in the House of Commons. 
This public belief is continually being 
reinforced by the traditionalists in this 
Chamber, most of whom seem to be really vocal 
members of the House, who keep insisting and 
pretending that the action on the floor of 
the House of Commons is all important and 
that if you upgrade any other aspects of this 
institution, in particular the House of 
Commons committee system, you are somehow 
tampering with Parliamentary democracy 
itself. Attach too much attention to 
committees, and the traditionalists hint 
darkly that we are moving towards
congressionalism ...
Most of what goes on in this Chamber is show 
business pure and simple. Most questions are 
not asked to obtain information. Nine times 
out of ten, questions are either asked to 
embarrass or the answer is already known. Few 
of the millions of words of speeches that 
flow across the pages of Hansard ever affect 
government, bills or government policies. By 
the time these items reach the floor of the 
House of Commons the die has been cast and 
policy directions have already been decided 
upon ... The traditionalists, by continuing 
to pretend, in the face of reality, that it 
is on the floor that all the important 
actions occur, are minimizing the role the 
Members of Parliament as representatives of 
the people, and in the context of 1973 
Canadian society they are doing a disservice 
both to Parliament and to the Canadian oeople 
(Stewart 1977:106).
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The Stature of our Representatives
The standing of politicians in Australian Society has 
long been regarded as low. Horne, reflecting a populist approach 
to our elected representatives argues that both Parliament and 
parliamentarians are a waste. To attract a high standard of 
parliamentarians, the standard of parliamentary life must be 
high. Unfortunately, laments, Horne, E the sheer dreariness of 
parliamentary life - its lack of political meaning and its 
old-fashioned rituals - repel many of the kind of people who 
might make good members of an Executive and also the kind of 
people who like to acquire information and to probe into the 
process of government* (Horne 1969:172). For a person of any 
talent, Horne goes on to argue, Parliament would also be a waste 
of talent and time, as Parliament is merely taken up with 
listening to colleagues day after day and delivering speeches 
’of almost complete drivel* to an almost empty Chamber. It would 
be difficult to find another Parliament anywhere where the 
quality of speaking was so poor. This poor quality is not caused 
by the pressure of work however. The quality should be better if 
for no other reason than the fact that ’they haven’t got enoughs 
to do’ (Horne 1969:172).
Elsewhere he describes Members and Senators 'as 
racheteers of the mediocre', 'pompous and out of touch*, and 
merely searching for ’excitement and or status ... (and) that 
their policies are most often the product of faction rather than 
coherent belief ...’ (Horne 1969:172-199).
Thus satisfaction for our ’second-rate men’ can only 
’assume useful meaning ... in his constituency*? though even 
this work, Horne believes, is menial. Yet while Horne says that 
this work is meaningful, he then notes that Parliament and 
parliamentarians are out of touch with the electorate. As a 
result, rather than encouraging young people to join and so 
become involved in politics, they create an image that allows 
them to be mocked and despised.
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While Horne's attack on the quality of Members and
Senators may be seen as a thinly veiled attack on Menzies and
his style of Cabinet and decision making, he nonetheless
reflects the public perception of the stature of Members and
Senator s.
Encel also highlights the low reputation of politicians 
in describing the reaction by the public to the increases in the 
renumeration of Members of Parliament in the 1950s; the flood of 
letters that were sent to newpapers and the committee of inquiry 
into parliamentary salaries overwhelmingly opposed any salary 
increase on the grounds that Members were overpaid already and 
not worth the money» Reaction by the media and the public to 
increases in the salaries of members in recent times have been 
equally critical*
One 'Commonwealth backbencher' has said that, 'the very 
term [backbencher3 in Australian Parliaments carries a certain 
overtone of contempt' in the electorate (Commonwealth 
Backbencher 1966:3)* Though this Member does not help their 
esteem when he goes on to say that, with few notable exceptions 
backbenchers ‘comprise the lesser lights'*
The Senate has also been regarded as a special case. 
Solomon argues that before the 1970's especially, the Senate was 
'something of a joke on the parliamentary scene ... it was 
considered as something of an old men's home, a retreat for aged 
and faithful party servants who could be rewarded in no other 
way' (Solomon 1974:527)» In contrast, former Senator K.S. Wriedt 
has more recently defended his colleagues; 'I am quite sure that 
there is as much ability and capacity in the backbenches of both 
parties as there is in the front benches of both parties. To 
deny that fact is not only a negation of the right of every 
parliamentarian but a reflection on the electors who put them
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there1 (Wriedt 1978:5). Yet as Hutchison notes, this problem of 
credibility is, and always has been, of their own creation. The 
public image of the Senate, says Hutchison, in any period has 
been a 'generally accurate perception of observable Senate 
activity at that time' (Hutchison 1976:366).
So the Senate in particular, and backbenchers overall, 
have been, and some would argue still are, faced with what 
appeared to be an enormous credibility problem in the eyes of 
the electorate. To recover its reputation, the Senate in the 
1970s has concentrated on developing its committee system. From 
being a 'dreamy old men's home*, it is now the centre of 
Parliament's committee activity.
However, without the committee structure, the Senate 
could still be seen as an anacronism. The sense of frustration 
that was expressed by the Canadian Member of Parliament is not 
isolated. As we shall see in chapter 3, most Australian Senators 
are also disillusioned about the workings of the Chamber.
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CHAPTER 3
WHY JOIN A COMMITTEE?
If Senators in my sample reflect the mood of al J. 
Senators then Chamber work appears to be going through something 
of a crisis. It was put as diplomatically as ‘the Chamber work 
is miore e p h e m e r a l 5 (D) f to ‘there is an element of the theatre 
in the Chamber* (L) .
As a result while the committee system for most may not 
have been the reason for joining the Senate, once settled into a 
normal Chamber work pattern, committees were seen to be the most 
attractive, interesting and valuable part of Senators* work. 51 
have believed for a long time that Committees are one of the few 
constructive things that the Senate does. It is intellectually 
satisfying and creative? especially in that you are working in a 
policy generating area and useful to the body politic in that 
you are engaged in the scrutiny of the Executive* (J) . A 
committee system, said another, *is a fairly essential part of 
the operation of a House of Review in a bicameral system* (A).
To a certain extent at least this is true. Committee 
work has become an integral part of the workings of the Senate:
When you come into this place, you are told 
that the committee system is worthwhile.
Within the parties there is an expectation 
that you should participate in committee 
activity (0).
Some Senators said that this expectation was covert: 
* It was apparent to me, though not through any pressure of my 
peers, that you had to join a committee* {F) . One Senator,
4 8
h o w e v e r , found  t h a t  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s  c o u ld  a l s o  be o v e r t .  In  h i s  
c a s e  he was 1c o u n c i l i e d  by one o f  my c o l l e a g u e s ’ t h a t  he s h o u l d  
become i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  com m it tee  sy s tem  (M).
For new S e n a t o r s ,  c o m m it te e s  a r e  a l s o  a q u i c k  way of  
g a i n i n g  c o n f i d e n c e .  In  th e  Chamber l e a d e r s  and ’ o ld  h a n d s '  t e n d  
t o  d o m in a t e .  In  a com m it tee  of s i x  members, such d o m in a t io n  i s  
l e s s  l i k e l y ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  unknown.
A prob lem  f o r  some S e n a t o r s  though  i s  t h a t  upon f i r s t  
becoming a S e n a to r  v i a  a h a l f - S e n a t e  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  
n o r m a l l y  o n ly  a l i m i t e d  number of  c h o i c e s  f o r  c o m m it tee  
p o s i t i o n s .  I f  a S e n a t o r  w a n ts  t o  g e t  on t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c o m m it tee  t h e n  l o b b y in g  i s  u s u a l l y  t h r o u g h  o t h e r  members o f  t h e  
co m m it tee  or t h r o u g h  t h e  Whip. A S e n a to r  who f i l l e d  a c a s u a l  
v a c a n c y  was t o l d  which  co m m it tee s  t o  j o i n .  The co m m it tee s  which  
he j o i n e d  would n o t  have  been  h i s  f i r s t  or seco n d  c h o i c e .  T h i s  
a r i s e s  b e c a u se  c o m m it te e s  under  s t a n d i n g  o r d e r s  a r e  p e rm an en t  
and v a c a n c i e s  o c c u r  o n ly  when S e n a t o r s  l e a v e  c o m m it tee s  o r  when 
t h e r e  i s  a d o u b le  d i s s o l u t i o n  and c o m m it te e s  a r e  d i s s o l v e d .
While  o v e r a l l ,  S e n a t o r s  were e n t h u s i a s t i c  a b o u t  s e r v i n g  
on c o m m i t t e e s ,  a sm a l l  number had r e s e r v a t i o n s .  These  S e n a t o r s  
were  d i v i d e d  be tween  t h o s e  who a r g u e d  t h a t  a S e n a t o r ' s  f i r s t  
p r i o r i t y  sh o u ld  be i n  t h e  v i s i b l e  Chamber r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  
smokey backrooms o f  P a r l i a m e n t  (L, M) and t h o s e  who had 
r e s e r v a t i o n s  a t  a b r o a d e r  l e v e l .
These S e n a t o r s  were t y p i f i e d  by a new S e n a to r  who s a i d  
t h a t  when he f i r s t  became a S e n a t o r  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  he would 
g e t  a l o t  o u t  of  co m m it tee s  and was o p t i m i s t i c  t h a t  he would be 
a b l e  t o  p u t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  view th r o u g h  c o m m i t t e e s .  Some 12 
months l a t e r  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  p o s s i b l e .  'They w i l l  
p r o b a b l y  i n v o l v e  a l o t  c f  h a r d  work b u t  work t h a t  c o u ld  be 
b e t t e r  s p e n t  o u t  in  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  . . .  i t  i s  v e ry  easy  t o  g e t
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lost in committee work and lose contact with issues that are 
emerging in the electorate or simply not have enough time to 
persue issues that should be developed* (0)c
As well as the institutional observations made by 
Senators (that is, how best can Senators fulfil their roles),
and these were nearly always from the more vocal high-profile 
Senators, committees were seen as providing a chance for 
personal advancement or enlightenment. There was an awareness 
amongst Senators of the need to broaden their experience - 'for 
my own education as much as anything else1 (M) . Similarly 
another saw it as the chance to fill a 'void in my own 
information* (N) , while one Senator saw it as a * chance to 
develop areas that are not of direct political importance5 (E)* 
This interest in committees can also be through expediency; ' 
otherwise I could have quickly been type-cast as a lawyer* (N) . 
One 'had a unique expertise in a special area which I have
followed ever since' (C) u Most Senators saw it as a chance to 
explore different areas* One other Senator said that he did not 
feel morally obliged to serve on either party or parliamentary 
committees in the area of his special expertise. (G) . The
possibility of one day being a shadow Minister or Minister in
that area was a strong motivator for some Senators.
But Senators have difficulty in explaining to the 
public, or even to their colleagues, the importance of Committee 
work. For Labor Senators, this latter group is particularly 
important as Caucus, and not the Prime Minister elects the 
Executive» While this is not the case in the Liberal Party, it 
is accepted within all parties that dedication to parliamentary 
committee work or any other institutional aspect of Parliament 
will not rate as high on the criteria for selection to the 
Executive. The chairmanship of the backbencher committees of the 
Liberal Party have been particularly successful avenues for 
gaining the attention of their Prime Minister when the 
appropriate time comes for Ministers to be chosen.
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This does not mean however, that those with ministerial 
aspirations find committees to ba of no assistance. A new 
Senator who had a strong legal background realised that the 
spokesperson in the party on legal matters was firmly in command 
of his portfolio and so a vacancy was unlikely to occur in that 
area. Accordingly, he made a deliberate choice to join a 
committee with a completely different emphasis in the belief 
that more ministerial vacancies would be more likely to arise in 
the areas covered by that committee. As is noted later, 
Ministers found that their committee experience enabled them to 
gain a better grasp of the workings of the Public Service. For 
this Senator, the knowledge of the subject matter and the 
personalities involved, both in the field and within the Public 
Service assisted him in adopting a higher profile on the Caucus 
committees, within the party room, and in the electorate.
In terms of Senators receiving publicity and 
recognition for the work that they carry out, then at least 
parliamentary committees are a better avenue than caucus 
committees. While this may be a 'pretty round about way of 
achieving visability, at least to some extent it is there and 
you can qualify it* (J) .
Senators' interests and the perceived personal benefits 
gained by being actively involved in committee work is in sharp 
contrast to their involvement in the proceedings in the Chamber. 
As indicated earlier, Senators in the Chamber are aware that 
there is an audience, whether it be their colleagues, the public 
or local branches of the party. Because of the different 
environment,
matters in the Chamber are straight out 
political; they are subject to debate within 
the party room before it comes up for 
discussion in t:he Chamber. Thus a line is
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assumed beforehand. The party as a whole 
determines the way you will vote and the 
attitude you will adopt. While on committees 
he is there representing his party, he is 
also there in his capacity as a Senator in 
the Parliament. He ' has a freer and more 
flexible approach resulting in cross party 
support on certain issues (I)*
Another observed.
On committees you are not on confrontationist 
display. In the Chamber you try to impress 
your colleagues and the opposition. Your 
ability and your display in the Chamber 
affects your progress in the party machine. 
Also the thousand reprints of questions you 
have asked or speeches you have made in the 
Chamber, [Senators are entitled to 100 copies 
of each speech, not the 1000 that the Senator 
suggested] can be sent out to the branches, 
lobby groups etc. In contrast, committee work 
is extremely time consuming, [and as a 
result] I will have to think seriously about 
cutting back somewhere (J).
The cause of what one regarded as ‘the poor standard of 
speeches' (C) may be because, as another put it, 'after 3- 
speakers on either side it is repetition; though you might pick 
up a few rounds in the committee stage of a bill' (K).
Indeed, Senators argued that serving on committees 
improved the standard of debate in the Chamber. ‘Once you have 
done a particular subject on a committee, you can speak for 10 
minutes when that matter arises in the Chamber because you have 
gone through the work already* (N).
Thus, when they are in the Chamber, most Senators 
believe that they are there as party members, whereas on 
committees they become 'more statesman-like in approach' (E) 
with party attitudes being strongly diluted. There is more give 
and take with reports being formulated in consultation with
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o t h e r  p a r t i e s  though  s t i l l  d i f f e r i n g  on p o i n t s  o f  p r i n c i p l e .  
That  p o i n t s  o f  p r i n c i p l e  o f t e n  do n o t  a r i s e  i n  c o m m i t t e e s  i s  
more b e c a u se  of  t h e  c o n s c i o u s  d e s i r e  by most S e n a t o r s  n o t  t o  
send r e f e r e n c e s  t h a t  i n v o l v e  su c h  c o n f l i c t s  t o  a r i s e .  Committee  
work f o r  most i s  q u i e t ,  p u re  d e l i b e r a t i o n ,  w i th  S e n a t o r s  w o rk in g  
w e l l  t o g e t h e r  b e c a u se  t h e r e  i s  no c o m p e t i t i o n .  Com m it tees  a r e  
seen  a s  ’ t r u l y  b i p a r t i s a n *  ( B ) .
The b e n e f i t s  o f  t h i s  b i p a r t i s a n s h i p  can a l s o  c a r r y  o v e r  
t o  th e  Chamber ’ such  as  d e v e l o p i n g  more r e s p e c t  f o r  o p p o n e n t s ’ 
t h r o u g h  w ork ing  c l o s e l y  w i th  each  o t h e r  on c o m m i t t e e s .  T h ere  i s  
o n ly  o c c a s i o n a l  " c h i l d i s h  p a r t i s a n s h i p "  on c o m m i t t e e s ;  t h o u g h  
one S e n a to r  a rg u e d  t h a t
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p a r t i e s  have  become so used  
t o  th e  conf  r o n t a t i o n a l . i s t  s t y l e  of  p o l i t i c s  
t h a t  t h ey  do n o t  use  t h e  c o m m it tee s  
c o r r e c t l y .  I t  i s  a g r a d u a l  p r o c e s s .  The more 
t h e y  use t h e  c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e  l e s s  p a r t i s a n  
t h e y  become. P a r t  o f  th e  p ro b lem  may be t h a t  
so o f t e n .  S e n a t o r s  come s t r a i g h t  from t h e  
Chamber and so t h e y  a r e  i n  a Chamber f rame of  
mind. (Q)
P e r h a p s  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  s t r o n g l y  p a r t i s a n  a p p ro a c h  t o  
t h e i r  work t h a t  t h i s  S e n a t o r  was r e f e r r i n g  t o ,  some S e n a t o r s  
d i s a g r e e d  w i th  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e r e  was no p a r t i s a n s h i p  on 
c o m m i t t e e s .  I t  was n o t  t h a t  t h e r e  was l e s s  p o l i t i c s  on 
c o m m it tee s  bu t  r a t h e r  t h a t  some S e n a t o r s  ' a r e  i n h e r e n t l y  l e s s  
. i d e o l o g i c a l  t h a n  o t h e r s * .  For t h i s  S e n a t o r  ‘ j u s t  b e c a u s e  you a r e  
on a c o m m it tee ,  you c a n n o t  g e t  away from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  you 
r e p r e s e n t  a p a r t y ’ (M).
Yet no m a t t e r  what  t h e  l e v e l  of  p o l i t i c s  on c o m m i t t e e s ,  
t h e r e  was u n i v e r s a l  a g re e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  more e f f e c t i v e  work was 
c a r r i e d  o u t  in  c o m m it tee s  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  Chamber.
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Despite such enthusiasm for committees it must be 
remembered, as our Senator above reminded us, that they are also 
members of political parties« As such, work on parliamentary 
committees can only ever be part of their overall work 
commitments« (This will be discussed in Chapter 5.)
(i) Benefits of Committees
Today our parliamentarians are better educated than 
ever before« Not only are there a greater proportion of 
Ministers with degrees but also their colleagues on the 
backbench are a better educated group than at any other time in 
the history of Parliament (as can be clearly seen in table 1) . 
Concurrent with this change is an increasing sophistication in 
the complexity of issues that need to be examined. Issues need 
to be decided upon more quickly. Prime Ministers no longer take 
seven weeks to get from Sydney to London by ship.
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TABLE 1
i;
NUMBER OP SENATORS WITH DEGREES, BY PARTY
Year ALP LCP DLP/AD Other Total
1922 -(12) 1(24) 1(36) •
1940 “(IB) 1(17) - - 1(36)
1949 2(34) 4(26) - -- 6(60)
1955 2(28) 5(30) 2(2) - 8(60)
1961 6(27) 5(31) 1(2) 1(1) 13(60)
1966 6(27) 4(30) 1(2) KD 12 (60)
1971 3(26) 7(26) 2(5) 2(3) 14(60)
1973 4(26) 12(26) 2(5) 2(3) 20 (60)
1975 5(29) 16(29) - 1(2) 22(60)
1976 7(27) 20(35) - 1(2) 28(64)
1978 8(26) 25(35) 2(2) -(1) 35(64)
1981 10(27) 21(31) 4(5) -(1) 35(64)
Note: The figure in brackets is the total number of Senators
in the respective categories.
Source: Hutchison 1976:164, Parliamentary Library 1973, 1976,
1978, 1981).
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In 1949 the average electorate had 39,948 voters, in
1983 there v/ere 74,989 voters; an increase of 88 per cent (Kelly 
1983 : 9}* In 1948 there were 17 Ministers in the Chifley 
government including a separate Vice President of the Executive 
Council. Currently there are 27 Ministers being supported by 
180,631 public servants. In 1949 there were no caucus
committees. There were four domestic committees, four joint
statutory committees and two select committees. Currently there 
are 64 Senators and 125 members servicing six Senate estimates 
committees, 9 standing committees, 8 Senate legislative and
general purpose committees, 2 Senate select Committees, 3 Joint 
statutory committees, 3 joint Committees, 2 joint select
Committees and 4 standing committees of the House of
Representatives. Clearly the workload that is placed on the 
current parliamentarian is far greater than their colleagues had 
to deal with in 1949.
Raison argues that involvement in committee work by 
Members of the House of Commons does a great deal to produce 
better Members of Parliament. Over the years, committee members 
can build up valuable expertise covering technical, bureaucratic 
and policy aspects in their special fields of interest (Raison: 
1979} . They are able to hear authoritative evidence and also 
catch a glimpse of the policy making process which is normally 
denied to backbenchers. Palmer, Chairman of the House of Commons 
Committee on Science and Technology, has observed that the 
compilation of evidence on the facts of a situation and the 
unveiling of the motives behind existing policy is in itself an 
invaluable service to parliamentary and public opinion' (Palmer 
1972:167).
Thus, committees also provide committee members with an 
opportunity to accumulate knowledge from a source other than the 
Executive. This is especially sc for new members or members of 
the Opposition, as committee work increases their level of
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participation and provides a sense of positive input that rarely 
occurs in the Chamber. Also it provides the ever increasingly 
better educated Senator the opportunity to use his knowledge and 
skills and so provide satisfaction commensurate with his 
ability.
Of course, while committees may give Senators the 
opportunity to fulfil tightened expectations that arise from a 
higher education and higher occupational status, it also places 
Senators under close scrutiny not only by colleagues but also 
witnesses„
Stewart, in The Canadian House of Commons, quotes one 
MP as saying:
Whereas Members of Parliament had found it 
easier to speak in the House of Commons 
without preparation, since they could get 
away with statements that were not entirely 
accurate, they found in committee, for the 
first time, that their facts and 
interpretations could be challenged by 
experts. Consequently, their lack of 
preparation was not found compatible with the 
needs of committee work. The committee system 
brought parliamentarians, for the first time, 
face to face with civil servants and 
Ministers in a way which enabled meaningful 
dialogue to be undertaken (Stewart 1977:182).
To take advantage of these witnesses however, Senators must be 
well briefed before the committee hearing.
The benefits of committee work however, are more than 
simply acquiring a good knowledge of the structure of the Public 
Service. Parliamentarians also see as 'one outstanding gain ... 
the steady building up of a network of connections, both 
personal and corporate, with industry. To them ... (a committee) 
is an independent centre of power and influence. It is within 
Parliament but apart from the massive governmental bureaucracy:
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a centre to which our approach can be made and from which 
inquiries can come* (Palmer 1972:167). (Though for a study the 
more realistic centre of power and influence see Chapter 5) „
< .*■
The General View v.s, the Expert
This raises the question of how specialised Senators 
should be* It can be argued, for example, that for the Science 
and Environment Committee to do its job thoroughly, it would 
require members who are scientists to be able to digest the 
evidence and write an effective report«,
Indeed, taking this area of science and technology, a 
difficult area for politicians to examine, the study group of 
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association commented that 
‘although one cannot expect that there will be huge numbers of 
parliamentarians who will bring scientific or technological 
training into politics, experience in the US indicates that 
laymen can become quite knowledgeable about scientific matters 
using the committee system to bring an excellent cross-section 
of scientific knowledge before them; so the Committee becomes 
the vehicle for specialisation that would not be possible 
otherwise* (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 1981:273).
Yet it must be remembered that committees are ‘not out 
to do jobs which only those with the necessary skills and 
responsibilities are qualified to do ... their [committee 
members] task is to select relevant subjects and to investigate 
them as thoroughly and critically as possible not only for the 
better guidance and. judgment of government and Parliament, but 
for the opinion generally, including particularly scientific and 
technical opinion’ (Palmer 1972:162).
A government is a complex and amorphous mass. To 
understand the workings of this mass, a Senator needs to have a 
high intellectual capability. Does all this mean, however, that
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government for the people and by the people is simply naive and 
flying in the face of what has become obvious; that government 
has become the stage for the expert. As it is, experts dominate 
many aspects of life. Duncan, for example, sees three types of 
expert:
1. Scientific - those with an understanding of theoretical 
principles;
2. Technical - experts who possess a knowledge based on a 
learnt skill plus on the job training; and
3. Executive - experts who have organising skills enabling 
them to be ‘expert' managers and administrators (Duncan 
1962:9).
Yet in attaining the status of expert, Duncan argues 
that this status will in turn disqualify that person from
becoming involved in areas that are not directly relevant to
their immediate area of concern.
Having accumulated this body of wisdom the question
that now arises, in ’what fields can these experts speak with
authority?'. The answer, Duncan says, is 'in very narrow and
specialised fields’ (Duncan 1962:10).
For example, as our scientist develops an expertise in 
a field, he eliminates from bis area of interest anything that 
does not directly assist him in the accumulation and possible
expansion of his specialised knowledge.
To become an expert requires sacrificing ‘breadth for 
depth’ and thus losing balance. This is not to suggest that
their advice is not invaluable, for it certainly is. It is
simply that politics is about ’the art of the possible'. This
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involves compromise and the balance of competing interests. 
Policy, in the last analysis, should relate to dealing with 
competing interests in society.
Scientific experts, explains Duncan, 'not only fail to 
realise the difficulty of administering unpopular legislation, 
but lack also the necessary patience to explain to ignorant (and 
often suspicious) people the need for such legislation* (Duncan 
1962:11). In speaking in a language that is often far removed 
from that used by the general population, his ideas fail to be 
communicated and accepted. As a result of this lack of 
communication, the public/electorate is perceived as stupid. 
(But as Duncan says, could it not be that our experts are 
unintelligible.)
In dealing with areas that require action, the 
scientific expert * tends to be at once naive and arrogant* 
(Duncan 1962:12). The time and effort required in becoming an 
expert automatically precludes him giving the required attention 
to allow him a broad understanding in competing policy matters 
that cover many fields. ‘The shaping of public policies can be 
done only by reference to some scale of values, and in the realm 
of value judgments, the scientist, as such, has no special 
authority whatever* (Duncan 1962:12).
Is society so simple that its problems fall within any 
one scientific field? Clearly the answer is no. The problems 
facing any area of policy transcends any one particular area of 
scientific knowledge.
Duncan defines policy as 'bringing together and 
co-ordinating the findings and recommendations of experts, the 
weighing of various factors, that all-too~often pull in 
different directions' (Duncan 1962:10). The task of balancing 
all this is one for the laymen -- ‘men of wide, general 
experience - not experts5.
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Decision making in government often involves a question 
of deciding priorities - politics«, When it comes to such 
considerations what makes our experts better than our 1 common 
man’? In deciding whether more finance should be given to 
education rather than, say, to defence, the only expert is the 
one who understands the mood of the majority in the community« 
If, however, the community believes that they have been mistaken 
in their selection of such priorities, then the community 
reserves the right to reject these representatives - the 
non-expert expert.
This is not to deny that experts have a function. But 
this function is, as Duncan says, 'essentially advisory in the 
drafting of legislation and assistance in the efficient 
execution of it ... The determination of goals or the final 
choice of the ends, or purposes of policy' should be left to 
elected representatives (Duncan 1962;13). To assist our elected 
representatives in making such decisions is an army of highly 
trained public servants, committees and royal commissions; 
skilled in providing advice on and in the case of public
servants, implementing matters of policy.
The main prerequisite for our leaders is that they must 
be intelligible in communicating ideas and explaining in a 
clear, plain way the need for a government to take particular 
action which it believes to be required.
It is interesting to note that most Ministers, and
certainly the most successful ones, are not those that have
combined their expertise with a political career. With few
notable exceptions - such as a lawyer being Attorney-General - 
these men and women are a fairly diversified group offering a 
wide general range of experience, yet not necessarily in the 
areas in which they had been working previously. Duncan observes 
that where experts have come to run departments - doctors in
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Charge of health, agriculture being administered by a farmer, 
etc, ~ ‘their very expertness is generally a handicap, tending 
to make them deaf to advice and "difficult" to work with' 
(Duncan 1962:15).
In recent Australian political history, there are
numerous instances where there have been men and women who, in 
spite of their expertise in specific areas, have never been 
promoted to the frontbench or when they have, have been great 
disappointments.
Contrary to most other authors Duncan claims that 
parliamentarians should not be experts. The one advantage that 
parliamentarians have over experts is that they are non-experts, 
and that rather than be damned, they should be praised for this. 
Duncan is not arguing that our parliamentarians should be 
ignoramuses, but he warns of the dangers of over-specialisation 
and reminds us that the role of parliamentarians in society is a 
special, and unique one. No parliamentarian ever loses sight of 
the fact that there is an electorate out there to which he is
ultimately responsible? and so his first task is to listen, 
interpret and understand that electorate. This requires a skill 
that is in itself unique and, indeed, the skill required in
being a parliamentarian makes him an expert -- in an area where 
such knowledge can only be accumulated through time and 
experience. This requires a mind that is constantly open and 
receptive to new ideas and concepts that straddle many fields of 
interest.
The_Edu_catlon__o_f _S_en at o r s
Expecting Senators to have a good breath of knowledge 
requires them to continually keep abreast of the latest
developments. However, this is not always an easy task.
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Senator Macklin has complained that very little is done 
in ‘providing parliamentarians with succinct information 
updates'. This problem is exacerbated because most members do 
not come from backgrounds ’which oriented or sensitised them to 
continuing education or information .. . more and more emphasis 
is placed on the information going to government, but 
information going to Parliament is being cut back severely ... 
information is the very essence of Parliament. The power of 
Parliament is increasingly decreased by keeping members in the 
dark ...'
To counter this, Senator Macklin proposed that there 
should be regular seminars held in Canberra on issues that are 
topical in Parliament. As well there should be computer access 
of MPs linking their offices with the Parliamentary Library and 
other national and international data bases. He also urged the 
establishment of a cross-party organisation similar to the 
Congressional Clearing House in the United States. This enables 
members to keep abreast of new developments (Macklin 1983) .
As has been argued in chapter 1 and earlier in this
Chapter, Senators see committees as providing a valuable avenue 
for acquiring information in particular areas so that they can 
keep abreast of new developments.
Some Senators however, are concerned that committees 
are taking on the most complex references that are too
specialised for most Senators. Senators ’are simply not well
equipped to do committee work*. As a result, 'the questioning is 
poor, the reports are poor and overall it is a waste of money' 
(D). Committees often barely touch on the subject and the 
inquiry is seen as a joke; especially by those working within
the relevant department. One Senator asks, how can a committee 
with limited resources and limited time investigate matters that 
over 300 public servants are examining? (D, G, L) . To challenge
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this bastion of knowledge are six Senators, a secretary, 
research officer, a stenographer and perhaps an adviser. It must 
be remembered, said another Senator, that 'people in Parliament 
are not scholars' (Q) . For these Senators, the problem is seen 
to be with the reference rather than with the lack of knowledge 
on the part of the Senators.
It could be argued that if committees wanted to study 
the more complex areas then consultants ... could be hired to 
help Senators on committees. (This will be explored more fully 
in Chapter 5.) There was not universal agreement on this course 
of action, with some Senators seeing it as an advantage in not 
having experts: 'non-specialists are a breath of fresh air; 
specialists have perceived ideas' (E).
Most feel that what is really required is a good 
working knowledge and this could be acquired after a period of 
years working on committees.
If you have had some basic interest in it you 
can flesh it out; you would have to be really 
limited if you did not learn from some of the experts who came across your vision. Also, 
simply because you are there in Parliament 
indicates that you have political realism and 
so grasp topics quickly (IC) .
Perhaps echoeing the dangerous tunnel vision that Duncan saw of 
specialists, one Senator observed that 'non-specialists provide 
the social consciousness of a committee’ (0)„ As long as one or 
two have some degree of expertise then it was felt that no 
further specialists were required on the committee. (One Senator 
quipped that 'on the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee 
all lawyers should be banned' (B).)
While Senators did not see the need to be experts in a 
particular field, they did see the need to specialise, with this 
trend being inescapable.
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There is a risk of over-specialisation but it 
is a necessary risk to enable a Senator to 
get on top of a subject (0) „ As another put 
it:
The complexities of society have grown so 
much that it is impossible to expect every 
Senator to be fully conversant with the 
intricasies of every facet of modern
governmentc
There tends to be a sub-conscious agreement amongst 
Senators to leave the study of certain areas of knowledge to 
other colleagues,, knowing full well that each will receive 
reciprocal respect from other Senators for the knowledge
acquired in respective areas.
Senators have also used committees as a basis to branch 
out into areas in which they do not have specialisation or
knowledge. Committee work has encouraged the desire to develop
an interest in areas that are not of direct political
importance. For them, 'committee work was intellectually 
broadening * (J).
The use of committees by Senators as a training ground 
for future ministries is an action that does not fit into the 
normal role of committees and certainly does not fit into the 
purpose of the Senate as a House of Review or any of Odgers*
other roles of the Senate. Yet one Senator who for a period was 
a Minister in the same area of work of a committee on which he 
had previously been involved for a number of years, said that 
without this prior committee experience he would have been
floundering. Because of his previous work on the relevant
committee he felt that in some areas he knew more about the 
subject than the bureaucrats (I) . Another Minister was more
reserved:
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P r e v i o u s  c o n t a c t  w i th  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  t h r o u g h  
c o m m it tee s  h e lp e d  me, though  com m it tee  work 
i s  n o t  e s s e n t i a l  t r a i n i n g  g round  f o r  
m i n i s t e r s  ~ b u t  y e s ,  i t  d i d  h e l p  me (II) .
T h is  i s  s u p p o r t e d  by most o t h e r  S e n a t o r s  who s e e  
co m m it tee s  as p r o v i d i n g  them w i t h  ‘ an i n - d e p t h  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of  
t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e 5 (F) , and im p ro v in g  t h e i r  o v e r a l l  a b i l i t y  to  
c a r r y  o u t  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s  a s  S e n a t o r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e i r  
p r e s c r i b e d  r o l e  o f  r e v i e w in g  governm ent  a c t i o n s .
However, t h e s e  a r e  comments t h a t  would n o t  have  been  
made i f  S e n a t o r s  had been  i n t e r v i e w e d  b e f o r e  e n t e r i n g  t h e  
S e n a t e .  Very few S e n a t o r s  have  any u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
com m it tee  sys tem  b e f o r e  t h e y  became a S e n a t o r .  The comment 51 
had n o t  opened a com m it tee  r e p o r t  b e f o r e  e n t e r i n g  t h e  S e n a t e 5 
(B),  t y p i f i e s  t h e  a p p ro a c h  t h a t  S e n a t o r s  have  t o  t h e  S e n a t e .
E l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  S e n a te  i s  s e en  p r i m a r i l y  as  a way of 
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  p a r t y ;  though  once  i n  t h e  .Chamber, a b e t t e r  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e i r  r o l e  a s  a S e n a to r  emerges w i t h  most  
S e n a t o r s  becoming a c t i v e l y  i n v o l v e d  on c o m m i t t e e s .
The r e a s o n s  g iv e n  and t h e  b e n e f i t s  d e r i v e d  from work on 
c o m m it tee s  v a i r i e s  from S e n a to r  t o  S e n a to r  and d epends  on t h e i r  
a s p i r a t i o n s .  T here  i s  no s i n g u l a r  m o t iv e  f o r  w o rk in g  on 
c o m m i t t e e s .  For example  even i f  S e n a t o r s  see  c o m m it te e s  as  
p r o v i d i n g  them t h e  means f o r  p e r s o n a l  ad v an cem en t ,  n o n e t h e l e s s  
they  a l s o  see  v a l u e  i n  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  com m it tee  work .
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CHAPTER 4
ASSISTANCE FOR SENATORS
To assist Senators and members in their duties as 
representatives of the people in Parliament, allow them to 
specialize as was mentioned in chapter 3 and at the same time 
provide a service to electors through their electoral office, 
the Remuneration Tribunal provides for backbench Senators and 
Members to employ a staff of two: one c.f whom is to be the
electorate secretary in the electorate office and a second 
person who f may be located in the electorate office as an 
electorate assistant or in Canberra as an legislative assistant* 
(Remuneration Tribunal 1982:90),
As well as personal staff, parliamentarians are also 
assisted in their work by the five parliamentary departments 
which operate in Parliament House. The departments are the 
Department of the Senate, the House of Representatives, the 
Parliamentary Reporting Service (Hansard), the Parliamentary 
Library and Joint House, The President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the Rouse of Representatives discharge
ministerial-type responsibilities as heads of their respective 
departments and also exercise joint responsibilities (with the 
assistance of the relevant standing committee) for the 
administration of the Library, Hansard and Joint House.
I will concern myself here only with those departments 
(the Library and the Senate) that Senators have the most contact 
with when carrying out their duties generally and see how they 
help in their committee activities. In carrying out the broad 
range of functions that is required of them, Senators will call
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upon the assistance of support staff and experts. The important 
factor for this thesis is the degree to which that help changes 
their attitudes to, or workings in, the committees.
Department of . the Par 1 iamerdc.a,rv. J,ibr.ary
The Library is located in Parliament House and occupies 
two floors in the centre of the building. The President of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are 
advised on Library matters by the Joint Committee on the Library 
(consisting of six Senators and six Members of the House)„
The Library is used extensively by rno.st Senators and 
Members, using the wide range of information and research 
services that have been developed to meet the unique demands and 
pressures that are created because of the nature of Parliament. 
Barker and Rush found in their study cf the Member in the House 
of Commons that 7 2% of Members use the Library at least once a 
day and only 3,7% use the Library less than once a week. It was 
also found that 7 5% of Members use the Library primarily for 
obtaining information (Barker and Rush 1970:1-28).
Senators and Members in the Australian Parliament also 
use the Library heavily. This is reflected in the growth of the 
Library where in 1.965 there were 16 on staff, in 1970 there were 
80 and by 19 81 the Library had grown to having 14.1 staff 
members. This last figure would no doubt be higher except for a 
restriction on staff ceilings that has been placed on the 
Library (there are similar restrictions on all parliamentary 
Departments)„ The 1981 Annual Report of the Library noted that a 
'very tight staff ceiling situation places the Department in an 
unenviable position in attempting to meet the growing level of 
demand ... the growth in the total client demand ... since 1978, 
is 48,5% ... clearly staffing increases in the client services 
are required, In addition, there are areas of the supporting
6 8
services which are badly overtaxed ... However, it is unlikely, 
even with increases, that staffing levels will ever achieve the 
desirable balance between resources and demand (Parliamentary 
Library 1982:5).
Yet while staff ceilings have been imposed on the 
Library, Senators and Members have shown no such constraint in 
the level of requests that the Library has received. In the last 
five years alone, the number of requests has increased by 45.6%. 
As can be seen from Table 2, the areas that have received the 
extra workload are across the board with the increased usage 
coming from both Members, Senators and Committees through the 
Committee staff.
The Library consists of four branches:
1. Library References and Information Services.
Questions answered by the Services range from simple 
queries to the preparation of substantial summaries and 
extensive bibliographies. This section provides reading lists, 
bibliographies, literature searches and summaries of facts. The 
section .is normally the first point of contact for parliamentary 
committee staff when commencing a new inquiry.
The section also arranges the screening of fiJrns and 
videotapes on topics that are of interest to Senators, Members 
and commi11ee s.
2. Information Services.
The Information Services Section is broken up into three 
sections:
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TABLE 2
PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY REQUESTS RECEIVED 1977-81
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 %increase
Number of Reauests Received
RSRS (Reader Services 
and Reference Section) 5495 6066 7079 7104 7858 30.0
LRS (Legislative 
Research Section) 3464 4341 4543 4568 5271 34.0
CIS (Current 
Information Service) 4571 5206 5894 8098* 10052 54.5
Request Sources
RSRS Members 2733 2694 2832 33.5
Senators 3298 3650 1592 1557 1865
Committees 513 402 695 509 550 6.0
Other 1684 2014 2077 2344 2601
CIS Members and
Senators 3855 4243 4686 6552 7690 50.0
Committees 134 148 359 295 535 75.0
Other 582 815 849 1251 1827
LRS Senators 911 1361 1429 1323 1638 44.0
Members 2036 2360 2596 2670 3067 34.0
Committees 98 113 104 114 142 31.0
Basic Papers 25 26 20 19 29
Basic Briefs 41 30 49 33 49
Other 353 451 345 409 161
* Method of counting CIS requests changed in January 1980; 
however, 33 1/2 per cent of increase = growth in real terms,
(Source: Parliamentary Library 1977-82).
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a. Current Information, which provides an extensive
newspaper clipping system and a collection cf 
Ministerial releases. The information is derived 
from 21 newspapers, 3 overseas papers and 3 
periodicals and is broken down to some 3000
subject files (Department of the Parliamentary 
Library 1979:19).
b. Hansard Information, which has a collection of
Hansard clippings for each Senator and Member; one 
for speeches and one for Questions Without Notice 
and with Notice. There is also a Ministerial
subject file.
c. Current Af f airs Monitoring and Tran s c riptions
Service. This section tape-records radio and 
television current affairs programs covering some 
17 radio programs and 6 television programs. Other 
programs are recorded on request.
3. Legislative Research Service.
A Legislative Research Service has operated in the 
Parliamentary Library since 1966. Operating in conjunction with 
the Reference Services, the Research Service meets requests for 
advice and information mainly through the preparation of short 
papers. The branch operates under seven subject headings: 
defence; education and welfare; finance, industries, trade and. 
development? foreign affairs; law and government; science, 
technology and environment; and statistics.
Often the information sought by Senators and Members is 
used in speeches in Parliament, the party room or in their 
electorates. The service is heavily used by Shadow Ministers and 
Opposition Members who lack the backing of the Public Service to
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provide a source of information? both for attacking government 
policies and to assist in the formulation of their own policies. 
Thus most work of the research service is political« This is 
also the area most often used by Senators wanting to gain a 
deeper understanding of the subject*
All of the services of the Library are also used 
extensively by the Secretariat. Senators felt that there was no 
need to go to the Library on committee matters as this was one 
of the jobs of the staff. Thus in areas that committees are 
studying, while the library may be a valuable source of 
information, Senators receive this information from the 
committee secretary and not directly from the library.
Tiie_ Depart mept^_f_J,he_Senate
As well as being responsible for the conduct of the 
Senate Chamber, the President of the Senate is also the 
parliamentary head of the Department of the Senate, being 
elected by ballot by all Senators.
The Permanent Read of the Senate is the Clerk of the 
Senate. As well as his normal duties as a public servant, the 
Clerk offers advice to the President and Senators with regard to 
the conduct of business, procedural matters and points of order.
Thus whereas normal public servants serve the 
government of the day, parliamentary officers have the task of 
meeting the demands of a] 1 members of Parliament. Also as 
Solomon observes, they can be seen to be serving the 
'institution* of Parliament rather than meeting the needs of the 
public (Solomon 1978:133).
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In  b ro a d  t e rm s  t h e  Depar tm ent  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two 
g r o u p s :  p r o c e d u r a l  s t a f f  and com m it tee  s e c r e t a r i a t  s t a f f .  The
P r o c e d u r a l  s e c t i o n  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  day to  day ru n n in g  of 
th e  S e n a te ?  from th e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  N o t i c e  P a p e r , a d v i c e  t o  
S e n a t o r s  on S t a n d in g  O r d e r s  and d r a f t i n g  a d v i c e  to  t h e  w r i t i n g  
o f  t h e  J o u r n a l s .  A l th o u g h  b o th  g ro u p s  a r e  s t a f f e d  by S e n a te  
o f f i c e r s ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  i n t e r c h a n g e  be tw een  t h e  two s e c t i o n s ,  
and i n  p r a c t i c e  t h e y  t e n d  t o  o p e r a t e  a s  s e p a r a t e  s e c t i o n s .
Solomon f e e l s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a c e r t a i n  r i v a l r y  be tw een  
th e  two s e c t i o n s  of  th e  D epar tm en t  w i th  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  s t a f f  
b e in g  s e e n  ' a s  o c c u p y in g  f a r  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  
P a r l i a m e n t  Rouse b u r e a u c r a c y  ( than)  t h o s e  w o rk in g  as  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  o f f i c e r s .  Work on co m m it tee s  was s e en  as  p a r t  of  
t h e  normal  t r a i n i n g  f o r  an o f f i c e r  of the  s e r v i c e ,  and c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  an end i n  i t s e l f .  The end was t o  be on p u b l i c  v iew in  t h e  
Chamber, as  C l e r k ,  or one of  h i s  a s s i s t a n t s .  Work was s e en  as  
more i n t i m a t e l y  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  p o l i t i c s  t h a n  w o rk in g  on 
c o m m i t t e e s .  Committee  work was seen  as  t e c h n i c a l ?  Chamber work 
a s  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  outcome o f  p o l i t i c s '  (Solomon 
1 9 7 8 :1 3 6 ) .
N i n e t e e n  s i x t y  n in e  was a landm ark  i n  t h e  deve lopm en t  
o f  th e  Committee S e c r e t a r i a t ;  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e ,  t h e r e  was a 
s e p a r a t e  c a t e g o r y  f o r  com m it tee  s t a f f  i n  t h e  b u d g e t  documents  
f o r  t h a t  y e a r .  U n t i l  t h e n ,  co m m it tee s  were n o r m a l ly  s t a f f e d  on a 
p a r t - t i m e  b a s i s  by o f f i c e r s  from t h e  P r o c e d u r a l  a r e a  of t h e  
D e p a r tm en t .
The S e c r e t a r i a t  has  been  t h e  o n ly  growth  a r e a  in  t h e  
D epar tm en t  s i n c e  t h e  l a t e  lS 7 u s ,  While  t h e  P r o c e d u r a l  a r e a  h as  
rem ained  f a i r l y  c o n s t a n t ,  t h e  com m it tee  a r e a ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i th  
th e  a d v e n t  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Dem ocrats  and t h e  r e s u l t a n t  s e l e c t  
c o m m i t t e e s ,  has  s e e n  n o t a b l e  i n c r e a s e s .  O v e r a l l ,  t h e  Depar tment  
has  grown from 25 S e n a te  o f f i c e r s  i n  1965 t o  150 t o d a y .  ( In  
c o n t r a s t  t h e  number of  S e n a t o r s  who a r e  m eant  t o  f i l l  t h e  e x t r a  
com m it tee  p o s i t i o n s  h a s  r em a in e d  c o n s t a n t . )
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From the appointment of a staff of 2 in 1969 to work 
full-time on committee matters, the Secretariat now numbers some 
54 officers headed by the Senior Clerk of Committees (Clerk 
Class 11) . Each legislative and general purpose committee is 
staffed by a Secretary (Class 11) , a Research Officer (Class 7) 
and a Steno-secretary. By agreement with the Senate, the House 
of Representatives also staffs the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence» The other joint committees are also staffed 
by the Department of the House of Representatives,
The eight estimates committees are serviced by a 
part-time secretary (seconded from the Procedural section for 
the duration of the committee hearings) and a permanent research 
officer. Similarly, select committees are staffed by a
secretary, a research officer and a steno-secretary. The current 
arrangement is to seek approval from the Public Service Board 
for a temporary raising of staff ceilings for the duration of 
the inquiry. Previously, there was a pool of research officers 
who filled such positions as required,
(a) Cornuilttee Staff
The Secretariat provides information in the way of 
background papers, questions and summaries of submissions and 
generally 'act as advisers for the whole committee’. This 
activity is seen as invaluable by Senators because of the 
constraints on their own time. As well as preparing this 
information, staff also provide possible questions for Senators 
to ask witnesses. While staff may hope that the questions they 
prepare are asked, this is by no means guaranteed.
The dangers in the preparation of background papers by 
staff became apparent during the British election in 1983. A 
document headed 'the Chairman’s draft report1, from the House of 
Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee was leaked to the
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p r e s s .  The r e p o r t  was h i g h l y  c r i t i c a l  o f  t h e  G o v e rn m e n t ' s  
economic management.  In  r e s p o n s e ,  t h e  Chairman o f  th e  Committee ,  
Mr Du Cann, c la im e d  t h a t  t h e  r e p o r t  was ' p r o d u c e d  by th e
Committee a d v i s e r s .  I t  i s  n o t  th e  C o m m i t t e e ' s  r e p o r t ,  nor  i s  i t  
m ine '  ( S e a r j e a n t  1 9 8 3 : 1 ) .
Some S e n a t o r s  f e e l  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  p rob lem  of  t h e
l e v e l  o f  work r e q u i r e d  i s  c a u se d  by th e  c o m m it te e s  t a k i n g  on 
r e f e r e n c e s  t h e y  a r e  i n c a p a b l e  o f  d o in g  p r o p e r l y ,  and as  a r e s u l t -  
s t u d i e s  o f t e n  ' b a r e l y  to u ch  on some a r e a s  b e c a u s e  th e  s u b j e c t
m a t t e r  i s  t o o  c o m p le x ’ * (For a d i s c u s s i o n  on t h e  q u a l i t y  of 
r e f e r e n c e s  see  C h a p te r  6 . )  In  su c h  c a s e s  t h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  i s  
f a c e d  w i t h  ‘ t h e  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  . . .  (of)  d e a l i n g  w i th  
th e  most complex a r e a s ' .  Solomon a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  s u c c e s s  o f  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m m it te e s  i n  g a t h e r i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  depends  on t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  which th e y  knew7 what  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e y  w a n t .  T h is  can 
b e s t  be a c h i e v e d  ' I f  t h e y  a r e  s t a f f e d  by e x p e r t s  i n  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  f i e l d s  i n  which th e y  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  (n o t  a common 
phenom ena) '  so t h a t  t h e  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  g e t t i n g  most  o f  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  f i e l d  a r e  i n c r e a s e d  (Solomon 
1 9 7 8 : 2 4 ) .  W hile  S e n a t o r s  a r e  c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  r e f e r e n c e s  may be 
to o  complex f o r  c o m m it tee s  t o  h a n d l e  a d e q u a t e l y  most  a r e  n o t
p r e s s i n g  f o r  more s p e c i a l i s t  s t a f f  -  ‘ i f  you want s p e c i a l i s e d  
s t a f f  t h e n  you s h o u ld  use  c o n s u l t a n t s ' .  As lo n g  as  s t a f f  
u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  l a n g u a g e  in  key a r e a s  S e n a t o r s  do n o t  lo o k  f o r  
any f u r t h e r  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n .
As one S e n a to r  n o t e d ,
Your b a s i c  s t a f f  c o u ld  b e s t  be d e s c r i b e d  as  
s p e c i a l i s t  g e n e r a l i s t s .  They o u g h t  t o  have  an 
o v e r a l l  knowledge g a in e d  o v e r  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  
p e r i o d  w i t h  th e  c o m m i t t e e .  They d o n ’ t  have  t o  
be t h e  a b s o l u t e  e x p e r t  on an a r e a ;  i f  you d id  
you would s e v e r e l y  l i m i t  t h e  c o m m i t t e e .  You 
can a lw ay s  b r i n g  i n  s p e c i a l i s t s .  Committees  
can g e t  bogged down i n  one p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a  
b e c a u s e  t h e y  have n o t  t h e  e x p e r t i s e  o f  an
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officer who can guide them in that area. That 
officer may encourage the committee to remain 
in the area (A) .
And then commented that fstaff tend to become specialised anyway 
if they stay with the Committee for a number of years' (Q) . It 
is the policy of the Department however, to rotate staff after a 
number of years with one committee to avoid staff being 
type-cast and to provide a variety of work.
Rather than look for better expertise on staff, some 
Senators argued that more staff should be appointed to ease 
their workload. It was openly acknowledged that the Secretariat 
was expected to carry out the majority of the work - from the 
preparation of questions for witnesses to the writing of the 
draft report for the Chairman. However one Senator stressed that 
the draft report is the Chairman's report and not the staff's 
report. Some Senators use their own staff to assist them for 
their committee work because of the lack of adequate secretariat 
staff (Ar C, J).
While there v;as strong urging that there should be more 
staff, most noted in passing that they were in no way advocating 
that Senate committees should become like U.S. committees where 
it is felt that staff tend to overwhelm committee members. 
However in the case of the Australian Senate,1 committees are so 
understaffed that there is no way of overwhelming us* (F, N).
Indeed the problem seems to be, with the staffing of 
parliamentary committees throughout the world, that they 
function either 'with inadequate or non-existent professional 
staffs ... or with the huge entourage of the DS congressional 
system, where arguably the support function is becoming top 
heavy' (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Study Group 
1981:272).
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In the US Congressf the growth of the staff attached to 
o Congressman has led Salisbury and Shepsle to note that 'as a 
consequence of staff expansion each member of Congress has come 
to operate as the head of ' an enterprise - an organisation 
consisting of anywhere from 8 to 10 to well over 100 
subordinates. These organisations ... constrain and shape the 
behaviour of the members in ways that help make Congress itself 
a loosely coupled collection of these enterprises, a very 
different institution than it was* (Salisbury and Shepsle 1976: 
559) .
One Senator was concerned that staff are not used 
properly, and until they are, then committees should not receive 
extra assistance. He said the main problem with staff was caused 
by the fact of ‘too many chairmen not exercising proper 
executive control and not getting across what they want the 
committee to do. Also you get some staff who do not have enough 
woirk to do* (A) (see also Chapter 0). This supervising role 
should include visiting East Block (where the Secretariat is 
located) and making sure that the staff are working and kept 
busy.
Secretariat staff are permanent appointees of the 
Department and rotations and promotions are decided upon by the 
Department and not by the members of the committees which they 
service. While Senators did not express any interest to me in 
being involved in the selection of staff, in late 1983 all the 
chairmen indicated that they want to be more personally involved 
in the selection process of staff.
Staff are expected both by the Department cf the Senate 
and Senators to be politically neutral. It is felt that 
politically committed staff are a positive handicap and may 
ultimateiy result in staff being appointed for political 
considerations as well as for, or instead of, their ability. The 
difficulty of such an arrangement is that 5 it would clearly be
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harder for staff concerned to secure confidence and respect of 
these members if they in any way owed their appointment or 
loyalty to the Government or majority party* (Ryle 1981;500}.
If parliamentary committees v?ere to look at policy r 
this would pose a dilemma for staff, who would then be expected 
to examine policy and advise on it; and in the process become 
more involved in the cut and thrust of politics. This may in 
itself be a constraining influence in the formulation of 
references as the secretary often may be involved in the writing 
of the terms of reference.
You have to recognise that there are 
political and non-political roles to play and 
you cannot expect the secretary under the 
current system to be involved in the
political role. There should be, as well, 
personal staff just to assist you in your 
duties on committees ... to give that
political input (J)„
If staff are non-partisan they are less likely to play 
politics with issues and more likely to direct their energies to 
providing a flow of information that will help the committee 
come to a decision. As it is, one Senator commented without any 
particular concern that 'staff only present one side of the 
case. Bias is in everybody and they are only human1 (B)„ But the 
bias, he acknowledged is professional, not political.
Normally staff do not change (nor dees the chairman or 
other members of the committee) when there is a new reference. 
This is not to suggest that the role of the secretary is 
passive, as most secretaries develop a highly specialised 
knowledge of the committees area of interest over a period of 
time. The power of the secretary can be very subtle, providing 
the committee with a person who has had many dealings with the 
relevant departments and actions over the years and has thus 
built up an excellent number of contacts. Before hearings of
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witnesses, as well as preparing questions for members, they will 
critically analyse the evidence that the committee has received. 
This will normally culminate in the preparation of a draft 
report.
Staff on congressional committees can spend up to 3 0 
years on a committee. However, on committees in the Senate in 
Australia, periodical staff rotation will preclude such 
occurrences. This normally coincides with a double dissolution 
of Parliament. Also, staff turn-over generally means that the 
longest serving person in the Secretariat will be there for only 
10 years or so.
Overall, opinion on staff ranged from the sympathetic:
And so while the great ones depart for their 
dinner.
The Secretary growing thinner and thinner,
Picking his brains trying to recall and report,
What he thinks they'll think, they ought to have thought (D).
to the concern that staff were underworked or lazy or both. 
V7ithin these two extremes, there was general agreement that 
there is a high degree of dependence in the work of staff and 
that as long as staff are selected who have a very good working 
knowledge of the committee's area of interest there is no need 
for greater specialisation. After all, ‘you are not going to put 
someone on the Science and Environment Committee, for example, 
who doesn't know anything about science or the environment, are 
you?' However, other than on the Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs Committee, this is not a consideration in the selection 
cf staff for particular committees. It appears that Senators are 
not aware of this policy and some Senators, at least, would 
disapprove of such selection criteria. While Senators are not 
looking for specialists in the sense of being, for example, a 
microbiologist, the generalist that they want on staff must have 
a sound knowledge of the science area.
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C ounsel
While staff may be able to prepare questions ior 
Senators, they are not allowed to ask questions of witnesses 
during the hearing» There have been suggestions by some 
commentators, including Senators, that the workings of the 
committees could be improved if committees were provided with 
counsel to assist in the direct questioning of witnesses. While 
Senator Evans, for example, has called for extra personal staff 
and more staff on committees to. overcome the constraint of a 
Senator’s workload, he suggests that some of these staff be 
employed by the committees as Counsel for the examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses in both public and private 
hearings (Evans 1982b:ll). It is argued that this support is 
necessary because of the lack of time available to Senators to 
come to grips with the mountain of complex material that is 
involved in a difficult inquiry.
Weller also suggests that it may help the investigative 
ability of committees if they were to hire counsel to assist in- 
the questioning of witnesses. He could begin the
cross-examination, open up the areas of particular dispute, show 
where the sensitivities lie and then allow the politicians to 
move in on those areas. Too often witnesses, and particularly 
senior public servants, are expert at hiding the important issue 
under a morass of technical and administrative detail. To 
appoint such a counsel would not reduce the parliamentarians' 
status or relegate them to a minor role.5 Senators already 
acknowlege that assistance is required from experts by employing 
consultants, whenever a committee is in need of such assistance. 
If Senators accept that there may be limitations in their 
understanding of a reference, why, asks Weller, should counsel 
aJso not be used? (Weller 1982:114).
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Malbin, however, in his study of staff on United States 
congressional Committees, asks: 'If the members are so 
overburdened that they need professional staff not only to point 
out but to choose among alternative assumptions, we may we11 ask 
whether something crucial to democratic government is being lost 
in the process?' (Malbin 1980:203).
At best, Senators' responses to this suggestion of 
parliamentary counsel were luke-warm. The kindest comment for 
this came from one of the more aggressive Senators who would 
‘like to see this more developed in that they could assist in 
the presenting of the basic material and play a more active role 
in the preparing of material. It is very difficult to imagine in 
some context playing much more of a role than they do now' 
(referring to committee staff) (J). However, he recognised that 
if counsel were allowed to ask questions a major re-organisation 
and change in emphasis in the committee system would need to 
occur. Within the current framework, he admitted that it would 
be difficult for staff to carry out a more aggressive role than 
they currently do.
Most of the other Senators felt that it would be better 
if Senators did the questioning. For them the questions that are 
prepared by committee staff are enough« If counsel were 
appointed then the operations of committees would become like 
American Senate committees which, most felt, had become a staff 
operation. In any case, argued one Senator, 'appointing counsel 
would be introducing a committee based on legal proceedings and 
operating in a litigious way. Once you start that then you get 
an adversary suffocation' (0).
Indeed, some saw this lack of additional support as 
encouraging Senators to maintain an active role. If counsel were 
to be appointed then their interest in proceedings could 
diminish. 5 In fact*, said one Senator, 'you would not only have 
specialists drawing up a report but they would also be doing the
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committee work, I think the real strength of our system is that 
most Senators have indulged in the questioning process and are 
interested in reading the submission to ask intelligent 
questions - which must help in the writing of the first draft' 
(N)c This opposition to the use of consultants did not of course 
mean that this Senator was not aware of the limitations of 
committee proceedings.
While other Senators agreed, one qualified his remarks 
in suggesting that 'the number of Senators competent to do this 
is limited, I think; after all, here we are elected to be 
members of Parliament to do a very specialised job which may not 
have been in the minds of the people who elected them, nor might 
these people have the technical expertise to do the job and they 
may not even try hard enough to understand the subject or they 
may be very, very busy and find it hard to keep up with the 
submission because if you get an expert submission you must know 
what it is about* (Q) .
Consultants
Consultants have been used to a varying degree by the 
committees. Under Standing Order 36 (AA)(18) a committee ' . < » 
shall be empowered to appoint persons with specialised knowledge 
for the purposes of the committee, with the approval of the 
President*. This approval has never been withheld. Once 
appointed to the committee, consultants are in essence de facto 
staff and enjoy the same rights as normal staff, attending both 
public and private meetings, preparing background papers, 
analysing evidence and assisting in the preparation of the 
chairman's draft report.
The role of outside advisers or consultants on 
committees is to supply 'for the purpose of particular 
inquiries, either information which is not readily available or 
to elucidate matters of complexity within the committee's order 
of reference ...* (Barker and Rush 1970:122).
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Thought on the use of consultants was divided. Those 
who supported the use of consultants argued that, almost every 
reference that a committee received required the hiring of 
consultant - ‘you are dealing with expert matters and even with 
the best will in the world there may be aspects of it that you 
just don’t understand? simply because you don’t know enough, the 
right answers aren’t coming up' (Q).
However, others felt that consultants have sometimes 
been employed unnecessarily when the work could have been 
carried out by the Parliamentary Library or through academics 
producing the material in the form of submissions (E, M)0
However, it appears that they do not completly 
understand the role of consultants; which is to interpret and 
analyse submissions and the evidence received, as much as 
provide original material at the submission stage. Senators also 
saw a danger of over-specialisation of the committee, 
particularly if committee members are themselves specialists. 
They argued that in such a highly specialised environment you 
left out ’one important dimsension - most of the population* 
(F) . Others found that consultants have not been paticularly 
helpful on committees. ‘After all, we are preparing political 
documents in order to persuade fellow politicians who are 
themselves non-specialists to a particular course of action. 
Consultants can help you come to understand a particular 
industry ... but in the end you have to understand it yourself 
as a politician and communicate to other politicians* (N). Some 
Senators thought that consultants were employed too readily by 
over-enthusiastic chairmen wanting to increase the size of the 
committee staff (B, E, L) . Also it may imply that, the chairman 
has taken the committee into areas that it is beyond the 
capabilities of the committee to examine.
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A small number of Senators argued that consultants 
could determine the direction of the report too much (K, M) . 
This asertion is too broad to accept. Certainly on some 
committees where the chairman is weak and the members themselves 
are uncertain or are not interested in the area then the 
consultant can be too assertive. (This can also be said of the 
permanent staff.) But then could this be a fault of the 
reference, which the members either find too difficult to 
understand, or a loss of interest in the subject for various 
reasons such as excessive workload or simply because it is an 
uninteresting topic.
Overall, Senators were divided in their approach to the 
use of consultants. Their comments covered the extremes of they 
are used too often and are a waste of time, to concern that 
until committees start to use consultants more as a matter of 
course, then areas will always be inadequately covered.
M.S.Ls.tance_fpx^^St.Qr^
Senators and Members have continually made submissions 
to the Renumeration Tribunal since its establishment in 1973 
urging that they should receive more personal staff to assist 
them in their duties both in the electorate and in Parliament. 
To date, their efforts have been largely unsuccessful. One of 
the few concessions given to Senators and Members has been the 
provision of 10 extra research assistants for the Shadow 
Ministry. All Senators agreed that they needed extra staff to 
help them in the electorate and to assist them in their work in 
the Chamber. As it is, local branches of their party often 
provide voluntary assistance to help in the running of the 
electoral office. Also, Senators and members do, on occasions, 
employ extra staff out of their own salaries.
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The Library is used very heavily by most Senators to 
ease their workload; particularly the Legislative and Research 
Service which a number of Senators treat as an extension of 
their own personal staff» This especially so if both of the
Senator's staff are in the electoral office which is a common
occurancGc However, as the 1981 Annual Report of the Library 
pointed out, staff already face an excessively heavy workload» 
At least until the tight economic climate has passed, the
situation will not be improved; either for Senators or for
staff»
Equally clearly, Senators are also dependent on
committee staff to carry out most of the work on committees» 
This includes the writing of the report (see also chapter 13). 
All Senators accepted this as inevitable given their heavy 
workload and the inadequate assistance that they receive in
other areas of work. Because of this dependence on committee 
staff, it may be expected that Senators want a pool of experts 
to assist the committee in studying a topic. Yet clearly this is 
not the case» Senators did not see the purpose of the report as 
a chance to write the definitive document on that subject. As
will be shown in chapter 14, the purpose of conducting an 
inquiry may be to educate themselves, their colleagues, the 
government or the public, and Senators felt that the best way of 
doing this was by being involved in the inquiry and by employing 
staff that are generalists. By this Senators meant that they 
required staff to have a broad interest and knowledge of the
committee's general area of study. If further knowledge is 
needed it can be acquired either through the careful choosing of 
witnesses or by employing consultants.
While seme Senators interviewed may have been critical 
of the over-use of consultants, all believed that when needed
they should be used. (When they are needed though, is another 
question.) However, they did not show any interest whatsoever in 
going beyond such assistance and using counsel to ask questions.
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All Senators were familar with the United States Committee 
System and expressed a dislike for such counsel working on 
Australian Senate committees.
While Senators were opposed to extravagant staffing 
levels, they were concerned with the level of assistance 
provided to them; personally, from the library and from the 
secretariat. At all three levels, Senators argued that extra 
staff should be provided to ease their excessive workload. This 
concern is not new. In 1970 and 1974, Senators were urging that 
adequate staff be provided to assist them in their work on 
committees.
In chapter 3, Senators spoke of the need to specialise. 
The Library and committee staff are tv/o of the most invaluable 
avenues available to Senators as a source of information that 
will assist them in this specialisation. Yet while they art- 
critical of insufficient staff on committees, and the Director 
of the Library is highly critical of the 'very tight staff 
ceiling situation', Senators' efforts to improve the situation 
have been muted.
The Library is especially important, being an 
invaluable source of information for committee staff and a 
source of information for Senators in their work in the Chamber, 
on backbench committees or in their electorate.
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CHAPTER 5
>*■
THE WORK OF SENATORS
Having joined a committee, Senators must fit their new 
commitments into a broad range of duties that will occupy their 
time, both when the Senate is sitting and when it has adjourned 
for the recess. As well as being involved in parliamentary 
committees, they will be involved in activities in the Chamber, 
attending party committee meetings, handling electorate work and 
nurturing the local branch of the party.
Senators must make judgements about which is the more 
important. The diversty of the workload is described in this 
chapter for two reasons? first it shows how broad their role is 
and how political imperatives often push them into other areas; 
and seconds to illustrate that what Senators do elsewhere has an 
impact on what to do, or not to do, in committees. Committees 
are not isolated organisations? Senators must fit their 
activities into a broader scheme. As this Thesis will show, what 
is done elsewhere has an impact on how committees work.
Parliamentary Life
If Hutchison is correct in arguing that the public 
image of the Senate in any period is merely a reflection of the 
activity cf Senators at that time then the current image of 
Senators should certainly be impressive.
As can be seen below in Table 3, the Senate during the 
last decade has sat on more days than any period since 
Federation. Comparing the periods 1951-60 and 1961-70 to the
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current decade, there has been sixty per cent and thirty-three 
per cent increase in sitting days respectively. As well as the 
increase in sitting days, since 1970, the number of committees 
operating in the Senate has increased dramatically with the 
establishment of the eight Legislative and General Purpose 
Committees. It must be remembered that these committees are not 
allowed to meet while the Senate is sitting so that while the 
Senate is meeting more frequently, Senators also have to find 
time to attend committee meetings.
As well, while the Caucus committees had been operating 
in the 1950s and 1960s, it was not until the advent of the Labor 
Government in 1972 that these committees became a permanent part 
of a Senator's duties«,
Beyond these developments however, the style of work in 
the Chamber has changed. As can be seen in Table 4, the number 
of Bills that have been passed by the Senate each year has shown 
a steady increase. In the eight decades since Federation, the 
number of Bills passed has increased from an average of 23.2 
Bills for the first decade of Federation to 173.3 Bills for the 
period 1971-80. What these figures do not reflect is that while 
the number of Bills has increased, so has the complexity of the 
issues involved.
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF SITTING DAYS SINCE 1901
Average number of sitting days
Decade Senate House of Representatives
1901-10 71.2 94.9
11-20 51.4 70.8
21-30 50.8 67.4
31-40 42.6 58.4
41-50 42.1 70.0
51-60 48.1 62.6
61-70 58.9 62.3
71-80 78.0 68.1
Source. (Odgers 1976, Parliamentary Library 1978,1981)
TABLE 4
NUMBER OF BILLS THAT HAVE BEEN PASSED.
Decade Average number of Bills passed per year
01-10
11-29
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
81-82
23*2
40.1
46.5 
121.6
72.5
95.5 
119.8 
173 .3 
170.0
Source (Odgers 1976, Parliamentary Library 1978,1981).
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While government legislative activity has increased, 
other aspects of Senate work have also undergone changes. For 
example, since Federation, there have been four separate years 
when there were no petitions presented to the Senate and on 
eight occassions the number has been as low7 as one a year. Until 
1970, there were only a total of 387 petitions presented to the 
Senate. Yet like so many other activities in the Senate, the 
number of petitions presented to the Senate has increased 
markedly since the mid 1970s. As can be seen in Table 5, the 
number of petitions presented to the Senate has grown steadily, 
reaching a peak of 1014 in 1982.
In 1973 5 Private Members* Bills were introduced into 
the Senate. In 1981-82 36 Private Members' Bills were introduced 
and 28 hours was spent debating Private Members' Bills compared 
to two and a half hours in 1973. Comparing the same two years, 
the time devoted to consideration of government legislation 
declined from 47% of sitting time to 37%, in spite of an 
increase in the number of hours that the Senate sat (Evans 
1982:136).
As well as an increase in time given over to Private 
Members' Bills, the amount of time devoted to general business 
has shown a similar increase. The contents of general business 
can be determined by a non-government majority in the Senate. In 
April 1982, it was agreed that on Wednesday afternoons after 
question time, one hour would be devoted to discussion of 
committee reports.
Procedures in the Senate have also changed? primarily 
to enable Senators to use their time as effectively as possible. 
Until 1972, all questions on notice and the answers to these 
questions were read in the Chamber. The Standing Orders 
Committee in 1971 argued that this method of dealing with such 
questions was time-wasting and thus could be incorporated in
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Hansard. In 1972 a sessional order covering this recommendation 
was agreed to and in 1977 Standing Orders 102 and 103 were 
amended to provide for such an arrangement.
Another area that has been altered as the work of 
Senators has increased has been the placing of a time limit on 
speeches made in the Senate. Until 1919 there was no . limit on 
the time taken for Senators in giving speeches in the Chamber 
(the record for the longest speech is held by Senator Gadina, 12 
hours in 1918). In 1919 a time limit of one hour was introduced 
except for the Address-in-Reply or on the first reading of a 
Bill when Senators could speak for one and a half hours. In 
1972, speeches were limited to 30 minutes on broadcast day and 
in April 1982 a sessional order was agreed to which provided for 
a 30 minute limit on speeches across the board.
All of these changes reflect the evolving nature of the 
Senate; streamlining its legislative and scrutiny procedures in 
order to deal with government activity and the work of 
departments. Yet as Senators said in Chapter 2, these 
developments appear to have left them singularly unimpressed.
A week in the life ...
Today, a Senator's workload is a mixture of a sometimes 
rich, sometimes repetitive, life style fitting into the roles 
that they wish to aspire to and playing out other roles that 
they may not enjoy but are committed to pursue. Depending on 
their state of origin, a Senator will fly into Canberra on 
Monday night or Tuesday morning oi a parliamentary sitting week, 
except for those that have committee meetings on Monday. 
Normally there is scheduled a full party meeting scheduled for 
Tuesday morning which will go up to lunch time. At 2.00 p.m. 
they will assemble in the Chamber to commence their 'Chamber 
duties' for the week going until 10.30 p.m. after a break at
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6.30-8.00 p.m. for dinner. All Senators are expected to be in 
the Chamber for petitions. The lifestyle of Senators over the 
next ten days will revolve around the Chamber. The current 
sitting pattern is:
(a) during the first sitting week -
Tuesday, 2 p.m. - 6.30 p.m.;8 p.m. - 10.30 p.m.
Wednesday, 10 a.m. - 12.45 p.m.; 2 p.m. - 7.p.m.
Thursday, 10 a.m. - 6.30 p.m.;8 p.m. - 10.30 p.m.
Friday, 9 a.m. - 12.45 p.m.;2 p.m. - 4.15 p.m.
(b) during the second sitting week -
Monday, 2 p.m. - 6.30 p.m.;8 p.m. - 10.30 p.m.
Tuesday, 2 p.m. - 6.30 p.m.;8 p.m. - 10.30 p.m.
Wednesday, 10 a.m. - 12.45 p.m.;2 p.m. - 7 p.m.
Thursday, 10 a.m. - 6 30 p.m.
Senators then return to their electorate for two weeks.
While the Senate is sitting, the Senator will be 
involved in various activities - in the Chamber, in his or her 
office and at party committee meetings. As mentioned in Chapter 
11, parliamentary committees cannot meet while the Senate is 
sitting without the prior consent of the President of the 
Senate. This course of action for committees is normally not 
taken up.
A Senator's duties in the Chamber will involve asking 
questions during question time, occasionally speaking during 
urgency debates or MPIs, commenting on Bills before the Senate, 
or on tabled papers, departmental annual reports or committee 
reports and also occasionally speaking on the adjournment 
motion, where it is possible to speak for up to ten minutes on
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any matter. Of course to engage in these activities requires 
research and preparation and often the assistance from the 
Parliamentary Library and the Senator's research assistant is 
required. Not all Senators (nor MPs) have their research
assistants permanently positioned in Canberra.
While net in the Chamber there are dinners and
luncheons to attend or meetings over these periods;
correspondence needs to be answered; attempts made to see a
Minister or party leader; informal meetings with colleagues; or 
perhaps meeting a constituent who is in Canberra for the day.
There may also be research for a speech in Parliament or for
Saturday's school opening or Sunday's sports presentation,
Sunday's lunch (for fund raising of course) or any of a whole
host of activities that ensure that cur Senator - or MHR - will 
be fully occupied on the weekend.
Our Senator will usually leave Canberra on Friday
morning to return to his or her electorate office where a 
personal staff of two will have been running the office for the 
rest of the week; though there can be committee meetings to
attend either in Canberra or in other states on the Friday 
ensuring absence from the electorate office (and family,) until 
Saturday. For those Senators who live in Perth, Darwin or a 
non-capital city, returning back to the electorate can be quite 
a time consuming ordeal.
While it is true that because a Senator represents the 
State he does not have electorate responsibilities to the extent
that an MHR does, he is still approached by a considerable
number of people. Also, a Senator can be ’appointed’ by the 
party hierarchy to look after a region, especially where the 
local member(s) of that region is from a different party.
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In 1901 some 161 million letters we re received by 
American Congressmen and Senators. They also had to deal with 
some 5500 registered lobbyists. In an orientation paper that is 
provided by the registered lobbyists of the United States 
Chamber of Commerce, is a list of 105 separate business issues 
that is suggested should be examined (Wittenberg 1982:46). The 
situation in Australia is obviously less dramatic with only 
about 10 major lobbyists and about an equal number of ether 
single issue lobbyists. The quantity of material going to our 
MHRs and Senators is unknown unfortunately. Though Solomon 
estimates that a Senator or Member will receive a minimum of 100 
to 150 inquiries from constituents a week. The nature of the 
inquiries will mainly be in relation to grievances with Federal 
departments. In such cases the member or his staff will make 
representations to the department on behalf of the constituents. 
This area is a constant source of complaint by members who argue 
that they simply do not have enough time nor assistance to 
handle these inquiries, not to mention the mail that also comes 
through the office. As well there is the more mundane office 
work that has to be attended to (Solomon 1978:124).
It is common for parliamentarians to hire extra staff 
from their own resources. Also, party helpers will be used to 
assist in the working of the parliamentarian’s office. This 
’free’ assistance by the party organisation conforms to official 
party strategy that above all else a parliamentarian’s electoral 
duties must be maintained at the highest possible level? not for 
any humanitarian reason but simply because the Senator or Member 
who is seen to be working hard will win votes for himself and 
for the party.
While elect orally a Senator may not have the same level 
of work as a Member, though in some cases this difference is 
becoming marginal, the reverse appears to be the case in their 
activities within Parliament.
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In comparing the workload of a Senator to his 
counterpart in the House of Representatives, Solomon feels that 
Senators'... have had a busier time in Parliament than Members 
... with half the House's membership, the Senate still has to 
deal with the same number of bills and sits for only slightly 
fewer hours than the House ... [as well], the amount of 
committee work [in the House of Representatives] is pitched at a 
far lower level* (Solomon 1978:114).
In another study of committee workload in the Senate, 
Solomon found that ' ... the amount of parliamentary committee 
work is higher in the Senate than in the House [more than two 
committee assignments for each House of Representatives 
backbencher] , while the spread of work is far more even in the 
Senate than in the House. However, House of Representatives 
backbenchers undertake more party work than their Senate 
confreres (Solomon 1979;67}.
Party committees occupy a considerable amount of 
Members' and Senators' time. In 1982, there were 26 party 
committees, 10 Labor and 16 Liberal Party, covering 26 subject 
areas. Each committee had a chairman, deputy chairman and a 
secretary but no support staff as parliamentary committees do. 
Ministers in a Liberal National Party Government (though when in 
opposition not shadow ministers) are excluded from membership. 
Labor committees have a designated time each week for them to 
meet. The Liberal Party committees meet 'regularly*. Meetings of 
the committees are open to any member who wishes to attend, 
which may occur if there is a guest speaker.
Solomon notes of committee membership generally that 
'backbenchers who once occupied high ministerial office are less 
likely to take part in parliamentary committee work than their 
younger colleagues' (Solomon 1978:67). In any case, Senators 
were not enthusiastic about the quality of ex-Ministers (also 
see comments by Senators in Chapter 12).
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United States Senate committees are an integral part cf 
the legislative process sitting up to six hours a day, five days 
a week for indefinite periods. However, it must be remembered 
that in the Australian Senate there are only a limited number to 
draw upon with not all Senators wanting to devote all or a large 
part of their time to committee work.
Party Committees
Party committees fit awkwardly into the parliamentary 
environment. Like many other aspects of Executive government in 
Australia they are not recognised in the Constitution. While 
they operate in the parliamentary arena involving most of the 
players in the game of politics, their position is a privilege 
and not a right. As Reid notes, ‘they are party, not
parliamentary, responsibilities and are alien to the formal 
machinery of government* (Reid 1982:3).
Indeed, formally, parliamentary committees are in a far 
stronger position in that their powers and privileges are 
recognised in the Constitution, they can receive evidence on 
oath, take evidence in public and have it recorded as Hansard. 
As well, parliamentary committees can advertise their reference 
and call for submissions, travel as a committee and can call 
upon support staff to assist in the workings of the committee. 
Under the previous Liberal Government, a Government Parties 
Committees Support Unit was established as a ‘contact point 
between the backbench committees, party secretariats and 
government1 (Giles 1982B:2.) . This unit has continued under the 
current Labor Government. The unit operates purely as an 
administrative organ providing secretarial services but: not 
research facilities. The unit makes arrangements for travel by 
committees to visit places of relevance to the committee but 
does not travel with the committee. If the committees have 
witnesses, either interstate or at Parliament House, there is no
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transcript of evidence taken and the minutes of the meeting are 
often taken by the secretary of the committee., who is a member 
of Parliament, The Renumeration Tribunal allows members of a 
committee to receive a travel allowance equal to that which is 
received when travelling with a parliamentary committee. 
However, any costs incurred, such as the flying in of witnesses, 
hire of venues when on an interstate visit etc, must be met by 
the party. Also, in the overcrowded environment of Parliament 
House, parliamentary committees have first call on the use of 
committee rooms. Thus while they may be said to be used by the 
parties as a means of keeping their backbenchers occupied, party 
committees appear to have little power and influence within the 
environs of Parliament House.
Yet within the party structure which operates in
Parliament, such committees have become quite formalised. In the 
Liberal Party committees, all legislation is screened for 
approval by a committee before it is introduced into the party 
room. This is not merely a rubber stamp. Giles says that, ‘in 
many instances committee opinion has caused alteration to, and 
elimination of, parts of major bills' (Giles 1982A:2).
The Labor Party has formalised the power of its
committees by providing within its Caucus rules, that
before any proposal is submitted to the party 
or its Executive by a Minister or Executive 
member, other than a proposal which by its 
nature must be confidential, it shall, be
submitted to the relevant committee (Jenkins 1982 s 2).
In both cases, party committees consider the
legislation before the Executive of the party or Parliament is 
able to examine the legislation« As Anne Summers says, 'The 
lobbying effort in Canberra often begins with the committee 
rather than the Minister' (Summers 1980:3).
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In  t h e  Labor P a r t y f c o m m it tee s  a r e  a l s o  d i r e c t l y  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n  a p p a r a t u s  t h a t  o p e r a t e s  i n  
p r e s e n t i n g  c h a n g e s  i n  p o l i c y  and p l a t f o r m  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
c o n fe r e n c e *  Thus p a r t y  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  t h e  ALP have  ra d e c i s i o n  
making ro le *  ( J e n k i n s  1 9 8 2 :2 )*
S i m i l a r l y  on L i b e r a l  P a r t y  c o m m i t t e e s ,  p o l i c y  p r o p o s a l s  
may be i n s t i t u t e d ,  though  t h e  p r o c e s s  i s  n o t  a s
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  a s  w i t h i n  t h e  ALP o r g a n i s a t i o n ,
In  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  power t h a t  p a r t y  c o m m i t t e e s  have  
w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a p p a r a t u s ,  M i n i s t e r s ,  w h e th e r  L i b e r a l  or 
L abor ,  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  c l o s e  l i a i s o n  w i t h  t h e i r  r e l e v a n t  
co m m it tee .  I n  th e  p r e v i o u s  L i b e r a l  P a r t y  Government ,  t h e  
Chairm an,  Deputy Chairman and S e c r e t a r y  met w i t h  t h e  M i n i s t e r  a t  
l e a s t  once  a week. As w e l l ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r  c o u ld  a t t e n d  m e e t i n g s  
o f  t h e  co m m it tee  as  a g u e s t .
The ALP p r o v i d e s  f o r  a more f o r m a l  l i n k  b e tw ee n  t h e  
M i n i s t e r  and t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o m m i t t e e .  For e x am p le ,  Caucus r u l e s  
p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of c o m m i t t e e s  which  1 . . .  s h a l l  
r e f l e c t  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  m i n i s t r y  a s  composed or p ro p o s e d  by 
t h e  p a r t y '  (Reid  1 9 8 2 : 2 0 ) .  In  1981 t h e  ALP e s t a b l i s h e d  a 
com m it tee  on T r a n s i t i o n  t o  Government .  As a r e s u l t  of  a s t u d y  
i n t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s  i n  C a b i n e t  by t h e  c o m m it te e ,  i t  
was d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e r e  would be s i x  C a b i n e t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n  a 
Labor g o v e rn m e n t ,  each  c h a i r e d ,  n o m in a l ly  a t  l e a s t ,  by t h e  Prime 
M i n i s t e r .  R e f l e c t i n g  t h i s  change  i n  th e  s t r u c t u r e  of  C a b i n e t ,  i t  
was a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e r e  would o n ly  be s i x  Caucus c o m m it tee s  
( though  w i t h  a m u l t i t u d e  o f  s u b - c o m m i t t e e s )  t o  shadow th e  
C a b in e t  c o m m i t t e e s .  A c h a n n e l  be tw een  t h e  p a r t y  v i a  i t s  
com m it tee  sy s te m  and t h e  M i n i s t e r  i s  t h u s  f i r m l y  e n t r e n c h e d .  As 
w e l l ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r  i s  f o r m a l l y  a member o f  Caucus c o m m i t t e e s ,  
though  o b v i o u s l y  he i s  n o t  e x p e c t e d  t o  a t t e n d  a l l  su c h  m e e t i n g s .  
Whereas L i b e r a l  P a r t y  c o m m i t t e e s  may comment or recommend
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changes  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  i s  t o  come b e f o r e  t h e  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  Labor  c o m m it tee s  a r e  o b l i g e d  t o  make a
recom m endat ion  i n  r e s p e c t  of  each  b i l l  or  r e s o l u t i o n  p r e s e n t e d ,  
or t o  be p r e s e n t e d ,  t o  th e  P a r l i a m e n t*  (Reid  1 9 8 2 : 2 1 ) .  As w e l l ,  
any C a b in e t  p r o p o s a l  must i n c l u d e  a r e p o r t  from t h e  r e l e v a n t  
Caucus c o m m i t t e e .
Yet. w h i l e  t h e  Labor P a r t y  has  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  
c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  of  c o m m it tee s  w i t h i n  
Caucus r u l e s ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  and powers  o f  m e e t i n g s  i n  t h e  two 
p a r t i e s  a r e  v e r y  s i m i l a r .
I t  was i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  t h e  g ro w in g  in v o lv e m e n t ,  
i n f l u e n c e  and power of  p a r t y  c o m m it te e s  t h a t  th e  Prime M i n i s t e r  
i n  197 6 p u b l i s h e d  G u i d e l i n e s  on. Of f i c i a l  Conduct  o f  Common w e a l t h 
Pub l i c  S e r v a n t s .  The Prime M i n i s t e r  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  
a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  p r a c t i c e  of p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s  a p p e a r i n g  b e f o r e  
b o th  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  and p a r t y  co m m it tee s  by t a b l i n g  t h e  
g u i d e l i n e s  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  1976 f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .
These g u i d e l i n e s  c o v e r e d  1 a p p e a r a n c e s  by p u b l i c  
s e r v a n t s  and o f f i c e r s  of  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s 5 b e f o r e  p a r t y  and 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m m i t t e e s .  In t h e  s e c t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  p a r t y
c o m m i t t e e s ,  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  a l l o w e d :
( i )  M i n i s t e r s  may a u t h o r i s e  o f f i c e r s  o f
t h e i r  d e p a r t m e n t s  . . .  t o  a p p e a r  b e f o r e  
governm ent  and o p p o s i t i o n  p a r t y
c o m m it tee s  t o  p r o v i d e  b r i e f i n g  o r
m i n i s t e r i a l  d e c i s i o n s  and p r o p o s a l s
( i i )  B r i e f i n g s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  w i l l  be 
a u t h o r i s e d  on th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
p ro m o t in g  t h e  f r e e s t  p o s s i b l e  f low  o f  
f a c t u a l  and b ack g ro u n d  m a t e r i a l  t o  
p e r m i t  in fo rm e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by t h e  
c o m m it te e s  and p a r t i e s  c o n c e r n e d  o f  
t h e  i s s u e s  i n v o l v e d  . . . *  (Reid  
1 9 8 2 : 3 ) .
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The guidelines formally recognise what has been 
occurring for some time; that public servants appear before 
committees of both types providing detailed information through 
extensile briefings.
The guidelines for both types of committees are 
similar, requiring officers to refrain from commenting on 
policy. Yet this does not appear to have restricted the contact. 
As Reid notes of party committees, they ‘have had an almost 
unencumbered access to public servants and they have taken full 
advantage of it; moreover, they applaud the procedure*. The same 
comment, with some notable exceptions such as the Berthelsen 
case involving the Minister for Defence and the Joint Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence, can be applied to parliamentary 
committees. On the whole, Ministers have allowed their 
departmental officials to liaise closely with all types of 
committees, indeed with all backbenchers.
Caucus committees were allowed access to departmental 
officers for the first time in 1973. This move, which was 
instigated by Caucus, proved successful as most Ministers 
•co-operated fully in phasing the committees into the whole 
process of government. The committees were encouraged to seek 
briefings from public servants who, in their turn, accepted 
without strain this penetration into the secret courts of the 
Labor Caucus* (Lloyd and Reid 1974:117).
Ten years later, it is clear that this is still 
continuing. Senators have found that they spend a significant 
proportion of their time acting as a check on public service 
advice that is being presented to the Minister and ensuring that 
this advice is ‘consistent with reality* (E) . As a result, ‘a 
lot of things get cleaned up on a backench committee which will 
later save the government embarrassment, both in the Chamber and 
in the electorate* (C) , though there was a feeling amongst some
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that work on Caucus committees was mainly of the negative type, 
blocking rather than initiating legislation, with 90% of 
legislation being accepted by the committees without amendment 
(D) * Perhaps not surprisingly then, these committees were seen 
by some as simply a means of keeping the backbench occupied. One 
Senator, in fact, argued that parliamentary committees were a 
more effective way of scrutinizing the Executive as they were 
more public than Caucus committees (J).
There was a strong contrast between backbench 
committees of the ALP and the LNP. ALP committees appear to be 
more involved in policy development, the formulation of tactics 
and an approach to forthcoming legislation, while LNP committees 
act more as a 'check on Public Service advice ensuring that 
advice given by the public service is consistent with reality1 
(B) (though this is probably more a contrast between opposition 
and government backbench committees rather than straight party 
comparisons).
This contact with the public service has enabled 
committees to gain some insight into the advice that a Minister 
is receiving. More importantly, these committees also act as 
sources of advice on specific topics. Concurrent with this 
development has been the gradual opening up of committees to the 
lobbyists that were starting to proliferate at this time. Until 
the establishment of the Caucus committee system in 1973, Caucus 
had always refused to receive deputations from any extra 
parliamentary organisations, including trade unions. This 
changing attitude, Lloyd and Reid suggest, resulted in giving 
Caucus 'access to a much greater range of information than it 
had ever possessed before. It raised, also, the danger of the 
whole system submerging beneath the weight of representation 
made to it from outside' (Lloyd and Reid 1974:118).
The benefits of these developments were twofoldt
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1« it provided for a source of information enabling them 
to keep abreast in specific fields and so provide a 
sound basis to scrutinise the Executive; and
2. it provided a focal point for interest groups and lobby 
groups with backbenchers. This was a two-way flow as it 
could inform members of certain moods in the electorate 
and provide a focus for these groups who would 
otherwise have little chance of catching the ear of the 
Minister.
Giles, for example, quotes a Managing Director of a 
major Australian company who commented:
Ministers today are overworked ... fas a 
result] Backbench Committees devoted to a 
range of problems, are most desirable. We 
have an opportunity to talk frankly at 
length, and you have not bad phones ringing 
... (Giles 1902:2).
It is doubtful, however, whether the Managing Director would 
attempt to meet a parliamentary committee if he could not meet 
the Minister.
Giles also commends the previous Liberal Prime Minister 
(the Rt Hon. J.M. Fraser) for insisting that reports of 
government party committees would receive a response within six 
months of their being tabled. The Prime Minister also introduced 
a similar innovation for parliamentary committees in 1978.
Both party and parliamentary committees undertake 
interstate visits. Parliamentary committees, cf course, have the 
power under Standing Girder 36 (AA) „ Party committees travel as 
backbenchers and so while they may not have the powers of their 
parliamentary counterparts, they have no difficulty in obtaining 
guest speakers, etc.
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Membership of both types of committees is similar, with 
the Whips more often than not being arbitrators on allocation of 
committee positions.
A further advantage of both committee systems is that 
they provide a meeting place for Members and Senators. For manyf 
it is the only contact they will have with certain other Members 
for the week. As wellf for joint parliamentary committees and 
party committeesr these committees 'help to bridge the divisions 
caused within the same party by its membership being drawn from 
different Houses of the same legislature', a feature of our 
bicameral parliamentary system. However, parliamentary 
committees provide a forum for Members and Senators from 
different parties to meet, free from the divisive atmosphere 
that exists in the Chambers, and so discuss issues in a less 
partisan manner.
As well, committees of all types are a 'convenient and 
important means for the political socialisation of members, 
[also they] appear to be stepping stones to Ministerial office? 
whereas parliamentary debates once provided the proving groundv 
for Ministerial talent, now the (party) committees offered 
similar scope and training' (Reid 1982s7). While Reid was 
referring to party committees, the same comments are often made 
of parliamentary committees. However, one Senator said that 'for 
frontbench objectives, Caucus committees are more important. As 
a result, it is a more negative environment in that you cannot 
afford to stuff things up'. The main concern for these Senators 
was their conduct in the committees in front of their colleagues 
(J) .
Thus, in a sense, both party and parliamentary 
committees are serving similar, if not the same functions, as an 
offset to, and for scrutiny of, the Public Service? providing an
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alternative source of advice for backbenchers and acting as a 
focal point for interest and lobby groups; as well as requiring 
a siginficiant amount of Senators time.
Yet. for all their similarities in purpose and function, 
the two committee systems are different« Sir Robert Menzies in 
1950 felt that 'it would be of assistance to Australia and the 
Government Parties if backbench members gained specialist 
knowledge in relation to the functions coming within the 
jurisdiction of the various Ministers and conveyed the views of 
the Committee to the Minister from time to time1 (Reid 1982:6)»
While the statement could be seen to cover both party 
and parliamentary committees, the power to enforce any views 
that committees may have is markedly different. While a Minister 
can fairly safely ignore the recommendations of a parliamentary 
committee, though this is not always the case, it would be a 
foolish Minister who would treat his party committee in the same 
manner.
While members of the party committees are conveying 
ideas to their Ministers, 'they also provide backbenchers with 
opportunities to communicate their own, or their party's, 
viewpoint to relevant interest groups and to individuals* (Reid 
1982:14); and so it is here that the difference between party 
and parliamentary committees emerges - the level at which 
partisan politics is introduced.
Party committees, for example, ensure that Ministers 
are kept informed of the mood of their party colleagues and that 
the Minister does not become any more isolated than he may 
already be. Thus the party's fortune is the main concern of the 
committee. Any government would be reluctant to allow a 
parliamentary committee to examine proposals for legislation 
before they were introduced into either House»
104
Party committees of the Fraser government received all 
Bills 'at least a week, in advance of the party room being 
informed of their imminent introduction to Parliament' (Summers 
1980:3). The chairman would then send a report on the Bill to 
the relevant Minister and the Prime Minister. With such 
potential power, it is not surprising that a number of Ministers 
developed a close relationship with chairmen. Summers reports 
that the then Minister for Telecommunication, Mr Staley, wouJd 
ring the Chairman of the Communications Committee. Mr MacKenzie, 
if he was having difficulty with a Cabinet submission. This is 
the type of power that parliamentary committees can only dream 
of.
One difference between parliamentary committees and the 
Liberal Party backbench committees, is that the latter have a 
Chairmen*s Committee. While attempts have been made to establish 
such a parliamentary committee, as yet such a committee has not 
been (formally) established. The Chairmen's Committee has 
overriding responsibility for all party committees and the 
support staff (Giles 1982:4). The power of this committee can be 
seen by the fact that the Fraser Liberal Government often 
referred difficult problems straight to the Chairmen's Committee 
rather than to the party committee.
The practice also developed of the Chairmen's Committee 
meeting with the Prime Minister at least once a year. It is hard 
to envisage such a practice developing with parliamentary 
committees.
Clearly, the difference between the two committee 
systems lies in the purpose of the two which can be described in- 
terms of power. If a Senator or Member wishes to be involved in 
policy formulation, to wield power and influence over their 
Executive and be involved in party tactics, then it is the party 
committees that they will become involved in. Formally, party
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committees may not be recognised. Informally, it is the party 
committees, and not the parliamentary committees, that are more 
often granted the ear of the Executive* And so it is not 
surprising that Senators said that the two committee systems 
could not be compared as their purposes were so different. The 
underlying concern of the party committee is the party*s fortune 
with the objective of maintaining or achieving power. They are 
directly concerned with policy. At best, parliamentary 
committees attempt to influence government policy through a 
lengthy report and scrutiny of government activity; this 
reviewing function being reactive.-
It would appear that parliamentary committees may help 
a Senator accumulate background knowledge in areas that he is 
working on in the party committee. As well, for those with 
ministerial aspirations, Caucus committees are seen as more 
important than parliamentary committees. Thus Senators see a 
clear distinction between the two types of committees with most 
considering party committees to be the more important in meeting 
their objectives. Accordingly, it is likely that parliamentary 
committees will continue to pursue the investigative areas of- 
inquiry rather than devote their energies to examining
legislation or enter into areas of policy. Those areas are 
already being fully explored on their party committees.
Competing Pressure
All Senators indicated that these competing pressures 
were becoming excessive with many indicating that they were 
thinking of curtailing their committees' activities. This was 
especially applicable for the more ambitious Senators who were 
more concerned that they maintain a high profile. Committee time 
for most was taking up to one half their time*
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As I suggested earlier, each Senator has to personally 
strike a balance between committee work, Chamber duties and 
electoral commitments* It appears that for a number of Senators 
this balance is difficult to achieve and they are concerned with 
the effect that it is having on their work overall:
Because of all these meetings, you get lost 
as to the procedures of the Chamber and what 
does go on In there. Some days because of all 
the committee work (both party and 
parliamentary) you can spend only half an 
hour in the Chamber. I am not too sure that 
this is a good thing (0)*
Yet even when a Senator devotes a considerable amount 
of time “ 'sometimes whole weekends® (N) - there is still
frustration expressed that they do not devote sufficient time to 
committee work after completing the report of the committee. 
Because of this, for ordinary members of a committee, the 
reference stops when the report is tabled. After the report is 
tabled, the committee will commence a new reference and so while 
all indicated a desire to follow up on previous work, once 
again, because of their workload, it is simply not possible. 
Moreover, 'I have electoral duties to consider; as well, my 
pre-selection comes up in July so I will have to re-examine my 
committee commitments for the winter recess' (N).
Another Senator also said that if he were to have 
pre-selection problems he would resign from the committees he 
was on and focus on areas that had a higher profile* He felt 
that committee work simply did not receive enough publicity in 
Senators' electorates and in their local branches. As one noted: 
'The Chamber is more public - your supporters can see that you 
are working*. No Senator said that he went onto a committee to 
benefit from the extra publicity. (This aspect of the poor media 
coverage of matters that relate to committee work will bo 
elaborated upon at a later stage).
107
Once again we are seeing that committee work is not
acknov/ledged, either in the electorate or in the local branches 
of their party. Indeed some local branches appear to see
committee work as merely a leisure activity and new Senators 
soon learn this afer joining the Senate:
I am told by the old hands that the 
performance in the Chamber is more important,, 
more relevant and more recognizable. I tend 
to agree that they are right. Probably the 
only people who would disagree would be some 
chairmen and secretaries (0).
As well as the threat of pre-selection,- the competition 
for time is also a problem for those on the frontbench or those 
who have such aspirations. All Senators feel that they are
overworked. As one Senator remarked: 'When you combine their
electoral duties? Chamber work and their committee work? 
Senators are the hardest working parliamentarians in Australia; 
there's no doubt about that' (Q) . Another said wearily that 1I 
sometimes feel overwhelmed. It is very frustrating' (C).
Why Committees?
One Senator commented that 'working on committees is
virtually a second job; it requires you to be more than a 
Senator - virtually a commissioner* (P) . If this is the case?
the question may be asked? why not appoint a commissioner to
investigate the matter and ease Senators' workloads?
If one accepts Senators' comments that they are
overworked, why then are references referred to committees 
rather than establishing a judicial inquiry or Royal Commission 
to consider the matter? What makes Senators sit on committees, 
examining a topic knowing that there are alternative forms of
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investigation available? The answer, that Senators believe 
committees to be the best means of examining such areas, begs 
the question -* why?
If nothing else, they are significantly cheaper and 
quicker and there is a greater chance of it being kept alive, 
replied one Senator; especially as the government is required to 
provide a response within 3 months. Only one Senator expressed 
reservations about whether their ability was adequate to study a 
matter in sufficient depth: 8 if you want to report on a
difficult area then you should commission a team of experts' 
(D) * Other Senators however felt that as long as they could 
mobilise consultants and 'not be shackled with party drones' 
then committees could successfully study an area (J) (see also 
Chapter 4). In many cases it was a positive advantage in having 
lay people investigate matters (see also Chapter 3) . Moreover, 
‘because a report is generated from within a political 
environment, it has more political impact on the decision 
makers' (E), with Senators being able to make representations in 
the party room, in the party committees or personally to the 
Minister.
As Senators complained in Chapter 15, committees are 
often struggling, to gciin sufficient media coverage. Nonetheless, 
they felt that a definite advantage that committees had over 
other forms of inquiry was that committee hearings are public 
and so keep in touch with industry (K).
It is because of these contacts with industry, 
community groups and the public generally that ‘Senators are 
better informed than Members cf the House of Representatives. 
Members tend to concentrate on areas of interest that directly 
affect their electorates. But this can restrict your approach to 
national concerns. Senators can look beyond small regional 
interests’ (K).
109
That most Senators still work on committees despite 
such workload pressures vindicates earlier comments by Senators 
that committee work is the most valuable and constructive work 
that a Senator currently undertakes.
When should Committees Meet?
One of the problems with the workload of Senators in 
relation to committee work is that under S.0.36(AA)19,
committees are not permitted to meet in private or conduct 
public hearings while the Senate is proceeding, without the 
permission of the President. While permission has never been 
refused, it is rare for committees to seek approval to hold 
meetings while the Senate is in progress.
The most recent request was in September and October
1583 when the Public Accounts Committee and the Joint Committee 
on Electoral Reform were given leave to meet while the Senate
was in progress. (Only the Public Works Committee can sit during 
sitting hours without seeking leave of the Senate; there is
provision under the Public Works Committee Act.)
There have been suggestions from time to time that 
committees be automatically allowed to meet while the Senate is 
in progress. As recently as 1981, the matter was referred to the
Standing Orders Committee. The Committee's report on Meetings_of
Committees__d .u r A n 9__£ ittings of the Senate f (Standing Orders
Committee, 1981) recommended against allowing committees to meet 
while the Senate was meeting without the consent of the Senate.
The report maintained that:
1. The primary duty of Senators is to the Senate 
and that proceedings in the Senate ought not 
to be neglected or poorly attended in favour 
of proceedings in committees, which are 
creatures of the Senate (Standing Orders 
Commit tees 19 81:3).
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2. It would be difficult to impose restrictions
on when and how committees (including how 
many committees should sit at any one time) 
should meet during the sittings of
Parliament *
3. The working of committees would deteriorate 
because of competition with the Chamber for a 
Senator's time.
4. The consideration of matters during committee 
hearings would be continually interrupted by 
the proceedings of the Senate. This would 
occur not only because of the calling of 
quorums and divisions but also when Senators 
are waiting to speak on a matter (Standing 
Orders Committee 1981:3} „
As the report notes: 'The Senate has not refused 
permission to committees to meet during sittings when committees 
have made application in particular circumstances . (Standing 
Orders Committee 1981:4). However, when the Public Accounts 
Committee sought leave to meet, it was strongly opposed by the 
Liberal Party and Senator Harradine. Senator Chaney said 'the 
principle that committees should not sit during sittings of the 
Senate is one that we should seek to uphold and maintain. Vie do 
not take the view that that is a principle which applies without 
any exception* (Parliamentary debates - Senate 1983:1303). 
Senator Chaney opposed the motion because it would mean that the 
committee would be meeting while (what Senator Chaney believed 
to be) important Bills were being considered in the Chamber. The 
ALP and the Australian Democrats supported the recommendations 
of the Standing Orders Committee that if committees sought leave 
to meet, then i.t should be granted. On both occasions when the 
Public Accounts Committee sought leave (6/9/83, 11/10/83), the 
Senate divided on the motion. On both occasions the question was 
resolved in the affirmative.
The reluctance to grant leave for committees to meet 
was confirmed by my sample. While most agreed that there was a 
real time problem for meetings of committees and it would
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certainly make life easier for them, they felt that it would be 
too difficult to implement. There was also a feeling that it 
would have a detrimental affect on the workings of the Chamber; 
that it would ’become as deserted as the House of 
Representatives* (E) „
A Senator who was generally not a keen supporter of the 
committee system argued that ’a Senator’s obligation is to be in 
the Chamber or at least aware of what is going on in the 
Chamber ’ (L) .
Yet, in the Rouse of Commons, where committees can meet 
when Parliament is meeting, it has been found that *... 
attendance at debates on the floor is no worse than it was. In 
some cases defence, economic, criminal and penal affairs, come 
to mind - the quality of debate on the floor has been enhanced 
by mat e rial po uring down stairs’ (Pring 1982:20) „
In an attempt to get around the clash in workload, a 
number of Senators suggested that parliamentary time be 
reorganised with Parliament either sitting less frequently of\ 
that it meet for a four day working week with specific times for 
committee work or study. Certainly the problem of workload is 
unresolved.
In the first year of the Hawke Government two different 
sets of sitting patterns were tried; with as much success as the 
many different sitting patterns that have been experimented with 
in previous years. The problem with committees is that there are 
few times that are available for committees to meet when 
Parliament is sitting. The non-sitting days of a sitting week 
are not really suitable with Senators entering into other 
commitments months in advance. Accordingly, when meetings are 
held on non-sitting days attendance is often poor.
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As a result of this workload covering party and 
backbench committees and other commitments, a Senator's workload 
is inevitably affected in most areas of activity, as more than 
one commentator has noted. For example, Wettenhall had observed 
that *... those appointed to committees participate very 
unevenly in their proceedings; sometimes fewer than half the 
members of a committee will take any part in the preparation of 
its report, and some members will only attend sessions when a 
witness they consider particularly interesting is to be 
examined* (Wettenhall 1979:55). Senators themselves are not 
concerned. It is simply not expected that all Senators will play 
an active part in every reference that a committee considers.
Xn_S _e/L r ch__. o f _ a_ B a lance
Thus the workload of a Senator is a diverse mix of 
party, parliamentary and electoral duties which ensures that 
they are fully extended, and some would suggest, overworked? 
particularly when Parliament is meeting.
The difficulty is in finding a satisfactory mix. As v7as 
seen in chapter 2, Senators are first and foremost members of a 
political party operating in an environment that continually 
reinforces their ideological stand. This is not to suggest; that 
they do not support the institution. All Senators displayed a 
great deal of respect for the Senate and its proceedings, but it 
must be placed in a broader political context. The Senate ticket 
is the vehicle that Senators use to enter Parliament. Having 
achieved this goal, they must continue to nurture the electorate 
and the local branch council. While this may not require the 
same effort that is expended by a Member of the House of 
Representatives, nonetheless, it never escapes their minds. Thus 
their first priority is to matters that relate to the party and 
the electorate.
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It is not that such areas as parliamentary committees 
are unimportant» But such work is considered to be part of their 
role as a Senator rather than that as a party representative. 
Even here, though, ulterior motives can form a strong basis for 
parliamentary committee work, protecting their party * s interest 
or for personal development, either as an extention of their 
ego, developing an expertise in an area or as a stepping stone 
to gaining a ministerial position or both. Yet all of these 
goals can be achieved via other avenues in the parliamentary 
arena without working on parliamentary committees.
Thus if one uses these criteria then parliamentary 
committees are, at best, only relatively important. As Senators 
said, if an election is coming up or Senators are having 
pre-selection difficulties then parliamentary committees would 
be the first area that they would lock at in an endeavour to 
create time to undertake other activities. Even when such 
difficulties do not arise, committee work roust fit into the 
broad mix of political commitments that Senators are involved 
in. Thus while their workload continues to be excessive, work on 
parliamentary committees can only ever be expected to be on a 
very part-time basis.
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CHAPTER 6
REFERENCES
All matters that are referred to Senate committees must 
come from the Senate Chamber. Normally a Senator, though not 
necessarily a member of that committee, moves that a reference 
be referred to a committee for Consideration. A reference can 
originate from the committee itself with a member of each party 
steering it through the respective party rooms. If the reference 
has the support of both parties then normally there is no vote 
in the Chamber; this in turn increases the possibility of 
bipartisanship on the committee.
Committees are required to *take care not to enquire 
into any matters which are being examined by a Select Committee 
of the Senate* (Standing Order 36AA(12))• A resolution to refer 
a matter tc a committee normally reads: ’that the following
matter be referred to the standing committee on ... 1
While a reference can follow the same course through 
both party rooms, the scrutiny it may receive appears to vary 
between parties. While Senators in the Liberal and National 
Parties accepted that it is customary for the chairman to obtain 
approval before it is sent to the Chamber, they argue that the 
reference should be of no concern to the party room; it is only
a matter for the Senate. Particularly galling for some is the
possibility of members in the House of Representatives
determining references of Senate Committees. ‘It is surely none 
of their business’ (B).
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Nonetheless, concern was expressed by some Senators 
interviewed that this may not always be the case in the future. 
One noted that a cnasty trend5 was developing of references 
being treated more seriously in the party room. It appears that 
such apprehension was a result of the Finance and Government 
Operations report on Asia Dairy, which was considered to be a 
watershed in the approach by the Executive to committees. It was 
now anticipated that the party room would be more careful in the 
future (B, E).
In contrast, most Senators who were members of the 
Labor Party argued that having Caucus approve a reference would 
certainly not be a mere formality. It would be raised either 
with the Caucus committee or the Executive and then have the 
matter discussed in the party room, if for no other reason than 
to determine the priority of interests in that area. After all, 
‘there is a great deal of wisdom in Caucus* (L) . This Senator 
could recall one reference that was overturned in the party 
room, though he stressed that this was a very rare occurrence.
Yet a Liberal Senator who maintained that politics 
should be left out of committees nontheless said that to get a 
committee to examine a matter: fI guess I would start, with the
Liberals on the committee then do a bit of lobbying on the 
backbench and ensure that you have the backing of the party and 
then approach the ALP' (F).
Despite the scrutiny that references receive in the 
party room, a number of Senators were critical of references 
that committees receive. Senator Martin for example, said that: 
‘there is a view that committees undertake references for the 
sake of doing something and that there should be a more critical 
appraisal of their activities1 (Martin 1982:235); though it was 
unclear whether she agreed with these sentiments. Martin then 
went on to note that when a committee reached the stage of
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preparing the draft report, the focus of Senators was being 
directed to a possible subject matter for the next inquiry. As 
well, * one can question the value of some of the inquiries that 
have been and are being undertaken and whether it is appropriate 
that they be undertaken by a Senate committee* (Martin 
1982:235). A small number of Senators also commented on the poor 
quality of references«, One Senator believed that
There is bad conceptualising in formulating 
the references. A lot of the references are 
self-fulfilling. You can write the report 
before the investigation starts: there*s a 
lot of it about, it*s a bad thing, and more 
has to be done to remedy it; or, it's a good 
thing and here's a shopping list (G) .
In such cases nothing is gained out of the reports. It 
was felt that committee investigations should contribute 
something new to the subject. The problem was seen to be that 
there was very little scrutiny in the selection of references. 
'The party room would never reject a reference even though they 
are formally discussed' (B) . The thought that the House of 
Representatives, through the party room, may have a control over 
Senate activity was also a concern for some Senators. No mention 
was made by this Senator or others of a possible role that the 
Senate Chamber or the Clerks could play in ensuring that a well 
written reference is prepared.
The appointment of committees or the definition of the 
terms of reference seems purely fortuitous to anyone outside the 
parliamentary system. As a result of this determination by 
committees to assert their independence, the making of a planned 
examination of government activity often becomes impossible. The 
Study of Parliament Group argues that 'the choice of subjects 
for committee investigation follows the mood of the House rather 
than any programme' (Study of Parliament Group 1970:38).
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This would also appear to be the case with 
parliamentary committees in the Senate» The study of Parliament 
Group also argues that members in the House of Commons often 
sought a topic because it would gain sufficient attention in the 
media and thus the public eye or that 'the declared purpose of 
an inquiry may disguise the ambitions of a particular Chairman* 
(Study of Parliament .1970:38) „ (Though see Chapter 14 on 
difficulties in gaining satisfactory media coverage«)
The reasons for those who wished to involve their party 
in future references ranged from non-political *... it makes 
sense to find out if there are a priority of interests in the 
particular area* (0) to * it bothers me that a lot of what one 
does on committees is done without the concurrence and knowledge 
of the party as a whole. On a committee one is on one's own. 
Although you are there on behalf of the party, yet you are 
making decisions without any collective authority* (M) , Another 
Senator said that he would seek Executive approval even before 
he informed the party committee or the party as a whole (I)«
These views were consistent v^ ith those expressed 
earlier. Those who saw committees as a continuation of politics, 
only at a different level, continued to follow that line of 
thinking. Yet when asked are there, areas that committees should 
avoid examining there was agreement that one should not look at 
policy or security areas for ‘this would merely build up 
antagonisms that would flow over to other less contentious 
areas. Senators would also become more agressive*. Although one 
Senator countered this with * No? it is up to the Chamber to 
determine. Open government depends on it* (C). All Senators felt 
that partisan policy areas would split the committee. This would 
result in committees being nothing more than ‘a useless 
exercise‘.
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Few Senators seemed to have thought through
implications that spring from this desire to avoid policy 
issues. Clearly though, they are there. Evans, for example, 
maintains there is tremendous' pressure to preserve the unity of 
committees by avoiding matters that are likely ‘to generate 
partisan controversy; this tends to narrow quite spectacularly 
the field of potential enquiry B..s (Evans 1982:13).
Weller goes beyond this in suggesting that efforts to 
keep committees bipartisan results in their being couched in the 
most general terms. Yet, even when they are specific, they deal 
with issues that are themselves bipartisan or of no importance 
politically and the report becomes little more than a 
descriptive document. Thus the style of a committee is directly 
affected through Senators' efforts to maintain unity and harmony 
on a committee (Weller 1982:106).
The fruitful enquiries are of the non-partisan nature, 
which creates two problems: ‘If specific proposals are made then 
either the topics under review are of no immediate political 
importance and are thus marginally irrelevant to the issues of 
the day, or they are, ... of equal and similar concern to all 
parties. But if the inquiries are of substantial political 
importance they have to be couched in such generally acceptable 
terms that concensus is retained...the paradox of parliamentary 
committees seems to be that they can usually be specific when 
the issue under consideration is not politically important or 
partisan; but they must be general - often describing processes 
- when it is a live political issue. Only thus can the unity of 
the committee be maintained and the report be anything but a 
simple party political document9 (Weller 1982:106).
Those Senators who were critical of the way references 
were written (and they were only a small number) did not 
attribute the desire to avoid policy areas c\s the cause of the
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poor quality of these references? nor did they, or any other 
Senators, offer positive guidelines on the direction that 
references should take. Hawker makes a suggestion that
references should try to maximise the distance between
themselves and the Executive. Also, committees should select 
references that are not confined to a single department but 
rather select a reference which involves ‘cross-organizational 
boundaries so that allies can be sought in different locations 
or opponents car. be held off, balanced or neutralized. 
Short-term problems cannot be tackled well, for sudden rushes to 
decision and superior bureaucratic forces of paper work and 
procedures will be quickest to respond ... Bipartisan work on 
policy problems can be guaranteed only when problems are both 
important and ill-defined. Policy problems which are coming into 
view, which some political activists at least think may be of 
importance to their party and which the executive and its shadow 
find too difficult to undertake; this defines the arena for: the 
committee system* (Hawker 1979:9). Yet if the Executive finds 
the issue too difficult to consider then it is unlikely that a 
parliamentary committee would be able to consider the matter 
without a strong partisan element entering into proceedings.
Senators who were critical of references that
committees received reflected the concern that committees should 
adapt to the demanding workload of Senators. Reflecting the 
comments made in the parliamentary debates in 1970 and 1971, 
they were looking for references that are of no more than 12 
months duration and ending with a short report.
While observers and some Senators, especially those 
from the Opposition, were disappointed that committees did not 
examine policy issues that may be potentially crtical of the 
government of the day, most reflected their understanding of 
their role that they displayed earlier. Parliamentary committees 
are approached in a bipartisan manner because Senators believe 
that there are more productive and effective ways of pursuing 
their political objectives.
CHAPTER 7
THE POWERS OF COMMITTEES
A. Constitutional Powers
The general power of the Parliament to conduct 
inquiries through the appointment of Senate committees, and to 
determine the power, privileges and procedures of these 
committees, is derived from section 49 of the Constitution which 
states:
The powers, privileges, and immunities of the 
Senate and of the House of Representatives, 
and of the members and the committees of each 
House, shall be such as are declared by the 
Parliament, and until declared shall be those 
of the House of Commons House of Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, and of its members and 
committees, at the establishment of the Commonwealth.
Parliament has yet to declare what its powers, 
privileges and immunities are. Nevertheless, Parliament and its 
committees derive from section 49 two primary powers:
1. Investigatory power - this provides for 
committees to send for witnesses and 
papers.
2. The privilege of freedom of speech and 
open debate (derived from article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights).
These two powers provide the legal basis for the
workings of committees. The extent of these powers is not 
altogether clear with the Executive taking a narrower 
interpretation of these powers than Parliament, and in
particular the Senate.
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These specific powers of Parliament and its committees, 
through the Standing Orders, are derived from section 50 of the 
Constitution, which states:
Each house of the Parliament may make rules 
and orders with respect to -
(i) The mode in which its powers,
privileges, and immunities may be
exercised and upheld:
(ii) The order and conduct of its business 
and proceedings either separately or 
jointly with the other House.
Provision for the powers of the Legislative and General 
Purpose Committees, which are the committees this Thesis is 
concerned with, are stated in Standing Order 36 AA(2). This
empowers such committees to:
inquire into and report upon such matters as 
are referred to them by the Senate, including 
any Bills, Estimates or Statements of 
Expenditure, messages, petitions, inquiries or papers, ...
When Bills are to be referred to committees, a motion 
to refer the Bill to a committee is moved immediately after the 
second reading speech. Notice need not be given (Standing Order 
196 A).
B. Privileges
Odgers describes the privileges of Parliament as the 
'special rights or immunities attaching to Parliament, its 
Members, and others, necessary for the discharge of the 
functions of Parliament without obstruction and without the fear 
of prosecution' (Odgers 1976:633).
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As explained earlier, these privileges, under section 
49, allow the Parliament to delegate this power to parliamentary 
committees.
Privileges can be categorised under two headings: 
corporate privileges (which are inherent in the committee) and 
individual privilege (those held by members themselves).
(i) Corporate Privilege
a. Control of internal proceedings: This is 
recognised under section 50 of the 
Constitution and the Standing Orders.
b. Control of members: Under section 47 of 
the Constitution Parliament has the 
power to determine the eligibility of 
Members of Parliament. Each House also 
has the power under Standing Orders to 
suspend a member for conduct unbecoming 
of the Chamber.
c. Inquisition powers: That is, the right
to summons persons to give evidence.
d. Publication of debates and documents:Parliament has complete control over 
debates in the Chamber and thus, in 
committees. The principle of privilege 
covers the publication of Hansard and 
any report that is tabled in Parliament. 
Each House also has control of the 
admission of persons who are not members 
of that Chamber. This also covers 
committee proceedings.
e. Punishment for contempt or breach of
privilege: Each House has the right to 
punish any person for breach of 
privilege. This can cover a breach of 
Standing Orders, interference with the 
conduct of business in the Chamber or
with members, or contempt with the 
Chamber generally.
(ii) Individual privilege
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a. Freedom of speech: Article 9 of the Bill 
of Rights states 'The freedom of speech 
and debate or proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be impeached or questioned 
in any court or place out of Parliament'
b. Freedom from arrest: There is freedom
from arrest and civil action for both 
members and for witnesses attending 
Parliament,
(Lumb and Ryan 1981:96-99)
While Standing Orders do not cover all aspects of 
privilege, they do make specific reference to the two most
important powers of Senate committees. They are the power to
call for papers and the power to summons witnesses (S.O. 36
AA(9) and (13) and Chapter XXXIII).
The power to administer oaths to witnesses is derived 
from section I of the Parliamentary Witnesses Oaths Act 1871 (by 
virtue of section 49 of the Constitution). This act empowers any 
committee of the House of Commons to administer an oath to the
witnesses examined.
Crown Privilege
As noted earlier, the extent of the power of privilege 
in Parliament has yet to be clearly defined. One result of this 
is that the question of how far crown privilege extends or 
intrudes into parliamentary privilege has has yet to be 
resolved. Under the doctrine of crown privilege, the Executive 
may claim privilege in respect of documents and, with regard to 
witnesses, may instruct public servants to abstain from giving 
evidence. While the Executive, at its convenience, has claimed 
crown privilege with regard to certain matters, Parliament has 
never accepted the concept. As Parliament has never tested its 
powers to the limit, the issue remains unresolved.
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The High Court in Fitzpatrick and Brown (1955) said 
that section 49 of the Constitution should not be read down and 
it is generally accepted that the powers and privileges of 
Parliament and its committees are very wide. However, Ellicott, 
in particular, has argued that there ought to be areas where the 
government can claim privilege and further, that the width of 
the powers of Parliament was intended to be restricted to 
matters that arise from Parliament's legislative function 
(Greenwood and Ellicott 1972) .
Odgers contends that 'the Executive Government enjoys 
no privilege which puts it above Parliament, having in mind that 
an overriding principle of the parliamentary system of 
government is, and must be, the accountability of the Executive 
to Parliament. Any recognition of Executive privilege, as an 
unchallengable right, to deny information to Parliament, is 
inconsistent with that fundamental principle' (Odgers 1976:563).
Yet as is noted in Chapter 12, the Government in 1978 
tabled Guidelines for Official Witnesses Appearing Before 
Committees which included a section outlining areas where the 
government believed it could claim crown privilege.
It is clear that Parliament has the power to provide 
parliamentary committees with powers as it sees fit. The 
Executive maintains that it may also claim privilege restricting 
the use of documents and limiting the areas that public servants 
may comment upon when appearing before parliamentary committees. 
As we shall see later, the government and Parliament's 
understanding of privilege do not always coincide.
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CHAPTER 8
THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN
While much has been written of the committee system, 
outsiders have given little thought to the person whose role it 
is to give the committtee its direction and who can shape the 
committee significantly. The purpose of this Chapter then is to 
explore the role of the chairman. Is the position an end in 
itself or are there other motives?
Following the start of a new session of Parliament the 
first task of a committee is the election of a chairman, who is 
chosen by members of the committee. Standing Order 36 (AA)6 
provides for a 'Government member as Chairman'. Traditionally, 
the most senior government Senator receives the nomination. ('As 
a result', said one Senator, 'it is not hard to be chairman. It 
would be a different matter if it depended on capability' (B) ) . 
It is also traditional that the Deputy Chairman is a member of 
the Opposition. It is interesting to note that a new chairman is 
not selected at the start of a new reference but at the start of 
a new session. It is customary at the first meeting of the 
committee to authorise that the chairman make statements to the 
press on the committee's behalf. However, provision can be made 
so that all statements must be approved by the committee before 
release.
The pool of Senators available for selection as 
chairman is limited. As the chairman must be a member of the 
governing party, there are approximately 28-30 senators to 
choose from. From this this pool there will be selected 5/6 
Ministers, a Whip,and President. At any one time there are about
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five first timers so we are left with some 15 senators to fill 
the eight positions as chairmen of committees: less than a one 
in two chance.
State Representation
In the selection of Senators and Members for the 
ministry, the balance in state representation is critical. All 
states must be represented, although the five or six Senators 
selected to join the ministry will not necessarily represent the 
six States and the two Territories. Yet while there is a 
conscious decision by poilitical parties to maintain a balance 
between the States, this is not the case in the selection of the 
chairmen of committees. As can be seen in Table 6, the 
distribution of chairs between States is grossly 
disproportionate, with W.A. coming out of the appointments best. 
At any one time, at least one State has not been represented in 
the chair of a committee. Clearly, State representation is not a 
consideration in the selection of chairmen.
TABLE 6
STATE REPRESENTATION AMONGST CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES
W.A. TAS. N.S.W. S. A. VIC. QLD. TERRITORIES
1972-75 1 1 1 - 2 2 -
1976-83 3 1 2 2 1 1 -
1983 3 2 _ 1 . 1 1
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The Role of Chairman
That the chairman receives an allowance for his duties 
implies that his role on a committee is beyond that of an 
ordinary member. As chairman of a committee, his role is one of 
steering the committee and controlling its structure, including 
staff. Given that the chairman is expected to supervise staff it 
is not surprising that they work closely together. Thus it will 
be the staff via the chairman who will present the committee 
with a list of potential witnesses and possible field trips and 
will provide the committee with background papers discussing 
possible isues that may be raised during the inquiry. This close 
relationship also develops because of the responsibility of the 
chairman to prepare the draft report. All Senators accepted that 
because of their heavy workload, the draft report was largely a 
staff effort under the supervision of the chairman. Thus it is 
accepted that the chairman determines how the reference is 
shaped, focuses the interests of the committee and is the main 
initiator of ideas. Only one Senator said that 'as an ordinary 
member of the committee I would like to play an important part 
in the shaping of the draft of the report' (J).
Media Projection
Because press statements are normally made by the 
chairman, on behalf of the committee, who generally acts as a 
contact point for the media, the position as chairman can 
provide him with a forum to gain publicity. In contrast, 
chairmen of backbench committees rarely receive publicity and 
the only contact that they have with the media is on an informal 
basis.
Only a small number of Senators however, have been able 
to take advantage of their position as chairman to project 
themselves into the national media. Without doubt, the most well
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known chairman in the committee system is Senator Rae who has 
been described as 'having an affair with the Senate' (Bowers 
1981:7) through his work on committees; though this affair 
appears to have ceased. Upon becoming a shadow minister in 1983, 
he withdrew from all parliamentary committee work. Articles that 
appear in the press on him invariably focus on his work on the 
Select Committee on Securities and Exchange and the Standing 
Committee on Finance and Government Operations. Never is any 
mention made, for example of his chairmanship of the party 
committee on Tourism (or, for example, that the Chairman of the 
Employment and Industral Relations Committee is Senator Scott, 
National Party, New South Wales). Other Senators who have been 
successful in projecting themselves include Senator Baume as 
Chairman of the Social Welfare Committee and Sir Magnus Cormack, 
as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence who was Chairman from 1967 to 1969. These and other 
Senators have been able to gain publicity that would have been 
extremely difficult to otherwise obtain.
Yet while these chairmen have been successful in 
gaining favourable publicity, there have been many who have been 
unsuccessful. Senators felt that the reason the chairman and the 
committee did not receive adequate publicity lay with the press 
who appeared not to be interested, nor understand the workings 
of committees; particularly when they are dealing in esoteric 
subject areas.
Yet committees themselves do little to cultivate their 
relationship with the press. In the House of Commons, some of 
the committees at the start of a new session arrange to have 
cocktails with the press. No such functions occur on Senate 
committees. As well, staff are not trained in how the media 
works nor the constraints and dealings that they face, though 
Senators generally can also display a lack of understanding of 
how to court the press gallery.
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Charirman as the Leader
While the chairman takes a leading role in committee 
proceedings, Senators made it clear that he would soon incur the 
wrath of his colleagues if he were to dominate questions during 
hearings. It is traditional that he 'let members get first bite 
of the cherry'. During committee hearings, his role tends to be 
that of arbitrator and protector of witnesses, particularly 
where questions of commercial or crown privilege are involved. 
(For a discussion on crown privilege, see Chapter 7.) A number 
of Senators said that witnesses would be nervous and 
apprehensive and it was up to the Chairman to make them feel at 
ease. No Senator however, would admit to threatening witnesses 
through unnecessarily aggressive questioning. As was seen in 
Chapter 5, the chairman of party committees, and especially the 
chairmens committee, are treated seriously by the government, 
with the Prime Minister and Ministers having regular contact 
with these chairmen. It has been said of Senator Rae that 
'through his strenuous efforts to exploit the power of the 
Senate committee system, Rae has built a political power base 
which he hopes will ultimately put him on a par with Fraser's 
Ministers' (National Times 1981:5) and presumably, more powerful 
than chairmen of the party committees. While this respect may 
'ultimately' be attained, clearly this has not occurred.
While he is held in high regard in the party room, one 
should be cautious in over-estimating his power base. As one 
Senator said, 'he may well have influence, but power - that is a 
different matter' (B) .
This is not to suggest that chairmen do not take a 
higher profile in the community as part of their duties as 
chairman. They make speeches, attend seminars etc. on behalf of 
the committee and, overall, promote the good work that the 
committee has undertaken. While it may be true that chairmen do
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not have a high public profile, in the areas in which they 
operate they can be quite active with people working in areas of 
interest to the committee corresponding to the chairman instead 
of the appropriate Minister - 'I get phone calls from people who 
say "as chairman of the ... can you fix this or that" when you 
are not specifically looking at it. It is simply in the 
committee's area of interest' (E).
The most important quality of a chairman is determining 
what will be acceptable to the committee both in the selection 
of the reference and the printing of the report. The chairman
needs to ensure 'that the report would be as comprehensive as it
ought to be and presented in a way which would be appropriate 
both for public consumption and by the members of the committee 
themselves, as well as being acceptable to them. The chairman 
that put before a committee a draft which was then hacked to 
pieces, substantially rejected and resulted in dissenting 
reports would obviously be a pretty unsuccessful chairman' (A).
The Chairmanship as a Stepping Stone
The number of options for advancement available to
Senators are limited to the position of Minister, President of
the Senate, Whip or Chairman of Committees. With only 6 
ministerial positions available in the Senate, clearly there are 
only limited possibilities available. The position of President 
of the Senate is normally given to one of the more senior 
government Senators, and certainly one that has been passed over 
as a possible Minister. The position of Whip is strongly 
contested, being in the mainstream of politics and is seen as a 
good training ground and a natural stepping stone to the 
ministry. If one examines the Whips since 1930 (see Table 7) and 
sees the positions that they have eventually gained, it can be 
seen why the position of Whip is seen as desirable. It is clear
131
that the position of chairman is not essential for the position 
of whip. Only Senators Baume and Robertson have been chairmen of 
committees.
TABLE 7
CAREER PATH OF GOVERNMENT WHIPS
Senator Period as WhiD Hiahest Position Attained
Wright, R.C. 1950-1951 Minister
(later Sir Reginald)
Rankin, A.J.M. 1951-1966 Minister
(later Dame Annabelle)
Scott, M.F. 1966-1968 Minister
Cotton, R.C. 1968-1969 Minister
(later Sir Robert)
Withers, R.G. 1969-1971 Minister
Young, H.W. 1971-1972 President of the Senate
O'Byrne, J. 1972-1974 President of the Senate
Poyser, A.G. 1974-1975 (New Party in Government)
Chaney, F.M. 1975-1976 Minister
Baume, P.E. 1978-1978 Minister
Knight, J.W. 1979 (Deceased)
Kilgariff, B.F. 1980-1983 (New Party in Government)
Robertson, E.A. 1983 (Seen as a possible
Minister by many.)
The position of chairman, however brings mixed results. 
Of the 19 ministers since 1976, only seven have been chairmen of 
committees (Senators Baume, Cotton, Durack, Gietzelt, Greenwood, 
Scott and Withers) . In contrast, of those who were chairmen of
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committees in 1972-75 (Senators Everett, Georges, Gietzelt, 
Primmer, Brown, Coleman and Keeffe) only Senator Gietzelt later 
went on to become a Minister. Indeed, there have been a number 
of long serving chairmen who have not gained promotion including 
Senators Butterfield, Cormack, Davidson, Jessop, Prowse, Rae, 
Sims and Thomas. Thus chairman of committees may be a stepping 
stone to the ministry, but there are too many exceptions to the 
rule to offer a lot of encouragement for ambitious Senators.
Weller and Grattan point out that most Ministers have 
joined the ministry within 5 years of entering Parliament and 
that if they have not been chosen within eight years the 
likehood of being promoted is remote. However, it is rare for 
Senators to become chairmen within their first two years. Weller 
and Grattan found that while 'some (Ministers) thought work on 
parliamentary and party committees a useful apprenticeship... 
there was a more general view that such parliamentary experience 
had limited value (Weller and Grattan 1983:37).
It is clear that chairmen have not attained the status 
of surrogate ministers that Senator Hamer and others have argued 
should happen and hoped that over time would occur. Senator Rae 
has been the only Senator who has consistently over the last 
decade received almost continual press coverage for his work on 
Senate committees. Certainly the financial gain is hardly 
indicative of such an exalted position. Whereas the Whip has an 
extra personal staff member and an allowance of $5,476, the 
chairman of a parliamentary committee, with three extra staff 
that must service all the needs of the committee, receives an 
allowance of $1,956 per annum (in 1982).
In terms of influence and respect within the hierarchy 
of the power structure within Parliament House, parliamentary 
committees and their chairmen do not rate very well. This is not 
to say that committees do not have influence, but rather that if
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it is influence, within the context of the decision making 
process in parliament, then there are more effective avenues 
that can be pursued; and Senators are well aware of this. Why 
then do Senators become chairmen?
Senators can fairly confidently seek the chairmanship 
in the knowledge that at least some of the previous occupants 
have been successful in progressing on to be Ministers. 
Chairmanship offers the opportunity to impress colleagues and 
acquire a thorough knowledge of a subject that is required as 
chairman of a committee; though no Senator suggested that the 
aspirations to a future ministry had any perceived effect on the 
way chairmen ran committees or chose references.
Yet almost in contradiction, Senators seek such a 
position if they have been passed over for a ministerial 
position. Their ultimate parliamentary achievement then, becomes 
chairman of a committee.
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CHAPTER 9
SUBMISSIONS
The c a l l i n g  o f  s u b m i s s i o n s  i s  t h e  f i r s t  c o n t a c t  
comm i t t e e s  w i l l  have  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c .  The r e a d i n g  of  s u b m i s s i o n s  
and t r a v e l l i n g  i n v o l v e d  i n  t a k i n g  e v id e n c e  i s  t ime  consuming and 
must  f i t  i n t o  an a l r e a d y  ove rc rowded  d i a r y .  I t  would be f a r  
e a s i e r  f o r  S e n a t o r s  n o t  t o  c a l l  f o r  s u b m i s s i o n s  nor  t a k e  
e v id e n ce  bu t  s imp ly  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a commission of  i n q u i r y  i n t o  
t h e  s u b j e c t .  Yet  S e n a t o r s  do commit t h e m s e l v e s  t o  a work load  
t h a t  can be v e ry  demanding .  I s  i t  a l t r u i s m  or do S e n a t o r s  
p e r s o n a l l y  b e n e f i t  f rom t h i s  p a r t  of  commi t t ee  i n q u i r y ?  The 
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  c h a p t e r s  examine t he  c o n t a c t  t h a t  S e n a t o r s  have  
w i t h  w i t n e s s e s  and t h e  impac t  t h a t  i t  ha s  on bo th  S e n a t o r s  and 
t h e  S e n a t e ,  and w i t n e s s e s .
Having r e c e i v e d  a new r e f e r e n c e ,  t h e  Commit tee 
S e c r e t a r i a t  w i l l  p l a c e  an a d v e r t i s e m e n t  i n  r e l e v a n t  newspape r s  
and j o u r n a l s  i n v i t i n g  i n t e r e s t e d  p e r s o n s  t o  f o r w a r d  s u b m i s s i o n s .  
When s u b m i s s i o n s  a r e  r e c e i v e d  t hey  a r e  c i r c u l a t e d  t o  a l l  members 
o f  t h e  comiri i t tee ( s u b m i s s i o n s  a r e  n o t  p u b l i c  documents )  .
S e n a t o r  Hamer a r g u e s  t h a t  ' t h e r e  i s  a v a s t  s t o r e  of 
wisdom and knowledge i n  t h e  community which  we s h o u ld  t a p '  
(Hamer 1982A:6 ) .  Advice  o t h e r  t han  from t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  a l s o  
has  t h e  a d v a n t a g e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  i d e a s  f rom ' t h e  ma i ns t r ea m of  
community l i f e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  i s o l a t i o n  of  C a n b e r r a .  The 
L e g i s l a t i v e  and G e ne r a l  Pu rpose  Commit tees  a r e  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
a d v a n t a g e o u s  p o s i t i o n  t o  t a k e  a dv a n t a g e  of  t h i s '  (Hamer
1982A:6 ) .
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The number of submissions a committee receives can vary 
extroardinar ily - from 25 for an inquiry into An Aircraft
Carrier to over 700 on South West Tasmania. Interviewed Senators 
complained that they sometimes became snowed with submissions.
It is at this point that the pressures of work can
become acute. There is simply an 'information blowout'. One 
suggestion that a number of Senators made during interviews was 
that a precis be made of every submission and that it be
attached to it to help Senators; though one Senator quipped that 
this would not help some Senators who are simply lazy.
All Senators agreed with Senator Hamer that committees 
have the potential to be an avenue for community participation
but believed that this did not happen at the grass roots level. 
Rather, submissions tend to come from organisations and people 
who are pushing their own barrows (B, C, I, 0) . One made the 
interesting point that 'we never get community views - only 
extremist views. Senators represent community views. They are 
elected by the community. As elected representatives they have 
been chosen to listen to expert evidence put forward' (D). 
Senators felt that only groups were capable of making
submissions as they are the only ones that have the
organisational capacity or the financial capacity to hire 
lobbyists. Yet as one new Senator argued, 'committees may not 
get the best cross section of community views, but I think that 
committees are the best method of getting community views' (0).
As well as receiving submissions, committees are sent 
printed material from organisations, embassies and other 
interest groups. This material is sent both directly to the 
Senator's office, as well as through the Secretariat. From the 
comments I received, it would appear that the effort and cost 
involved is wasted. Only a few actually glanced through all of 
the material. All felt that it was heavy-handed, a waste of time
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('they are the last people you would go to' (A)) and excessive, 
with one Senator commenting that he sent 'boxes of material back 
to my electorate' (B) . Another Senator saw it more politically. 
'While some of the single issue groups' actions are laudable you 
have to be careful supporting them. When you return to state 
branch or go to the national conference you have to look over
your shoulder and think what the repercussions would be if you 
went all the way with them' (K) .
Another source of information can be tapped by the 
committee writing directly to persons or organisations inviting 
them to make submissions. Committees also have the power to 
summons witnessses if required.
Senators met regularly on an informal basis with their 
colleagues on the committee as well as friends who were 
specialists in the area under study to discuss committee
matters, especially if the inquiry is considered partisan or the 
Senator intends to submit a dissenting report. Senators also
meet frequently with the chairman for informal chats. Only the 
Senator said that ' I try to talk to people in the community 
generally about references on an informal basis' (0).
Reflecting the relatively bipartisan approach to
committees one Senator noted that colleagues from other 
political parties who were not on the committee occasionally 
consulted with him to discuss a matter that covered the
committee's speciality (B).
Other than this contact, no personal research was 
undertaken by Senators. As it is , they did not have time to 
examine in any detail all submissions they received (C,F,N,0).
When an inquiry involves a State responsibility, the 
chairman will write to the State Premiers seeking their 
co-operation in the inquiry. In the case of the Victorian
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Government, this was formalised when, on 16 June 1976, the 
Secretary of the Victorian Premier's Department, Mr K.D. Green 
wrote to Mr Odgers, then Clerk of the Senate, outlining 'the 
procedure to be adopted in respect of state government 
participation in enquiries' . One Senator felt that this was an 
area underestimated in committee work. 'Committees provide 
another avenue for State governments to communicate (by way of 
submissions) to the Federal Government, except this time it is 
to the backbench. Indeed, it could be argued that this is the 
only avenue for state governments to reach beckbenchers.' 
However, State governments can be a 'little suspicious of 
federal intrusion into areas that they consider to be of their 
concern though generally, Senators felt that State departments 
have been very co-operative' (E, K).
While submissions are coming in, an itinerary of 
interstate visits to take evidence is prepared by the
secretariat. This is seen to be part of the role of staff - to 
look around for information 'to ensure that the net is wide 
enough cast', though as other Senators said, the difficulty is
in getting a broad community participation. Only one Senator
said that it was up to the members to get out into the community 
and gauge public feeling on the matter (0) . For most other 
Senators, it appeared that the information staff provided
through background papers and the submissions would be the sole 
source of knowledge (E).
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CHAPTER 10
VENUE FOR HEARINGS
Interstate
Other than when Public Servants and academics from the 
A.N.U are appearing before committees, Senators are reluctant to 
conduct hearings in Canberra, showing a strong dislike 'for the 
artificial environment of Canberra' (0). By conducting hearings 
interstate Senators felt that it provided a chance - perhaps the 
only chance - to bring Parliament to the people. For many in the 
community it is the one opportunity they will ever get to 
observe Senators working. This is especially the case for small 
towns where the arrival of a committee is almost as exciting as 
the arrival of the Prime Minister; especially as the Prime 
Minister will in all probability never visit that town. An 
example of this would be if the Defence Sub-Committee of the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence were to visit 
coastal towns in North West, North and North East of Australia. 
The Committee by its mere presence would show such communities 
that it was aware of the areas' defence sensitivities and that 
the parliamentary committee, and thus Parliament, was aware of 
those communities and their concerns.
This was observed by one Senator who was on the Social 
Welfare Committee when it was inquiring into Homeless Youth. The 
value in the nine field visits was that, here for the first time 
was the chance for people to communicate directly with people 
who had power (G). As another noted, 'it is almost a PR exercise 
to make democracy a little more real' (0) (although he seemed to 
be more concerned with the image rather than the product) and
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• • •'... when you go out into the States and receive evidence in the 
field I think they feel that they have an input in achieving 
reforms' (I).
As well as this potential for community involvement 
which all Senators considered to be a major advantage, going out 
into the field often proved to have a sobering effect on 
Senators themselves - to bring a sense of reality to the area of 
inquiry (E) . In any case, examining an area without actually 
visiting the subject of the inquiry would leave the committee 
open to much damaging criticism. One Senator though argued that 
staff had a vested interest in travelling around the country and 
so organised unnecessary visits (G).
When the committee system was debated in the Senate in 
1970, 1971 and 1974, Senators spoke of the need to provide 'what 
is virtually a direct channel to Parliament' (Parliamentary 
Debates - Senate 1976:310). Senators today also see the 
interstate hearings and field visits as an integral part of the 
process of offering community involvement in committees; even if 
many complained that they did not have the time to go on these 
interstate visits. Equally important, hearings and field visits 
allow Senators to gain a diverse range of contacts in subject 
areas that would be difficult, if not impossible to cultivate 
merely being a backbencher. The benefits for the more ambitious 
Senators is clear.
During those debates in the early 1970s, Senators also 
argued that as Members of the House of Representatives have 
different roles and responsibilities to a Senator, they do not 
treat committees with 'the same seriousness and the same degree 
of responsibility'. This greater freedom enables Senators to 
travel more without the fear of being seen to be ignoring their 
electorates (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1974:1154). Senators 
today still comment on this difference. They argue that because
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they are Senators, and not MHRs with greater electoral 
commitments, they have greater flexibility in the level of 
involvement in committee work and in particular in the amount of 
travel that they undertake on committees.
We are in the happy position of not having to 
worry about electoral problems and so on. On 
interstate visits you can look back more and 
... frankly because you are in for a six year 
term you can keep back at arm's length 
pressure groups; even within your own party 
(K) .
Thus the great advantage in being a Senator is that 
electoral commitments are not the all dominating focus of 
thought that exhausts colleagues in the House of 
Representatives. Through the different voting system and the six 
year term that they enjoy, they can maintain a more distant, but 
no less secure, relationship with the electorate.
Overseas Travel
This desire to go to the site of the problem, is 
restricted however, by the fact that committees cannot travel 
overseas. If a committee wishes to travel overseas, the chairman 
is required to approach the President of the Senate with such a 
request. The President then forwards the request on to the Prime 
Minister where he or Cabinet approves or rejects such a request. 
Interestingly, it is Cabinet and not Parliament that decides 
whether approval is given for a committee to travel overseas.
If approval is not given, which is normally the case, 
then Senators must travel privately as backbenchers, which is 
the action that Senator Primmer was forced to take. As he 
explained to the Senate, 'on a recent reference, I and two other 
members of that committee paid our own way around Asia in an 
attempt to pick up information. That finally allowed us to bring 
down a report ...' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1981:2691).
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The current travel entitlements for committee members 
(travelling within Australia) is set out in the report of the 
Remuneration Tribunal (No. 7 of 1980) . This provides for a 
travel allowance to be paid when members travel to committee 
meetings, travel on committee business or undertake field trips 
as part of a committee inquiry. However, the Remuneration
Tribunal has not accepted the arguments put before the Tribunal 
supporting overseas travel for committee Senators.
Currently, Senators and MPs are entitled to travel 
overseas as part of their general duties of Parliament without 
taking account of any particular functions - such as being a 
committee member.
It has been argued that committee members travelling 
overseas could do so as a group, something which would be
difficult to co-ordinate. On a more serious level, when 
travelling overseas as private members, committees are
inoperative. They cannot formally collect evidence, conduct
hearings or meetings and thus any information that a member
receives is not covered by parliamentary privilege.
A criticism that can be readily made of a committee 
report which encompasses a matter outside of Australia is that 
the report's impact and its credibility can be lost simply 
because committee members have not been there. In a submission 
to the Tribunal in 1981, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defence cited as an example, the Pacific Islands Monthly
review of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence committee 
report on 'Australia and the South Pacific'. The review said
that there were a number of inadequencies in the report. 
However, it qualified these criticisms by noting that 'if my 
comment seems rather harsh it is because of the expectations for 
something more imaginative to have evolved out of the
committee's deliberations. In the committee's defence, it can be
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said that they did not have the resources to travel to the South 
Pacific in order to get at first hand some of the views of 
Australia's image in the region - this lack of contact showed 
through in the committee's report' (Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence 1981) .
The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
claimed that it was frustrated in its inquiry into The Human 
Rights and Conditions of the People of East Timor because of 
'the inability to travel overseas to collect evidence and 
inspect particular areas "on the ground"; and the inability to 
meet the cost of bringing witnesses to Australia ...' (Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1983:xiii). 
The Committee noted by way of contrast that the Portuguese 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on East Timor visited 
Australia and met with the Committee during the course of its 
inquiry.
Most Senators that I interviewed would agree with these 
sentiments. Parliamentary committees should be entitled to 
travel overseas if required; and in any case it should not be up 
to the Executive to determine. The Senate Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee recommended that the matter of overseas travel 
by Senate Committees should be considered by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Appropriations and Staffing. The Senate Chamber has 
not acted on this recommendation.
However comments were made by Senators interviewed, 
that if committees could travel overseas, we would just happen 
to see references that required them to do so. They were also 
concerned that, inevitably, they would receive unfavourable 
press coverage of any proposed visits.
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In discussing the venue for hearings, Senators placed 
great emphasis on the contact aspect of committee hearings; on 
the importance of providing an avenue of communication between 
the electorate and Parliament. The emphasis that Senators placed 
on the ambassadorial role of committees is often ignored by 
commentators, yet, clearly, the process of hearings is seen as 
an end in themselves.
All Senators saw the value in committees meeting away 
from the rarified air of Canberra with both Senators and the 
community gaining from such travel. Senators can establish 
contacts in the area which can later be cultivated for reasons 
other than committee work and can observe at first hand the 
problems that the committee is examining.
Committees travelling interstate also provide an 
opportunity for those in the community who wish to contribute to 
do so at a level that would otherwise not be possible. However, 
to have the time available and the ability to work away from 
their electorate and their provincial press highlights the happy 
position members are in as Senators, representing a State sized 
electorate and not requiring endorsement for a six year period.
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CHAPTER 11
THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
An integral part in the functions of committees is the 
receiving of submissions and the appearance of witnesses before 
committees (see Chapter 10 for a discussion of the procedure for 
calling submissions). During 1981/82 the eight Legislative and 
General Purpose Committees held 70 public hearings during which 
316 witnesses came before the committees. This varied from 13 
witnesses for the Finance and Government Operations Committee to 
66 witnesses who appeared before the Social Welfare Committee.
At the start of a hearing, the chairman will read out a 
prepared statement informing the witness appearing before the 
committee of his rights; which includes the right to ask that 
all or part of the evidence be heard in camera. Such a situation 
could arise, for example, if the evidence to be presented would 
injure the character of the witness or a third party. A witness 
also has the right to be accompanied by advisers or counsel and 
is entitled to consult such counsel.
Witnesses may request that their evidence be heard in 
camera. If the committee agrees, the session is declared a 
private meeting with only committee members, witnesses, staff 
and Hansard reporters present (Standing Oder 36AA(16)). Senators 
are reluctant to exercise this option as it makes the use of the 
evidence more restrictive and impedes the desire by Senators to 
allow committee hearings to be as open as possible.
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Notwithstanding that evidence may be heard in camera, 
committees have the power to publish such evidence at a later 
stage under Standing Order 308 which allows committees to 
disclose evidence as they see fit. A daily Hansard is published 
of proceedings that are heard in public (36 (AA17)).
In 1982, a Canadian Journal, Parliamentary Government, 
devoted an entire edition to witnesses appearing before 
parliamentary committees. The journal argued that whatever the 
reference, witnesses should have one objective, that is '... to 
shed light on the subject so that the committee can come to some 
intelligent conclusions' (Parliamentary Government 1982:3); 
though one Canadian Member of Parliament argued that this needed 
to be qualified. He maintained that having witnesses come before 
committees to present basic facts or data was unproductive. This 
type of information should be obtained through the hiring of 
consultants and the provision of background papers for members. 
This would enable committee hearings to allow witnesses to 
concentrate on providing a diversity of debate and discussion 
(Parliamentary Government 1982:5). It was expected that 
witnesses would be willing to open up in conversation with the 
committee.
Senators regard the questioning of witnesses as the 
most important part of a committe hearing and have found that 
'witnesses take the committee very seriously, 'after all, it is 
their reputation that is at stake' remarked one Senator. 
Unfortunately, while the purpose of hearings may be to obtain 
information from witnesses, too many Senators 'try and convince 
them of their point of view' (K) . (In such a situation, it was 
expected that the chairman would guide Senators from this area.) 
Some witnesses have spoken enthusastically of the chance to 
appear before committees. As Dr O'Neill said, 'My colleagues and 
I welcome the opportunity to appear before the sub-committee ... 
the records (Hansards) ... are extremely valuable research tools
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for us ... the reports are major documents in their own right' 
(Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Sub-Committee 
on Defence Matters - Evidence 1981). For O'Neill, the Hansard 
was extremely valuable as it contained evidence presented by the 
Department of Defence, long considered the most secretive of 
Departments. For anyone working in the defence area, the 
hearings of the committee were the only source on what the 
Department's attitude was. Max Teichmann was also argued that 
'the continuing sittings of the Committee have discharged at 
least two important functions: firstly, the drawing out of the 
Defence Department as to what it is doing and why; and also in 
inviting submissions from a very wide range of interested 
persons and parties in the community. It must be said that the 
Defence Department has not been exactly forthcoming and the 
influence of ministerial attitudes is plain to see. Nevertheless 
the Committee is persisting and at the moment seems ahead on 
points. One gets the impression that our service chiefs are not 
at all opposed to providing Parliament and the citizens with far 
more information as to what they're doing and why, than we've 
been accustomed' (Teichmann, 1981:1).
As well as hearings providing information for Senators, 
they can also be an education for witnesses. Witnesses come 
before a committee and find, often much to their surprise, a 
high degree of bipartisan interaction between Senators in 
contrast to the point scoring from other Senators' comments that 
occurs in the Chamber.
Parliamentary Government found, though, that most of 
the witnesses expressed disappointment in the lack of follow-up 
after a report was tabled. They gained the impression that the 
report ended up in 'no-man's land'. As one witness said, 'it's 
unfortunate that what they do doesn't seem to lead to anything. 
None of us like to put a lot of effort into something and feel
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that there is no return' (Parliamentary Government 1982:8). It 
would not be a surprise if witnesses appearing before Australian 
Senate committees expressed similar feelings.
As was found earlier, Senators do not have a high 
regard for the standard of submissions that committees receive 
(Chapter 9, Submissions). This concern is also prevalent during 
committee hearings. They believe that most witnesses come before 
committees to justify themselves rather than to enhance the 
knowledge of committees (D, K) . Senators suggested that if you 
ask the question of where the vested interest of a witness is, 
you will find that everything they are doing is directed toward 
that vested interest. The purpose of hearing witnesses is 
because 'they are citizens and they have the right to be heard; 
but in terms of learning anything from them, then - perhaps 
sometimes' (G).
Yet this is not always seen as the fault of witnesses:
A lot of public hearings are of poor quality.
I am not certain that I would not restructure the whole process. As well, some Senators do 
not even read the written submissions. So 
that, before you even appoint counsel, you 
have to ensure that Senators are carrying 
their own responsibility fully on committees 
(G) .
While witnesses have a responsibility to prepare their 
material well, Senators also have a responsibility to be well 
briefed and be comfortable enough to ask the right questions. As 
John Evans, a Canadian Member of Parliament, says, 'if
parliamentarians are well prepared and can probe deeply into 
issues, then you can derive a great deal of information from 
witnesses. But if parliamentarians are not well prepared, then 
you have to take submissions at face value. The value of a
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committee's recommendation to government is going to be greatly 
lessened because, then it's just a compendium of special 
interest representation.' (Parliamentary Government 1982:6).
One witness interviewed by Parliamentary Government 
said that unfortunately the knowledge displayed by committee 
members and the questions that are asked are 'absolutely 
pathetic'.
Ultimately witnesses are dependent on the chairman of 
the committee for protection from unfair questioning, outside 
harassment because of their appearance before the committee and 
keeping witnesses fully informed of their rights. As the Ontario 
Law Reform Commission said, 'the good judgement of the chairman 
is one of the most important protections enjoyed either by 
witnesses or by third parties whom witnesses mention' 
(Parliamentary Government 1982:14).
The most well known case in Australia involving the 
harassment of a witness was when David Berthelsen, a computer 
engineer in the Department of Defence, gave evidence before the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence's Sub-Committee 
on Defence Matters. In his evidence (on 23 October 1978), and 
later in written response to further questions, he made a number 
of criticisms regarding a new computer system that was being 
installed in the Department. On 26 October, the Defence group of 
the Association of Professional Engineers also gave evidence 
which was highly critical of the Department of Defence. On both 
occasions, a number of press articles appeared, based on the 
evidence presented, which were severely critical of the 
Department. Over the following months, allegations appeared in 
the press arguing that pressure was being brought to bear on 
Berthelsen and members of the Defence group of the APEA by the 
Department of Defence. Subsequently, it was decided to refer the 
allegations of intimidation of B erthelsen to the privileges
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committee for further investigation. The Privileges Committee 
concluded that 'a number of persons within the Department ... 
(were determined) to silence him, to discredit him personally, 
and to deter him (and others similarly minded) from offering 
further evidence which was critical of the Department ...' 
(House of Representatives Committee of Privleges 1980:9). 
Ironically, the incident occurred in the Department run by the 
Minister who many journalists refer to as the great defender of 
parliamentary tradition.
Given the intricacies of Standing Orders and the 
aggression (if only rare) shown by Senators towards witnesses, 
the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that a booklet be 
prepared for distribution to all prospective witnesses as well 
as members of the committee (Parliamentary Govenment 1982:12). 
This booklet should be forwarded to witnesses well in advance. 
Such a booklet would also be suitable for Australian committees. 
The booklet could cover:
. a description of the procedures of committees;
. a note that it is the responsibility of the chairman to 
protect witnesses;
. an outline of the powers of committees and the method 
of questioning witnesses;
. a witness' rights and obligations;
. the duty to produce all documents if requested by the 
committee;
. the meaning of the oath or affirmation;
. the implications of contempt and privilege;
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. the right of witnesses to request that all or part of 
their evidence be heard in camera, the right of the 
committee to refuse such requests and that the 
committee has the power to release in camera evidence 
at a later stage if it so wishes; and
. the right of a witness to retain counsel when appearing 
before committees.
It appears at the moment that while most committees 
have a set outline of instructions for all potential witnesses, 
the style and contents of it is dependent upon the initiative of 
the secretary and varies between committees.
By the time hearings commence, Senators should have 
read background papers and most of the submissions and thus will 
have a reasonable understanding of the reference. One Senator 
commented that 'if you [the staff] haven't half written the 
report before you start hearing witnesses, then you are going to 
be in awful trouble' (D).
If reports are half written before hearings have 
commenced, then what is the value of conducting hearings? The 
benefits are twofold. Firstly, hearings provide access for 
community groups to personally interact with Senators. For those 
who cannot afford the services of a lobbyist, this can the only 
opportunity to personally put forward a case to a group of 
Senators.
Secondly, hearings allow Senators the opportunity to 
meet specialists to discuss matters that are of concern to the 
committee. The comments by Senators in their discussion on 
submissions also applies to Senators' approach to witnesses. 
Many Senators felt that even when people with a good deal of 
knowledge appeared before the committee, the question had to be
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asked, where do their interests lie? This does not mean that 
their evidence is considered a waste, but that it must be placed 
in perspective.
So, who gains from the committee hearings? It would 
appear that everybody benefits to some degree. Witnesses gain 
satisfaction from being involved in part of the parliamentary 
process while Senators benefit in hearing a diversity of views 
on the subject. Senators argued that this diversity was what 
made committees unique. They 'have got me in touch with other 
people I would not have otherwise met' (G). A number of Senators 
openly said that their views on matters have changed because of 
their work on committees (C,D,E,F,G,H,K,M,P,Q). Thus it would 
appear that if the objective of witnesses is simply to convince 
Senators of their views, then their efforts may not be in vain. 
If, however, their objective is to change government policy, 
then, as was found in Chapter 5, their energies would be better 
directed elsewhere; in particular to the party committees (see 
also Chapter 14, for a discussion on committees influencing 
government policy).
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CHAPTER 12
COMMITTEES. THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND MINISTERS
Public Servants as a Source of Advice
At this stage of its inquiry, the committee is able to 
carry out one of its most important roles; to draw out from a 
government department what it is doing in particular areas and 
why. Senator Rae has observed that,
In Parliamentary democratic theory you ask of 
the executive, the government who makes the 
policy, the questions related to policy, you 
ask to the administrators, that is the public 
service, the detail you need to find out in 
relation to the implementation of that policy 
(Rae 1981:1).
Under the theory of ministerial responsibility, the 
relationship between a public servant and Parliament should be 
through the Minister. Only through the Minister can Parliament 
question what is occurring in his department. The Minister has 
complete responsibility for making policy and so it is the 
Minister who is answerable to Parliament and in the end, to the 
electorate when policy comes under scrutiny. In accepting this 
responsibility, this convention also requires public servants 
not to intrude into policy when they are in the public arena. 
Yet in spite of this theoretical division, there are occasions 
when a backbencher does have contact with a public servant, 
especially in the operations of committees where contact can be 
frequent, and I would suggest, most productive.
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In Australia there has been a trend over the years by 
members of Parliament to have direct contact with public 
servants rather than through the formal channels of the 
Minister's office. Weller notes that this informal contact is 
regular if sometimes not quite within the bounds of 'complete 
loyality to the existing government' (Weller 1977:187). 
Senators' understanding of the structure of the Public Service 
to enable such direct contact has been brought about primarily 
through the contact Senators have with public servants as a 
result of their work on parliamentary and party committees. Thus 
while the Public Service is the 'instrument of government and 
governments use it to provide themselves with sources of 
information and advice denied to political parties which are not 
in government', some Senators use committees as a counterbalance 
to the Minister in the provision of information. Senators also
find that it is an effective way of extracting information from 
a reluctant public servant or Minister (Solomon 1978:151).
Indeed it has been argued by some Senators, that, if nothing 
else were achieved, this would by itself justify the existence 
of committees.
In briefing party committees, Weller says that public 
servants filled one or more of the following roles:
1. They '... provided expert information on technical
matters'. However, as Weller points out, this may not 
have always been at a level which backbenchers
understood;
2. 'They explained the implications of reports, and
alternatives which were available to the government
I .... ,
3. 'They acted as a counterbalance to lobby groups ...';
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4. Very occasionally public servants attended Caucus
committee meetings almost as 'surrogate Ministers'
(Weller 1977:188) .
Whilst Weller uses the above categories to describe the 
role of public servants appearing before party committees, the 
comments are also relevant to parliamentary committees.
No matter what the reference, all committees will 
depend to some degree on the assistance of the Public Service. 
This will occur at a number of levels. The first and most 
intimate contact is normally through the committee staff where, 
over a long period, a good working relationship can develop. 
Here, the staff may receive informal background briefings 
canvassing the issues that are likely to be involved.
Such requests for briefings from departments and 
requests for information can have a marked impact within the 
department; especially, through the work that committees 
generate in requesting information, requiring witnesses from the 
departments and in written form. Such requests for information 
may force a department to focus more resources on a particular 
area and encourage senior officers in the department to be more 
familiar with the subject than they may otherwise have been. 
Committees also may have an impact on departments through the 
recommendations they may make which, if they succeed in nothing 
else, at least generate discussion on a subject with a degree of 
endeavour that may not have occurred otherwise.
Sir Leo Pliatsky, a British civil servant for some 30 
years, complained that parliamentary committees were becoming 
too demanding of the civil service both in time and energies. 
This was also occurring for Ministers, he observed. 'My 
impression is that the pips are beginning to squeak in the
155
Treasury in meeting all these demands, not simply for
appearances, but in asking for questionnaires and submitting 
memoranda ...' (Herington 1981:10).
Thus a significant effect that committees have had on 
Parliament and government is that the volume of work, for 
everybody, has increased. Perhaps more importantly, as the 
British Study of Parliament Group found, public servants 'have 
become more visible to the general public, if only through the
publicity given to the evidence taken from them by committees'
(Study of Parliament Group 1970:31)? though this is less likely
in Australia because of the poor press coverage of Senate 
Committee work (see Chapter 15) .
Public Servants as Witnesses
Such direct contact with public servants prompted the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration to 
recommend that 'there should be guidelines governing the 
briefing of members and party committees by public servants and 
the handling of requests for information by members of
Parliament to departments and authorities' (Parliamentary 
Debates - Senate 1976:2924).
In 1976 the Government tabled in both Houses of 
Parliament the guidelines as proposed by the Royal Commission 
for discussion. The guidelines covered appearances by public 
servants before party committees and 'guidelines relating to 
access by members of Parliament to Public Servants'.
In 1978 'After extensive consultation and amendment', 
the Guidelines Relating to Acccess by Members of Parliament to 
Public Servants and Officers of Statutory Authorities and 
Guidelines to Apply to Appearances by Public Servants and 
Officers of Statutory Authorities Before Party Committees were 
tabled in Parliament (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1978:689).
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In tabling the 'finalised' guidelines the Leader of the 
Government in the Senate said that 'the Leader of the Opposition 
has advised the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the 
forthcoming debate on the Freedom of Information Bill, he 
considers them acceptable' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1978:689).
The guidelines said that:
2. ... Officials will not be expected or 
authorised to express opinions on Government 
policies, policy options or matters of a 
party political nature. Information provided 
may, however, include details of 
administrative arrangements and procedures 
involved in implementation of approved 
policies or legislation.
5. An official should, as appropriate, 
inform the head of his department or 
authority or Minister of a request for 
information and of the outcome.
Senator Chipp, upon reading these guidelines, said that 
he was 'appalled'. 'It virtually contains instructions for we 
members of Parliament to act like children. We cannot ask public 
servants certain questions. The restrictions on us, as 
democratically elected people, in seeking information from 
Ministers and public servants are so finite as to make work on a 
committee almost useless ...' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1978:789).
On 28 September 1978, eight days after the comment by 
Senator Chipp, the Government also tabled Guidelines for 
Official Witnesses Appearing Before Parliamentary Committees.
The guidelines instructed officials that:
1. Arrangements for an official to attend a 
Committee inquiry should be made through 
the relevant Minister.
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2 A submission should be cleared with the 
Minister or by the Permanent Head, 
before it is submitted.
3. Witnesses are to prepare themselves 
thoroughly before hearings.
4. In some cases it may be desirable for 
there to be informal consultation 
between the Minister and the Chairman of 
the Committee to consider ways of making 
available to the Committee information 
of a confidential nature which it 
considers essential to its purposes 
without endangering the preservation of 
essential confidentiality.
5. The Government sees the role of an 
official witness as being to speak to 
any statement provided to the Committee 
and to provide factual and background 
material to assist understanding of the 
issues involved.
6. The Government does not see it being the 
role of the official to take policy 
positions or to answer questions:
(a) seeking his personal views on 
Government policy;
(b) seeking evidence or identification 
of considerations leading to a 
Ministerial or Government decision 
or possible decision, unless those 
considerations have already been 
made public or the giving of 
evidence on them has been approved;
(c) which would require the witness to 
advocate or defend Government 
policy, or canvass the merits of 
Government (including State or 
foreign government) policy or 
policy options - past, present or 
future;
(d) on matters which could give rise to 
a claim of privilege [see below].
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7. If an official witness is directed to 
answer such a question, he should ask to 
be allowed to defer his answer until he 
has discussed the matter with the 
Minister or Permanent Head.
8. Questions may arise which an official 
witness may need to answer because they 
are within the role of providing factual 
and background material but which would 
also have wider implications because 
they are within an area of public 
controversy. This points to the need for 
the witness in his preparation to give
thorough consideration to any wider
ramifications of
inquiry.
the matter under
9. Witnesses should take care not to
intrude into responsibilities of other
departments and agencies.
For committees, the importance of these guidlines are 
that public servants are able to provide factual and background 
material only. They are not allowed to comment on government 
policy or discuss possible policy options. Taken literally, 
these guidelines have the potenial of limiting the usefulness of 
public servants appearing before committees.
Crown Privilege
Claims of Privilege by Ministers
. Claims of privilege should only be made 
by a Minister.
. If an official witness believes that
circumstances have arisen to justify a 
claim of privilege he should request a 
postponement of his evidence until the 
Minister can be consulted.
. Documents - or oral evidence - in
respect of which Ministers may wish to 
consider claiming privilege may include 
matters which fall within the following 
categories:
159
(a) Cabinet (and Cabinet Committees),
Executive Council and Loan Council 
documents and proceedings
(b) communications between officers 
and Ministers and between 
Ministers
(c) material the publication of which 
would be injurious to the national 
interest, ...
(d) opinions of the Law Officers of
the Crown and legal advice to 
Ministers, departments and
Commonwealth Government 
authorities
(e) communications between officers,
and between officers and third
parties relating to the 
formulation of policy
(f) material which, by statute, is 
required to be kept secret, ...
It is not possible to give an exhaustive 
list, the question in each case being 
whether the balance of public interest 
is against disclosure of the material.
The following list will give some
indication of the possible nature of the 
material referred to ...
(a) communications between Ministers 
and third parties
(b) medical, financial and other
personal information relating to 
private citizens and officers, 
e.g. medical reports, financial 
returns
(c) material obtained from individuals
or corporations in confidence or 
in circumstances where there is a 
duty not to disclose it
(d) material which, if disclosed,
might injure or substantially 
embarrass private citizens
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(e) information obtained by officers 
relevant to possible breaches of 
the law.
. There may be occasions when a Minister 
would wish, on a balancing of the public 
interests involved, to raise with the 
Chairman the possibility of an official 
producing documents or giving oral 
evidence in camera and on the basis that 
the information be not disclosed or 
published except with the Minister's 
consent.
. There will be circumstances where an 
official witness may have to request 
that his evidence, or part of his
evidence, be heard in camera. These 
circumstances might include:
(a) cases where, although a claim of 
privilege could be justified, the 
Minister considers that the 
balance of public interest lies in 
making information available to 
the Committee on the basis that it 
be heard in camera and not 
disclosed or published except with 
his consent
(b) cases where, while a claim of
privilege may not be justified, 
there are other special
considerations justifying the 
Committee being asked to take the 
evidence privately, e.g. where a 
private individual might unfairly 
be prejudiced by public
disclosure, say of a conversation 
between him and the witness.
(Yet the guidelines do not mention Standing 
Order 308 which provides for the Senate to 
disclose all evidence, including in camera 
evidence.)
. An official witness has no authority to 
consent to the disclosure or publication 
of evidence given in camera. This is a 
matter for the Minister, or the 
Permanent Head acting on his behalf. 
(Refer to note above.)
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In tabling these guidelines the Prime Minister, through 
the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister, noted that 'potential 
witnesses, particularly those who have had little prior 
experience of appearing before parliamentary committees, are 
uncertain as to their position and to the procedures to follow' 
(Parliamentary Debates - House of Representatives 1978:1506).
On the matter of crown privilege, the Prime Minister 
noted that these guidelines did not attempt 'to resolve the 
complex question of "deadlocks" between the Parliament and the 
Executive on such claims'.
The Prime Minister then went on to say that the 
guidelines were developed with four major considerations in 
mind:
(a) the importance of promoting the freest 
flow of information through the 
parliamentary committees to the public 
consistent with the protection, in the 
national interest, of the necessary 
confidences of government and the 
privacy of individual citizens
(b) the achievement of a proper balance 
between the need of governments to 
preserve some confidences and the need 
of parliamentary committees to be able 
to conduct through inquiries
(c) confirmation of the line of
responsibility between the Executive and 
Parliament, where Ministers have the
central role in dealings between the
Executive and parliamentary committees 
and should respond to Parliament, and
where officials are responsible to 
Ministers
(d) the maintaining of the traditional 
political impartiality of officials
The Government sees it as fundamental to the
operation of our system of government that
government and the committees approach
162
hearings in a spirit of co-operation and with 
a full recognition of the function each has 
in that system. ...
These considerations are in harmony with the 
principles of ministerial responsibility 
which underly the relationships of Ministers 
and officials in their departments, as is the 
current general practice of committees 
addressing to Ministers their requests for 
nomination of official witnesses to appear 
and for provision of documents (Parliamentary 
Debates - House of Representatives
1978:1506).
As with the other guidelines when they were tabled, 
there was no response by Senators (Parliamentary Debates - 
Senate 1978:1054) .
In the House of Representatves Mr Lionel Bowen made a 
statement in response to the tabling of the guidelines. He 
expressed concern over the 'range of matters which are
considered to fall within the concept of privilege...it is our
view that crown privilege should be either abolished or at least 
seriously redefined (Parliamentary Debates - House of
Representatives 1978:1508).
In the House of Commons, a similar Government
'Memorandum of Guidance for officials appearing before select
committees' was drawn up in 1976 and revised in 1980. It 
declared that 'officials appearing before select committees do 
so on behalf of their Ministers and that, accordingly, it was 
government policy for Ministers to decide which officials should 
give evidence to committees on their behalf ... official 
evidence to select committees is normally given, with 
Ministerial agreement, only by permanent heads of departments or 
by officials nominated by them for this purpose' (Norton 
1977:155). The rationale is similar to that given by the
Australian Prime Minister; that is that it is Ministers who
determine policy while their officials advise them and ensure 
that those policies are carried out.
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The Memorandum of Guidance also outlined the reasons 
departments could decline to provide evidence. They are:
1. excessive cost;
2. a threat to national security?
3. that it would undermine the collective
responsibility of Ministers by civil
servants?
4. if it revealed inter-departmental 
exchanges on policy issues or 
information about Cabinet committees or 
their discussions; and
5. covering areas of advice given by law
officers and information held in
confidence concerning private affairs of 
individuals or institutions (Lankester
1980:33) .
Implications of the guidelines
The guidelines for the Westminster and Australian 
Parliaments are similar and highlight the difficulity that faces 
parliamentary committees operating within a Westminster system 
where the Executive and Parliament are not separate and the
Executive has a greater control.
The guidelines are extensive, covering reasons why 
public servants can refuse to give evidence and areas that 
committees should avoid examining? including such matters that 
cover the tenuous area of crown privilege. The deilemma that 
faces Senate committees is that there may be times when there
are few sources of alternate information available. In such 
cases the department may provide the bulk of witnesses. As
government has become increasingly complex, the inadequacy of 
Parliament's procedures and the limited sources available to 
members has become apparent.
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It is, in part, because of such a dependency that Indyk 
argues that the lack of information, or at least the potentially 
limited access to information which is implied in the government 
guidelines concerning the activities of the Executive, is a 
major obstacle restricting the extension of the committee system 
to its limits. Accordingly, backbenchers are dependent on the 
goodwill of the government in providing them with the necessary 
information, which, as a rule, Indyk argues, is very little 
(Indyk 1980:98). He also notes that the guidelines brought down 
in 1978 'provided the executive with a considerable capacity to 
inhibit committee investigations'. Nonetheless, he goes on to 
note that they 'have generally managed to circumvent the 
guidelines laid down by the government ... In practice few 
official witnesses have actually pleaded crown privilege or 
ministerial responsibility ... refusal to provide the committee 
with adequate information often proved to be counter-productive 
for the department concerned ...'. Committees have been able to 
benefit from the appointment of specialist advisers who are 
often former senior public servants. As well, committees have 
taken advantage of experts outside of the public service in 
providing evidence and thus offering at least a partial balance 
to public service submissions (Indyk 1980:98-99). Thus he 
concludes that as a result 'of all these factors, committees 
have rarely lacked the information necessary to conduct 
effective inquiries'. He nonetheless urges that measures be 
taken to institutionalise the acquiring of information, so that 
committees are not dependent upon the goodwill of the Executive, 
the whim of certain Ministers and the mood of the public 
servants during the hearings.
Yeend also argues that such links should be both 
strengthened and formalised. For too long departments have 
tended to play down 'any role in relation to the Parliament, and 
until recently Parliament seems to have required very little of 
departments... Compared with the congressional relations
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division of departments in the United States we have not
seriously tackled the task of parliamentary liaison. I see scope 
for departments here to improve their knowledge of parliamentary 
proceedings and parliamentary requirements: and to put
themselves in a more positive role with Parliament generally. I 
think this can be done without at all stepping outside the
proper role of the public service and without impinging on the 
proper responsibilities of Ministers' (Yeend 1980:2).
As witnesses, public servants are nearly always heard 
first providing the official position and a basis for the 
committee to work from; though, as is argued by Indyk and
others, the level of assistance would appear to be limited 
somewhat by the caveat that public servants are not permitted to 
comment on policy. Senators had mixed feelings as to whether 
public servants should or should not be allowed to comment on
government policy with some suggesting that the current 
arrangements are adequate or at least inevitable given the 
Westminster system that operates and that 'without a fairly 
significant restructuring of the public service then it will not 
change' (J).
This feeling was also supported by the Ministers I 
interviewed. As one remarked, 'every public servant knows that 
they must not comment on government policy. They comment on 
facts and events. They are the servants of the community and 
they are there to implement the policy of the day. It is not for 
them to criticise policy' (H). 'After all', said another, 'there 
is a trade off between the privileges which a public servant 
gets and the obligations which fall upon this privilege. He is 
there to serve the government of the day' (G).
Those that saw it as an inhibition felt that not being 
able to comment on government policy merely provided a shelter 
for not answering questions. In particular, if public servants 
disagreed with the reference then they merely stonewalled 
information.
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Other Senators, however, were not overly concerned with 
this problem: as one rather ominously said,
there are ways of getting information from 
them (B).
In any case said another,
if policy comments are needed then the 
Minister should appear before the committee 
(D) .
There was also strong feeling that the issue tends to 
be overstated.
'Mostly, they do comment about policy in 
practice but there has to be a line that has 
to be drawn and . that is the art of
chairmanship of a committee, ensuring that 
that line is kept fine so that you can get as 
much as you usefully can without compromising 
the public servant who is, after all, the 
person who is carrying out the policy of the 
government. They can talk about the policy 
options, but not what the policy ought to be 
(A) .
Thus generally they do comment on policy; if 
indirectly. Most thought that it was in cases like this that in 
camera evidence was particularly useful, relaxing the witness 
and so melting the policy areas. As one Senator commented with 
some acridity,
they can get their views across with some 
subtlety (F).
Judging by the comments of nearly all Senators 
interviewed it would appear that the introduction of the 
guidelines for official witnesses appearing before parliamentary 
committees has not resulted in any changes in the operations of
167
committees. In any case, it should be remembered that the 
guidelines provide only some type of official recognition by the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to the practice and 
procedures that have been used by committees. Moreover, the 
suggested guidelines are directed to official witnesses, and not 
parliamentary committees. Thus it is directed to the Executive's 
administration rather than to Parliament.
Yet the guidelines do highlight the fact that 
committees are totally dependent on the goodwill of the Minister 
and the department. It would appear that the informal channels 
and unwritten understanding on both sides of what is required 
will be the means by which committees will obtain information. 
While the Executive has drawn or suggested guidelines for 
witnesses, these tabled guidelines have never been debated nor 
have they been voted upon. This is also the case with the 
guidelines for public servants appearing before Caucus 
committees. Given the continued insistence by Senators that 
committees should scrutinise the Executive and its
administration, and Caucus committees ensuring that Ministers 
are not snowed by their department, it would appear that the 
guidelines could hamper both types of committees from fulfilling 
their roles. Neither Parliament nor its committees, however, 
appear willing to come to grips with possible counter-proposals 
to these guidelines.
Difficulties between Committees and the Public Service
There have, of course, been cases where the distinction 
between fact and opinion can be quite precarious. The case of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr Stone, is such an example. 
Mr Stone appeared before the Senate Standing Committee on 
National Resources as a witness. In the course of the public 
meeting, Mr Stone indicated that official government policy was 
not the only possible policy option. One could reasonably argue
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that on any major policy issue, there is more than one policy 
option presented to Cabinet to consider; or are we to assume 
that all policy and expenditure matters that are presented to 
Cabinet are in the form of a fait accompli I Nonetheless, 
Mr Stone was reminded by his Minister that it was not for him to 
comment on Government policy.
On another occasion, the Defence Sub-Committee (the 
Katter Committee) of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence requested that the Secretary of the Department of 
Defence, Mr W. Pritchard, and the Chief of the Defence Force 
Staff, Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, appear before the Katter 
Committee. As is always the case, such a request was made via 
the Minister. In this case the Minister refused to allow them to 
appear unless the Committee accepted 'the proposed guidelines 
for official committees' that were discussed earlier.
While the Chairman, Mr Katter made it clear to the 
Minister that it is never the practice of the Committee to 
request public servants to comment upon policy, he would not 
give the assurance the Minister sought; that is that the 
Sub-Committee agree to observe the guidelines for official 
witnesses. As the Chairman pointed out, the Minister was asking 
the Chairman to give official sanction to what were (and still 
are in 1983) draft guidelines which Parliament has yet to 
consider.
As we saw earlier, the guidelines referred to by the 
Minister note that officials should not answer policy questions 
(apparently, the Minister had little faith in his Department's 
officers' ability to avoid such delicate areas if they appeared 
before the Committee). The central argument of the Minister for 
Defence was that 'Ministers answer to Parliament - not 
officials' (Killen 1981:2). He maintained that such action 
weakens the traditions of the Westminster system.
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In the Westminster system, Ministers alone are held 
responsible for policy as well as being accountable for the 
actions of their public servants. Public servants are the 
impartial executors of government policy. This means, as 
Mr Killen has often stressed, that the public servant is 
responsible only to the Minister; they are certainly not 
responsible to parliamentary committees. The Minister is the 
political head of his department and so is responsible for the 
direction and administration of policies. The department merely 
implements these policies.
If the doctrine of Westminster as espoused by Mr Killen 
means that public servants appearing before committees weaken 
the traditional link between the Minister and his department, 
and so threatens this tradition, then it is the doctrine which 
should be brought into question. But even more critically, while 
some form of ministerial responsibility may be said to exist in 
the political environment of Canberra, it is a much modified one 
which must take into account the bicameral system and the unique 
Senate (in terms of other Parliaments in the world) that exists 
in Australia.
If one is concerned with how best a Senator on a 
committee can obtain information, then it can easily be argued 
that having public servants appear before such committees can 
only improve a Senator's chance of gaining further information.
The resolution of appointment for the Joint Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Standing Orders covering 
the Senate Standing Committees (SO 36AA(13)) empowers a 
committee to call for any papers or persons as it deems 
necessary. As public servants are not excluded from this and as 
Parliament, which includes the Executive, accepts these rules of 
play then it would appear that the Executive has cried foul 
after the game has well and truly started.
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In the end, the senior public servants that the 
Committee requested did appear before the committee? after the 
Chairman had given assurances to the Minister that the witnesses 
would not be required to comment on government policy.
Neutrality in a Political Environment
Yet for Senators wanting to question an important arm 
in the parliamentary process, there appears to be a dilemma.
Weller reminds us,
that a public servant being politically 
neutral means only that he should serve the 
present government to the best of his 
ability? it does not mean that he should be 
without opinions or that he should be slow in 
pressing those opinions... The idea of
neutrality of the public service ... requires 
only that the public servant should implement 
the government's policies once they are made, 
within reasonable and legal bounds? and in 
doing so many public servants will become 
intricately involved in the political area 
. . . (Weller 1980:194) .
Garland also has noted that being objective simply 
means that he is not party political. But this is not to deny 
that they are not political in other areas. They have to be 
attuned to the desires of the Minister, the Prime Minister, 
party policy and platform statements. Submissions for the 
Minister are obviously written with regard to these influences. 
Beyond this, Garland argues that
They also I think have to see that their 
Departments take account of the interests of 
others in the widest sense of the word. They 
have to keep an eye on the public issues 
running in the press and in Parliament. If 
that is political then they are political, 
but (only) in that sense (Garland 1978:18).
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While public servants are expected to be highly tuned 
to the -political environment, the convention of ministerial 
responsibility ensures that these insights that have been 
acquired by the public service should be reserved solely for the 
government of the day.
While public servants appearing before committees 
represent the government of the day, Senators said that there 
have been occasions when submissions have varied between 
departments, particularly where there is lack of a clearly 
defined government policy. There was a feeling that when public 
servants departed too far from the government line in presenting 
a departmental view then this indicated that the Minister was 
weak.
While it was agreed that departments do not openly 
compete with each other some saw 'various departments giving 
their own interpretation of the reference, expressing the policy 
views of the department. The departments are often competing 
with each other.' One Minister explained such discrepancies in 
terms of power. They all have their own base to protect and 
their own ideas to foster; especially when the government has 
not determined its policy:
On one occasion we had Business and Consumer 
Affairs and Treasury putting submissions that 
were expressing completely different views. 
In this area the Government had yet to 
formulate a policy so that both departments 
were arguing very strongly for their own 
ground. The stakes were higher than merely 
trying to impress a committee. In the end we 
came down on the side of BACA and the 
Government came down on the side of Treasury 
and so rejected part of our report (C).
As well as Ministers being reluctant to assist 
committees there have also been instances where the problem has 
been with very reluctant departments. While there have been many
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instances of this, rarely has the committee complained in 
public. One committee that did voice disapproval of Public 
Service witnesses was the National Resources Committee which in 
March 1981 wrote to the Minister for National Development and 
Energy, Sir John Carrick and the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, Sir Phillip Lynch. The Committee criticised the 
relevant Departments for the quality of the submissions to the 
Committee. In particular, they complained that the Departments 
appeared to be totally reluctant to provide adequate 
information. There have also been occasions when departments 
have sat in when other departments have given evidence to ensure 
that they did not contradict each other. This has resulted 
(National Resources Committee) in the committee going in camera 
in an effort to prevent the repetition of answers that it was 
likely to receive.
Similarly, at a public hearing of the Public Accounts 
committee involving Federal and State officers from the
Department of Health, the committee went in camera 'to relax' 
officers of the State public service. Occasionally though, 
committees can benefit as a result of the willingness of 
departments to be forthcoming knowing that this may aid the 
department in any inter-departmental battle.
As well as the use of in camera evidence, witnesses are 
protected under Standing Order 390 'in respect of anything that 
may occur as a result of their evidence ...' This protects 
witnesses against coercion, legal proceedings, censure or 
physical violence. When such a breach occurs then it is 
considered a breach of privilege and as indicated earlier, this 
matter can only be resolved by Parliament.
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Contact with State Governments
An area not often discussed is the contact committees 
can have with State governments. A number of Senators raised the 
point that committees can provide an anvenue for State 
governments to reach backbenchers.
Senators have found that special problems can arise in 
questioning State public servants. One Senator observed that:
'With State public servants it is more 
difficult and restrictive because one is not 
as familiar with the policy areas as one is 
in the federal sphere. Even though federal 
public servants also cannot comment on 
policy, because we have a good understanding 
of policy development, it is easier to read 
policy implications into their answers' (Q).
As well, Senators have found that 'State governments 
can be a little suspicious of federal intrusion into areas that 
they consider to be of their concern' (E)1 This Senator did not 
mention the possibility of this area being of concern to the 
Senate as a States House. Indeed such contact could be used to 
support the argument that the Senate is acting as a States House 
on such occassions, except for the fact that as we saw in Table 
5, States are very unevenly represented, both at the level of 
the chairman and in the body of the committee itself.
Similarly, in writing of the report, it was accepted 
that while the committee could 'tell a federal government what 
to do, with a State government you offer suggestions for State 
departments to consider a matter; but never a strong 
recommendation' (E).
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Public Servants before Party Committees
The contrast between parliamentary committees and 
backbench committees can be seen by the different attitude that 
public servants appear to take when appearing before these 
committees. This ranged from the reticence shown by some at 
parliamentary committee hearings (especially at public hearings) 
to being relaxed and sometimes openly aggressive at backbench 
committees. Perhaps predictably, Ministers' reactions to this 
variation in behaviour was that public servants should behave 
absolutely identically at both Party meetings and parliamentary 
committee meeings. The public servant's job is to give objective 
information; as one Minister noted 'a Hansard of parliamentary 
committee meetings can be a very salutory thing'.
Senators' approach to public servants is also 
different. On government committees,
they are there as government advisers and are 
working with you rather than against you. You 
get them to do work for you; virtually as 
agents of the Ministers (M).
Yet even on Opposition committees, Senators suggested 
that public servants were freer and could be quite aggressive. 
The main reasons for this being that backbench committees are 
simply free of any public scrutiny and it is acknowledged that 
policy is the prime target.
Ministers and Committees
As public servants cannot comment on policy, it would 
appear to be desirable for Ministers to appear bvefore 
committees to answer questions that his public servants are 
unable to.
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While Ministers sometimes do appear before committees, 
it seems that at times it is more a courtesy visit than as a 
provider of information. It was felt that little is achieved as 
'you don't get much out of theml' Public servants are the ones 
with the specialist knowledge. Only four Senators saw it as an 
advantage to have Ministers appear (A,E,J,M,)? particularly when 
policy matters needed to be answered, with public servants in 
such cases restricted in what they can say in reply.
It was also argued by one Senator that Ministers often 
went to great lengths to avoid appearing before committees 
indicating that they were 'absurdly insecure':
'If a Minister were confident within himself 
he would not be reluctant to appear before 
committees; rather, one would have thought 
that a Minister would relish the chance to 
show off his ability and grasp of his 
portfolio and the chance to get the committee 
on his side' (A).
As well as the Ministers' lack of knowledge, Senators 
argued that it injected a strong feeling of partisanship into 
the committee. After all, it is a parliamentary committee, not 
an Executive committee. In particular, there was a definite 
danger that government Senators may become more concerned with 
their own future and more open to influence from the Executive 
rather than expand the committee's knowledge. Senators also 
pointed out that as committees were often offering advice to 
Ministers in their report then there was no need for contact 
before the reply tabled by the government.
This lack of enthusiasm for Ministers to appear before 
committees was also supported by Ministers themselves. One 
Minister felt that the capacity of the Senate to examine 
Ministers was already infinite. As well,
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there is the sheer limitation of time which 
prevents Ministers appearing before 
committees. A Ministers workload is far too 
heavy to allow this to occur and in any case 
because there are so many other avenues 
available (question time, M.P.I.s,
adjournment debates, Estimates Committee 
hearings) there is not a need for a wider 
probing by committees (H).
Yet in principle no Minister said that he would refuse 
to appear before committees.
Weller regrets that there is not some institutional 
pressure to encourage Ministers to be more willing to appear 
before committees. As question time is not in any way effective 
in extracting information from Ministers, committees could be a 
most fruitful avenue for providing a close scrutiny of
Ministers.
As Senator Evans notes though, 'Executive co-operation 
through coercive techniques can readily be devised on paper to 
ensure that Ministers do in fact give evidence to rival-chamber 
committees on demand or request, but the real question is 
whether any such system will be workable in political practice 
. . . ' (Evans 1982:15).
In 1981, the Senate Committee on Finance and Government 
Operations undertook an investigation of the Australian Dairy 
Corporation. During its hearings, evidence presented by the then 
Minister for Primary Industry to the Committee-in-writing was in 
conflict with that of the Chairman of the corporation, Mr Tony 
Webster. To clarify the matter, the Committee unsuccessfully 
sought departmental files that may have assisted the committee. 
One of the reasons given for refusal was that of possible 
executive privilege - again an area that the Executive often 
speaks of but which no one has been able to clarify. Mr Sinclair 
maintained that an answer he gave in the House the previous week
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was sufficient and as such the statutory declaration that was 
requested by the Committee was not required. The Chairman, 
Senator Rae, chose to accept the statement that was made to the 
House. If there were stronger institutional pressures available 
then perhaps the committee may have persued Mr Sinclair harder. 
However, as Bernard Crick has observed, 'politics, not law, must 
explain the concept and practice of Parliamentary control of the 
executive ... The hope for any worthwhile function of control by 
Parliament would be grim if it depended on the ultimate 
deterrent of the vote ...' (Crick 1964:76).
Ministers. Public Servants and Committees
Yet while Ministers are reluctant to appear before 
committees they are normally quite relaxed (with exceptions such 
as mentioned above) about public servants doing so. Ministers 
noted that while they often read the Hansard of proceedings, it 
was an impossibility to read everything. Interestingly, while 
one Minister sometimes read the evidence before public servants 
presented it, this was not always the case; and any way,
I would in no way attempt to influence or 
correct it. There would be many instances in 
which public servants from my department are 
asked to make a submission before a committee 
and as an act of courtesy the department 
shows me the submission. But they are not 
obliged. It is not a submission from me. It 
is not a submission influenced by or modified 
by me and in any case when the submission 
comes before the committee ... the public 
servant is there and they are free to say 
whatever they want (H).
The former Minister for Transport, Mr Hunt has also 
argued that submissions from his department were precisely that 
and nothing more. In April 1982, the Department of Transport 
made a submission to the Independent Air Fares inquiry. 
Subsequently, the Minister was asked in the House (28 April
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1982) whether he supported his department's submission. In 
reply, the Minister said that he was not involved in the 
preparation of the submission and that he 'neither opposes nor 
supports' the submission.
Yet Indyk says that committees have strengthened the 
concept of ministerial responsibility, making Ministers more 
accountable for their actions. If Ministers continue with the 
argument that it is their departments' submissions and not 
theirs, then clearly committees will fail in this regard (Indyk 
1980) .
Contrary to the 1976 guidelines, all Ministers
interviewed said that they did not select the public servants to 
appear before the committees though one admitted that he was 
involved in that he was aware they were to appear before a 
committee and 'generally read their submissions before I gave my 
approval'.
Not one of the three Ministers/ex-Ministers said that 
they selected or substantially intervened in the selection of 
public servants appearing before committees. Yet when this was 
raised at a meeting of Senate Committee Secretariat staff, a 
number of staff could cite specific instances of such 
intervention by Ministers in the selection of the public 
servants appearing before committees. There were also instances 
cited where Ministers refused to provide information that the 
committee had requested to assist it in its inquiry. Yet no 
Minister nor Senator indicated that such intervention occurred.
Contact generally between Ministers and committee
members is kept to a minimum. This separation is fostered by 
both sides. One ex-Minister said that he would meet Senators on 
committees 'only in terms of wearing my hat as a government 
Senator and thus having talks with my colleagues' .
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It could be expected that given a committee's constant 
contact with departments, Senators would be eager to have 
ex-Ministers on committees to use their acquired knowledge of 
the workings of the department. Reaction to ex-Ministers being 
members of committees was mixed. Perhaps surprisingly, an 
ex-Minister said that he felt he was able to contribute 
something special to committees. Being a Minister meant that 
skills could be developed from operating at a very high level 
and these skills could be brought onto committees. In contrast, 
one Senator felt that they were a dead loss. He thought that 
they are simply not very good, while another exclaimed, 'worse! 
... was a total pain in the neck' (D) . Over all, no Senator 
displayed any enthusiasm for gaining an ex-Minister on a 
committee.
The importance of the Minister's, and thus a
department's, co-operation in meeting committee needs cannot be 
overstated. As the Privileges Committee has noted, the
monitoring of the Executive's administrators is undertaken 'to a 
large extent through (parliamentary) committees whose activities 
depend largely on the availability and willingness of witnesses 
to appear before them* (House of Repesentatives Privileges 
Committee 1980:12).
Yet in the cases of Mr Sinclair and the Finance and 
Government Operations Committee, Mr Killen and the Katter
Committee, and officials from the Departments of Industry and
Commerce and National Development and Energy and the National
Resources Committee, the ability of parliamentary committees to 
force the Ministers to accept the committees' requests was 
virtually nil. In the case of Mr Killen, he claimed that if they 
wanted to ask questions, they could ask him in the House. With 
Mr Sinclair, he maintained that his statement in the House was 
sufficient as this amounted to a Ministerial oath, even though 
Senator Rae argued that such oaths 'do not bear in any way on 
the matter of obligation to make truthful statements, nor 
provide any sanction for breach' (Rae 1981B:3).
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Clearly what is at the heart of these disagreements is 
the relationship between the Executive and the committee system 
- ree Parliament. Clearly, in the end, it is up to the Minister 
whether he wishes to co-operate. The dilemma for Parliament is 
that the committee system is 'the only effective way that you 
can have the Parliament become aware of the complex sets of 
facts which are behind a lot of the operations of Gopvernment' 
(Rae 1981A:2).
How then, can Parliament become more effective in 
encouraging Ministers to be more responsive to Parliament's 
needs. As Evans concluded (Evans 1982), in practical terms there 
is very little that can be done. Yet if changes are to come, 
then it is up to Senators themselves to initiate those changes. 
As Sir James Killen said, some years previously, 'the supremacy 
of Parliament rests ultimately upon one factor and upon no 
other: are its members courageous and determined enough to 
compel governments to give an account of their actions'? (Quoted 
in Chipp 1976:12). In examining the actions of Sir James from 
1977 to 1982, the answer would appear to be no.
Having reached the point where Senators are ready to 
have witnesses before the committees, the task that then faces 
Senators is to take advantage of the witnesses appearing before 
them. In the case of public servants such as Mr Stone, the 
knowledge and expertise that they possess can be quite 
formidable. As ex-Prime Minister Whitlam commented,
A person who has been head of a department 
for 12 years has achieved more than most 
Ministers ever do. A man who wants to 
exercise power in that way would rather go 
into the public service than be on a 
parliamentary committee (quoted in Reid 
1980 : 11) .
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That there are guidelines on what public servants can say before 
committees does nothing to help balance this. Nonetheless, as 
Weller points out, public servants can (and frequently do) 
provide enormous amounts of material for the information of 
committees. The problem as Skene sees it is that it is not 
altogether clear that Senators are utilising the opportunity 
that is provided in having public servants appear before 
committees. Skene argues that, Members of Parliament need to 
know 'that they can get more from committee service than causing 
public servants or Ministers some temporary embarrassment. Until 
they do, it should not be expected committee activity will be 
any more successful than it is now' (Skene 1982:14).
Certainly, pressure groups have been aware of who has 
the power. As their role is to publicise their cause and have an 
input at the heart of where decisions are made, generally their 
representations are directed towards the appropriate Minister 
and his department whose decisions are decisive and the relevant 
Caucus committees, and not at parliamentary committees where 
recommendations are at best advisory.
Yet as was seen in Chapter 3 Senators were not 
concerned in this 'shift' in power from the Chamber. They all 
accepted that if they intended to become involved in policy 
areas then they would work through the Minister and the Caucus 
committees. While lobbyists and most pressure groups realise 
this, it would appear from the high expectations that some 
academics have of parliamentary committees, that they do not.
There is also some confusion in role expectations that 
arise from public servants appearing before parliamentary 
committees. Whilst not denying the importance of and benefits 
that Senators derived from having public servants appear before 
committees as outlined by Weller, Senators saw a major benefit 
as enabling them to develop an intimate knowledge of the 
sections of the public service that were relevant for all the 
roles of the Senator; who is where and how it works.
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With regard to crown privilege, as we saw in Chapter 7 
the powers of Senate committees are extensive, allowing them to 
call for papers and persons as they see fit. As well, while the 
issue of crown privilege has yet to be resolved, it would appear 
that the powers and privileges of Parliament are wide enough to 
nullify an attempt by the government through the guidelines to 
claim privilege. However, once again politics appears to be a 
determining factor with the Opposition willing to persue the 
issue only so far, knowing that one day it may be in a familiar 
position when in government.
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CHAPTER 13
COMMITTEE REPORTS
Consideration by the Committee
Following the public hearings, the chairman, in 
conjunction with the staff, will prepare a draft report for 
consideration by the committee. Under Standing Order 310, the 
chairman is required to present to the committee a draft report. 
During the period from the last public hearing to the first 
private meeting of the committee to consider the draft, other 
members of the committee tend not to be involved in the writing 
of the report.
As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, Senators all accepted that 
this was the responsibility of the chairman and the staff. Only 
a small number of Senators said they had informal discussion 
with the chairman or other members of the committee to discuss 
the reference at this stage (B,C,J,M,Q). Other than these
Senators there appears to be little contact between Senators
regarding the progress of a report. Again, the problem of
excessive workload is the reason why they are, on the whole, 
content to allow the chairman and staff to prepare the draft. 
Only one Senator indicated a strong interest in being personally 
involved in the drafting of a report (J).
Following the circulation of the draft report to other 
members of the committee, private meetings are convened for the 
committee to consider the chairman's report paragraph by 
paragraph (SO 311) . It is here that Senators have the
opportunity to influence the structure of the report. Senators
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may move amendments to the draft report which are recorded in 
the minutes of the meetings. Until the late 1950s, it was common 
practice on select committees to include the minutes of the 
committee's meeting in the report. Since then however, this 
practice has been dropped and since the establishment of the 
Legislative and General Purpose Committee system, no committee 
has incorporated the minutes in its report.
Thus the influence that staff can have on the shape of 
the report can be critical and will vary depending on the 
capability of the chairman and finally, other members of the 
committee. Not only will Senators be dependent on staff for the 
quality and quantity of information that they receive during an 
inquiry, but also Senators rely heavily on the ability of staff 
to write a report.
Minority Report
In the British House of Commons, it is not possible to 
include a minority report with the main report. The minutes of 
the committee, however, are printed with the report. The minutes 
would be expected to disclose any dissent, proposed amendments 
to report and divisions, if any over the contents of the report.
The United States Congress and Senate allow for 
minority reports to be presented and printed with the committee 
report.
This is also the case in the Australian Senate where 
committee members may add a dissent to a report when they 
disagree with any aspect of the draft report (Standing Order 
311) .
In the case of the Senate committee system, the 
addition of a dissent to a report is not a common occurrence. 
Odgers believes that the reason for the infrequent appearance of
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dissents is because committees are fact-finding and
advisory and do not aspire to decision making' (Odgers 
1976:468). It is because of this distinction in the role of 
committees, Odgers maintains, that committees have been able to 
remain relatively bipartisan in their work rather than as a 
result of sterile references or reports.
Satori offers another reason why minority reports occur 
so rarely. He suggests that 'committees end up with unanimous 
agreement because each component of the group expects that what 
he concedes on one issue will be given back or reciprocated, on 
some other issue' (Satori 1975:132). In that politics is the art 
of the possible and compromise, he, in all probability is 
correct. However, I was unable to verify or disprove this 
comment by way of interviews, though as I have already noted, 
Senators spoke constantly of the favourable working environment 
of committees, away from the 'theatre' of the Chamber, where 
there is more give and take.
Senator Giles says that committees do not become bogged 
down on party lines and add dissents to a report because all 
Senators 'bend over backwards not to fight and most decisions 
are reached by consensus. If Senators stuck blindly to a party 
line and defended Government policies in every situation you'd 
waste a lot of time, and time is so precious' (Quoted in 
MacKinnon 1982:11).
This is also the perception by outsiders of committees, 
and is seen as one of the great advantages of committees. Not 
surprisingly then, there is concern that minority reports damage 
the thrust of the committee's recommendations by reducing their 
impact through attracting attention and debate to the dissent. 
There is also concern that minority reports harm the committee 
system generally through the implication that partisanship is 
affecting the workings of committees.
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Senators that I interviewed showed mixed feelings 
toward the use of minority reports. Those who were against their 
use agreed with the above comments. They argued that a minority 
report involved partisanship entering into committee 
proceedings. Rather than a joint effort, it became a political 
effort. Accordingly, 'if there is a clash', said one Senator, 
'then the chairman and deputy chairman will thrash it out' (E) , 
while another Senator blamed 'the unsuccessful chairman' (D). In 
discussion on the role of the chairman, Senators also commented 
that, ultimately it is by the presentation of the report that 
chairmen were judged to be successful or unsuccessful. His 
ability to negotiate and to sound out the sensitive areas before 
hand would determine whether the report received a smooth 
passage through the committee. A report that was unacceptable to 
the committee would harm the stature of the chairman.
While this may sometimes be the reason for minority 
reports - which is open to question - some observers have 
expressed concern over such caution. They argue that in their 
attempt to avoid a dissent, which the Senate, most committee 
members and, in particular, procedural staff go to great lengths 
to avoid, references that are sent to committees and the report 
eventually produced are couched in such general terms so as to 
render the report and its recommendations either politically 
sterile, or merely innocuous (See in particular Weller 1979); 
rather a minority report is simply part of a committee report. 
After all,
...unanimity is not an end in itself, and if 
a dissenting report will bring out into the 
public domain issues and arguments which are 
necessary components of a full and rational 
debate, then it is better that they appear 
rather than being submerged in consensus 
language which satisfies no-one (Evans 
1982:14) .
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A number of Senators agreed with Evans, showing little 
concern over the use of minority reports (B,M,Q). One Senator 
for example, warned that by bending over backwards in writing a 
document which was agreeable to everybody, the report may be so 
diluted that it was not worth writing in the first place (J).
After all, said another Senator, 'a minority report 
arises because some people believe it necessary. I don't think 
that it is any worse than a consensus, it may be even better ... 
any division that such a report may highlight may be a perfectly 
valid division. It may reflect a division in the subject, a 
division in the community and if it does, then it may be 
fulfilling a certain function in doing that'. Thus while it may 
reduce the impact of the report, this is only because 'there are 
alternative points of view to the recommendations of the main 
report' (Q) . This desire for consensus in committee reports may 
merely be a reaction to the adversary nature of the Chamber and 
the fear that this may develop in the committee area.
Certainly, Ministers are not overly concerned with 
Minority reports. 'As a Minister, I would read the minority 
report and give it consideration' (H). Another said that 
'minority reports keep governments honest in that they prevent 
the possibility of a government-dominated committee from merely 
being a mouthpiece of the government' (G).
This once again raises the question of committee 
references and whether they should investigate policy areas or 
examine matters that will split the committee. While most 
Senators agreed that a dissent could 'detract from the 
committee's effectiveness', nevertheless, this did not 
automatically result in a call by all Senators to be draconian 
in the selection of references. 'Yes', said one Senator, 'it 
detracts from the force of the report; but this is not to say 
that committees should avoid looking at these areas just because 
there could be a split' (M).
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Overall though, those that saw dangers in the use of 
minority reports were the same Senators who expressed most 
concern that the committee should not examine certain sensitive 
areas. In studying those areas, they argued, it would split the 
committee; so committees should avoid studying them. A recent 
example showing that it is not always the case are the two 
Katter reports on defence matters? both "Threats to Australia's 
Security" and "An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence 
Force" were studying areas which involved strong partisan 
differences (at least for public consumption) yet both reports 
were approved without minority reports? both were from a 21 
member joint committee, even though one of the arguments against 
joint committees is that members from the House 'play the game' 
harder than their colleagues in the Senate.
As well as submitting a minority report, a Senator may 
take an even stronger step. While the chairman's draft report is 
normally used by the committee as the basis for preparation of 
the final report, provision is also made, under SO 312, for any 
committee Senator to submit a draft report for consideration by 
the committee. It is then for the committee to determine which 
report it will use as a basis for the final report. The outcome 
of this move will also be recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting.
It is the Secretary of the committee who acts as editor 
of whichever report is chosen; though up to 1984 this has been 
only a hypothetical opportunity.
The Department of the Senate has interpreted Standing 
Order 311 to imply that a member prepares a dissent without any 
assistance from the committee - though in practice there is 
normally some assistance given if a Senator approaches the 
staff. The committee manual of the Department states quite
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clearly that 'where committee members wish to prepare a 
dissenting report they cannot use committee staff for this 
purpose' (Department of the Senate 1983:25). In part, the logic 
behind this decision is that the staff work to the chairman of 
the committee rather than to Senators generally; though once 
again it would appear that this is a convention.
Under Standing Order 36 AA18 committees are provided 
'with all necessary staff ... for the purposes of the 
Committee'; not the chairman, though it is argued that a dissent 
is not 'for the purposes of the Committee' as a whole but for a 
Senator who wishes to go against the committee.
Senators themselves are uncertain on this matter. For 
example, while one Senator firmly believed that the staff should 
work closely with the chairman, he was equally emphatic that 
staff should also assist in the preparation of a dissent (D) . 
Such uncertainty was not unique. In any case, committee staff 
could recall several occasions where they had been approached by 
Senators individually, and not via the chairman to 'assist' in 
the preparation of a dissent.
Consideration of Reports
As was outlined in the chapter on the power of 
committees, a committee's report is a privileged document and 
until it has been presented to the Senate must remain 
confidential (SO 308).
Standing Orders allow Legislative and General Purpose 
Committees leave to report to the Senate from time to time. This 
may involve either a progress report or a final report with or 
without recommendations and evidence (Standing Order 36 AA(20)). 
Leave may also be given to table a report on a non-sitting day - 
an example of this was the Finance and Government Operations 
Committee Report on the Australian Dairy Corporation. In so 
doing, the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Rae, moved:
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(1) That, if the Senate be not sitting when 
the Senate Standing Committee on Finance 
and Government Operations has completed 
its report on the Australian Dairy 
Corporation and its overseas
subsidiaries:
(a) The Committee may send the report 
to the President of the Senate or, 
if the President is unable to act 
due to illness or other cause, to 
the Clerk of the Senate;
(b) The report shall be deemed to have 
been presented to the Senate and 
the President or the Clerk is 
authorised to give directions for 
its printing and circulation; and
(c) In such event, the President or the 
Clerk shall lay the report upon the 
Table at the next sitting of the 
Senate.
(Parliamentary debates - Senate 
1981B:3066)
The Senate may fix a time for a committee to report 
back to the Senate. This normally occurs when the Senate refers 
a Bill to a committee or, for select committees, which are 
established for a specified task. Upon completion of that task, 
that is the tabling of its report, the select committee is 
dissolved.
Standing Order 314 provides that tabled reports must be 
signed by the chairman. The public evidence is tabled together 
with the report and so becomes available to the public; the 
committee or the Senate may also, from time to time, move for 
the release of in camera evidence (Standing Order 36 AA(17) and 
(20), and Standing Order 308).
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Standing Order 66A explicitly states that consideration 
of the motion for consideration of a committee report 'shall
take precedence of any other "General Business"'. The chairman 
and other members of the committee normally make statements when 
the report is tabled. However, under Standing Order 316, no 
debate can take place at that time and a motion must be moved 
that consideration of the report be made an order for the next 
day of sitting. The report is then placed in the Notice Paper 
under the heading "General Business". (That is, matters that
have arisen from Senators other than Ministers.) Leave is 
occasionally given for at least one other Senator to speak at 
the time of the tabling of a report.
Under a Sessional Order initiated on 26 November 1980
and amended on 24 August 1983, General Business, unless the 
government otherwise moves, takes precedence over Government 
Business on Wednesdays after question time. Standing Order 66B 
states that 'a motion for the consideration or adoption of the 
Report from any Standing or Select Committee of the Senate, or 
Joint Standing or Select Committee of the two Houses, and,
unless otherwise ordered, any government statement thereon' 
takes precedence over any other General Business on the Notice 
Paper.
Some senators felt that reports were of a very variable 
standard. 'Some of them are so bad that they are appalling. Some 
of them are very good. The fault with the poor ones is with 
Senators and staff, but mostly Senators. Senators vary in their 
abilities. You have to remember, though, that you get to this 
place [the Senate] by being elected, not by passing an 
examination and people who get elected may have no skills in 
doing committee work at all. They may be elected for different 
kinds of skills and therefore the things that I value may not be 
the sort of things that certain other Senators can do' (G) .
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During the Senate debates on the committee system in 
1970-71, it was argued that the standing committees should 
produce short quick reports of no more than 12 months duration. 
If a longer inquiry was envisaged, then a select committee 
should be established. However, since the introduction of the 
standing committee system, inquiries have regularly taken longer 
than 12 months to report and select committees have been used 
very sparingly. A major reason for the lack of select committees 
is the difficulty that Whips have in finding Senators to serve 
on them. In 1981, reflecting this difficulty, there was an 
informal agreement reached between all the parties in the Senate 
that only two select committees would be established at any one 
time.
A number of Senators were dissatisfied with the time 
taken to write committee reports. One suggested that some 
reports were more like history books (A) . Another problem with 
committee reports can be that they take too long in coming and, 
as a result, Senators become bored (Bp). If a report went beyond 
two years then, one Senator suggested, there should be an 
interim report; though another Senator argued that such reports 
merely took up time. The effort taken in writing and publishing 
such a report could be put into publishing a final report.
The ideal time for a committee inquiry appears to be 
from 6 - 1 2  months. One way of speeding up the publication of a 
report would be through extra staff. As one Senator commented, 
'those who know the demands of Senators realise that it is 
remarkable that anything is produced at all (Np). After all, 
committee work is supposed to be a part-time job (Q).
Why then do minority reports occur, so irregularly 
given that a number of Senators and all the Ministers said that 
they still took the report seriously.
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To find the answer one must go back to the selection of 
references which are chosen carefully to avoid examining areas 
of controversy, which almost invariably are policy areas. As 
Senators said in Chapters 3 and 4, participating in activities 
in the Chamber has ceased to be all that satisfying because of 
the partisanship involved whereas committee work is useful and 
constructive. The Chamber is always available (with the greater 
opportunity for media coverage) for those who wish to engage in 
politicing. Thus, Senators perceptions of the role of committees 
will always ensure that disagreements are kept to a minimum on 
committees. The level of compromise that Senators are willing to 
accept would be unheard of in the Chamber.
In any case, most Senators simply do not see committees 
as a vehicle to pursue their ideological positions. Obviously 
they would not support a recommendation that went against the 
policy of the party. However, as Senators have indicated 
throughout the Thesis, they do not see committees as serving as 
a forum for promoting the position of their parties. Certainly, 
they never escape the fact that they represent their party but 
Senators rarely allow such partisanship to affect the workings 
of the committee.
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CHAPTER 14
AT WHOM ARE REPORTS DIRECTED?
From reading what commentators and most Senators have 
said publicly about committees, there would appear to be no 
doubt that the purpose of committees is to influence government 
policy; thus reports are directed at the government. 
Accordingly, to measure whether the committees are successful, a 
judgment is made whether the government has accepted or rejected 
the recommendations of the committee.
However, is this an accurate measure of whether a 
report has been accepted. Can such a precise measure be applied 
to an input into a policy that may also have inputs from party 
policy committees, interdepartmental committees of the public 
service and changes from pressures from within Cabinet? In any 
case, is the government always the audience for committee 
reports? The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the 
possibility that the audience for reports at times may go beyond 
the Executive and its administration.
The Executive and its Administration
Since the establishment of the committee system in 
1970, one of the functions of the standing committees has been 
to scrutinize the activities of the Executive and its 
administration. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 12, Senators have 
continually reasserted that one of the major roles of committees 
is to facilitate 'the discharge of Parliament's duty of probing 
and scrutinising Executive action on a continuing basis' (Knight 
1977:7). Senators (in interviews and and in public) and
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academics argue that reports of committees should be seen to be 
contributing to the development of government policy or 
providing a possible direction to potential policy. Senators I 
interviewed who said that reports were directed at the
government, said that reports tried to persuade but not tell the 
Government what course of action it should take, though
realising that even this was often a frustrating ambition. 
Senators took the sober outlook that if you really wanted to 
influence government policy then (for a government Senator at 
least) you would work through your backbench committee. By the 
time legislation and policy matters reach the Chamber, the
battle is all but over with the government unwilling to make
amendments for fear of losing face or for fear of encouraging 
critical activity. In any case, because of a conscious decision 
by Senators, committee work rarely involves such topical policy 
considertions. Rather, their work is more at the level of the 
green paper. Senators see committees as useful in exploring 
areas where policies have not been formulated or hardened. If a 
government is uncertain of what action it should initiate and a 
committee presents a report recommending a course of action, the 
government may implement those recommendations and attempt to 
deflect any criticism on to the committee. As well, committees 
have the ability to canvass areas that parties may find too 
sensitive or difficult to explore. For example, one committee 
which was presenting a report on a sensitive defence area noted 
that 'a report published by a parliamentary committee has an 
advantage over a government paper in that it can canvass the 
delicate matter of Australia's relationships with its neighbours 
and allies without compromising government policy' (Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1981:vi). Yet even this 
role was frowned upon by one Senator. Green papers should be put 
by the bureaucracy for public consumption (which is why this 
Senator believed that the public was not the audience of 
committee reports). 'Currently, reports merely fill a gap 
because the bureaucracy is too secretive' (D).
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In response to those Senators who did see reports as 
directed at the Government, a former Minister argued that 'those 
that rate the object of committees as being involved in policy 
overrate the importance of many other inputs that come before a 
Minister. They don't realise that governments receive a 
multitude of inputs and as a Minister you have to choose' . 
Because of the pressures of time he personally only read reports 
that were relevant to what he was doing (G).
Government Response
Given that the government is seen by many as the main 
focus of reports, it is not surprising that there is an emphasis 
by both academics and Senators themselves on the reaction of the 
government to the report of a committee. Writers such as Indyk 
have often lamented that the problem with the committee system 
is that committee reports are tabled in Parliament and then 
promptly forgotten by the Executive, Parliament and the Public 
Service; (Indyk 1980:48) or as he put it on another occassion, 
influence without power (Indyk : 1978). Such expressions of 
frustration have arisen, in part, as a result of the statement 
by the Prime Minister to the House of Representatives and the 
Senate promising that the government would respond to reports of 
parliamentary committees withing six months.
The possibility of making it manadtory for the 
government of the day to respond to committee reports has long 
been in the minds of Senators. On 15 March 1973, Senator Murphy, 
on behalf of Senator Willesee, moved a motion in the Senate 
urging that the government should 'table a paper informing the 
Senate of its observations and intentions with respect to such 
recommendations' within 3 months of any Senate Committee report 
that has been tabled.
It was not until 1978 however that the Senate heard any 
more about an Executive response to committee reports.
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All Honourable Members will recognise that a 
great deal of valuable work is done by 
Committees of this Parliament. It is 
important that the reports of these 
Committees, many of which reflect 
considerable thought, effort and often 
insight, receive full and careful attention 
by Ministers and by the Government.
Henceforth, ... the responsible Minister will 
make a statement in the Parliament outlining 
the action the Government proposed to take in 
relation to the report ... The procedure 1 
have outlined reflects the Government's firm 
intention to see that the work of 
Parliamentary committees does not pass 
unheeded ... (Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives 1978:2465).
Previously no such obligations had existed. (By way of contrast, 
the House of Commons Procedure Committee in 1978 recommended 
that the British Government should respond within two months.)
In reply to the Ministerial Statement of the Prime 
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Hayden noted that,
... One of the more depressing experiences in 
the Parliamentary system has been that so 
much effort is put into committee work ... 
the production of the wealth of expert 
advice, which has been obtained at 
considerable cost, measured in many ways, has 
resulted in nought or little better than 
that.
It is hoped however that the Committees in 
their various forms can now anticipate better 
facilities with which to work ... I would 
expect that in its way the proposal will help 
to make the Executive more accountable than 
it has been thus far.
(Parliamentary Debates - House of 
Representatives 1978 : 2466)
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Having finally accepted the idea that governments 
should formally inform Parliament of their observations on 
committee reports, the statement by the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition, if nothing else, raised the 
expectations of supporters of the committee system that it was 
the intention of governments of all persuasions to take 
committee reports more seriously in the future. Accordingly, it 
has been suggested that the way to measure the effectiveness of 
a committee's report is by seeing how many of its
recommendations the government adopts. Thus McKenry in his 
report on The Government Response to Senate Committee Reports 
said that ' the effectiveness of Senate committee reports 
depends in large measure upon the extent to which the
recommendations they contain are taken up and acted upon by 
others and principally this means the Commonwealth Government, 
and certainly the Government has encouraged this outlook' 
(McKenry 1981:3). As has been documented in a number of 
articles, the response by the governments has been far from 
satisfactory. Certainly most Senators both in the Chamber and 
elsewhere expressed disappointment that committee reports were
not taken seriously enough.
In 1980 the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee 
tabled a Report on the Government's responses to their reports. 
(Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee 1980.) In the report 
the Committee expressed concern 'at the delays in announcing the 
Government's response to its various proposals. Of even greater 
concern is the generally negative attitude to the Committee's 
proposals and the inadequacy of the arguments advanced in
support of the Government's view ...' (Parliamentary Debates - 
Senate 1980:1349).
Senator Missen, in tabling the report, said that when a 
government response came after the six months limit, it was
normally 'profoundly disappointing'. Overall the government
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'does not show any respect for the committee system or for the 
Senate in general (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1980:1355).
Senator Tate, also a member of the Committee, said that the 
report of the Committee had revealed a 'dilatory procrastinating 
approach (to committee reports) by the Government' (Senate 
Hansard 1980:1357).
A major reason for the delay in government responses 
said Senator Tate, was that Government procedures were 'so 
inept'. In particular, the IDCs, which are normally responsible 
for preparing a government response normally 'completely smother 
the central and vigorous recommendations and conclusions of the 
Senate Committees' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1980:1357).
What disappointed him was not so much that governments did not 
wholeheartedly adopt recommendations. Rather, 'when the delay is 
so long, when the result so meagre and when the heed paid to 
Senate Committee recommendations so minor, one can begin to
think ... whether the whole exercise is worthwhile. This is 
especially frustrating, said Senator Tate, as 'the Senate 
committee system was one of the attractions for my coming into 
the Parliament. As an outsider, I had heard of its worthwhile 
work' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1980:1358).
Senator Tate then went on to argue that the removal of 
partisanship from a report 'adds to its strength'. Yet this 
bipartisan approach that results does not in any way remove the 
vigor of committee recommendations and conclusions. However, he 
did wonder whether such committees were merely 'a massive 
confidence trick which diverts honourable Senators from real 
political work, [wej ... spend days, weeks and months disrupting 
our schedules and our electoral work and adding to our 
parliamentary week; we are diverted from real political 
effectiveness if, in fact, that work comes to nought, as it 
invariably does ... ' .
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He suggests that it goes to the heart of parliamentary 
democracy. Section 51 of the Constitution gives Parliament the 
powers to make laws in various areas. Section 61 gives the 
Executive the power to execute and maintain the Constitution and 
the laws of the Commonwealth. Thus concludes Tate, 'Parliament 
(and not the Executive) are meant to be the creative, law making 
body within our democracy ... the Executive is meant to carry 
out the will of the people as expressed by the elected 
representatives in the Parliament' (Parlaimentary Debates
Senate 1980:1358). The result is that the government's attitude 
to committees is leading to a 'denegration of our role as 
elected representatives' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1980 : 1361) .
Senator Cavanagh, in response to the Committees' report 
said that, in any case, he opposed the concept of standing
committees 'because I think they are only something offered by
the Government to its large number of backbenchers, to make 
unimportant members think that they are important by inquirying 
into matters about which nothing is done when the report is
presented. The report is just pigeon-holed. I have always 
supported select committees because they deal with particular 
matters of vital interest. They take evidence from particular 
quarters; they have powers almost as great as a royal
commission; and they create so much interest in their activities 
through publicity, that their findings are rejected by the 
Government at its own peril. However, no-one ever intended that 
committees function for the purpose of telling the government 
how to operate. This is a question of having the brains of a 
Parliament locked up in committee rooms where they could be 
fighting in Parliament to improve the conditions that exist at 
present' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 1980:1361).
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Senator Evans, also a member of the committee, argued 
that 'too often ... the Government's statements have been poorly 
reasoned and contemptuously dismissive, in some instances, of 
the committees' conclusions' (Parliamentary Debates - Senate 
1980:1361).
The study by McKenry supports the pessimism expressed 
by the CALA Committee. He found that 'the general pattern of the 
responses seems to have been unaffected by the Prime Minister's 
announcement of 28 May 1978 [see Chapter 12] ... Insofar as
there is a trend it is towards a greater rate of rejection of 
recommendations'. He then goes on to note that '43% of all 
recommendations advanced since 1978 have failed to attract a 
substantive response from the Government, an improvement of only 
1% on the figure prevailing previously' (McKenry 1981:17).
McKenry divided committee recommendations into 'hard 
recommendations' - seeking action or decision - and 'soft 
recommendations' - including seeking acceptance of a principle 
or certain concepts, or an agreement to investigate or review a 
matter.
It was found that 77% of the recommendations were soft 
recommendations. There were variations ranging from 91% for the 
FGO, 85% for CALA to 61% for Trade and Commerce. Government 
responses to committee reports in 1980 and 1981 stood at
5: within 7 months;
6: 1 to 2 years;
14:2 years ...;
9: no response at all.
McKenry concluded that there was little evidence to 
support a view that Senate committee reports had a major 
influence on government policy. 'Recommendations which seek to
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change established policy are demonstrably likely to be either 
rejected, deflected or ignored. This is especially true of 
recommendations involving legislation or changes to the
infrastructure of government ...
'The Government has shown itself to be generally 
receptive to recommendations which are broadly consistent with 
existing policy, or which relate to an area where policy
presently is not well developed or is being reassessed. Such 
recommendations have a moderate chance of acceptance, in whole, 
part or spirit' (McKenry 1981:20).
Hawker argues that government action on committee 
reports also has broader implications beyond the egos and
sensitivities of Senators. He points out that in providing
information to committees, community groups have an 'expectation 
... that outcomes of some beneficial sort have at least a 
reasonable chance of happening. So not only is it a problem for 
committees to choose the lines of inquiry which seem fruitful 
for policy development; they must also command the interest of 
groups outside the Parliament which have something to gain from 
the inquiry ... when interest groups and individuals begin to 
turn to the parliamentary institution as they now turn to the 
bureaucracy as a source of advice and of the intervention in the 
policy process, then we will know that effective change is under 
way' (Hawker 1979:12).
Thus while the Prime Minister promised that 'the 
responsible Minister will make a statement in the Parliament' 
(my emphasis) , quite clearly this has not always been the case 
as the Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee bitterly 
complained. Yet Ministers and ex-Ministers that I interviewed 
all indicated that they did take notice of these reports. 'The 
track record of committees is very good indeed. The history of 
these reports is that governments have been influenced very
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significantly by them, and a lot of them ultimately [my 
emphasis] pass into policy' (H) . Another Minister pointed out 
that it was also up to the committee to produce a report that 
was of good standard. When the report was good, 'then I took 
great cognisance of that committee's report' (I).
Support from Colleaues
In any case, as Senator Missen argues, it may be that 
the power of committees' recommendations is weakened not so much 
because the Executive ignores the reports but because Members of 
the House of Representatives show no interest in committee 
reports nor engage in discussion on them. This he describes as 
'most unfortunate and a weakening by them of our parliamentary 
system' (Parliamentary Debates - Seante 1980:1355).
Missen did not absolve his fellow Senators from fault. 
In particular he chastised them for poor attendance during 
discussion of committee reports during General Business.
Indeed to ask what the committee does with the 
information may miss the question. Perhaps it should be what 
does Parliament do with it? The answer is often nothing. Why is 
nothing done? Perhaps it is because of the lack of opportunities 
to debate the reports and because of the strength of the party 
divisions in the Chamber.
While it may be true that committee work removes 
Senators from the highly partisan environment of the Chamber, in 
the end, the committee's work must return to this partisan 
environment where the traditional methods are available to 
scrutinize the Executive. It must also be remembered that all 
government responses will be discussed in the appropriate Caucus 
committee before it is tabled in Parliament.
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Thus the opportunity exists for all Senators to speak 
to committee reports and question the Executive on the reason 
for ignoring or delaying a response to committee reports. 
Senators were strongly critical of their colleagues for not 
being more severe on the Executive, both in the Chamber and in 
the party room.
In the Chamber, reports could be more frequently 
brought into general discussion and the findings debated 
(D,M,0) . It was up to the Senators to do more to promote 
committee reports and ensure follow-through after the report was 
tabled - such as the committee going on field excursions and 
carrying out more of a watching brief (B). Thus the problem lay 
with Senators themselves; not with the committee system.
Yet what can Senators do? Even when the Senate feels 
that the Government is ignoring committee reports, and in 
particular, showing an inordinate delay in tabling a reply to 
committee reports, the options available to Senators are 
limited. Certainly, a Member or Senator may move a censure 
against a Minister, such a measure would appear to be rather 
drastic and overdramatic. Nonetheless, there is little else that 
can be done to encourage a Minister to reply to a committee 
report.
Davies suggests that committee reports could be 
strengthened by allowing the committee chairman to choose the 
tabling motion: to take note of the report; that the Senate 
approve of the report or approve of certain or all 
recommendations of the report. This would mean that the report 
would be a report of the Senate rather than the committee. Thus: 
'That this House notes with approval the ...
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Committee Reports - in Perspective
But these criticisms may miss the point. While there is 
validity in what the CALA Committee and McKenry say, I would
suggest that too much emphasis is placed on seeking response 
from the government. Committees do not actively seek similar
responses from other bodies. What makes a government response
more important than other bodies? Does this mean that committee 
reports are always directed at the government and never at other 
institutions or bodies? (or the public?)
Senator Evans, two years after his comments in the 
Senate on the constitional and Legal Affairs committees report 
on government responses, altered his attack on the government's 
attitude to committee reports. While agreeing that the Prime 
Minister's pledge of 1976 had not been honoured, and agreeing
that it lowered the morale of Senators and dissuaded them from 
further effort, be noted that 'while this is frustrating, it 
does not...make the committee function in any way meaningless. 
Our task is simply to do our best to create the political 
pre-conditions that will make it difficult for committee reports 
- because of their penetration, comprehensiveness, exposure or 
manifest wrongs or good plain sense - to be simply ignored'. Our 
task as members of those committees is to expose the weaknesses 
in our governing system and show the way they may be remedied, 
but not to take the task of governing ourselves' (Evans 
1982:17).
The British Study of Parliament Group also approached 
the aspect of government response in a different light. They 
argued that 'the real test of select committee performance and 
their impact on members is not the number of members attending 
set-piece debates in the House, but their influence on members, 
who, having read committee reports (or at least just some of the 
evidence or recommendations) make use of the material in the
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course of their parliamentary activities. Select Committee 
reports, even if not formally debated on their own, often 
influence other discussion in the House. Unfortunately, the 
extent of this use cannot be precisely defined1 (emphasis added) 
(Study of Parliament Group 1970:20).
A problem that arises in discussing the effectiveness 
of committee reports is that the degree to which policy is 
affected by recommendations can be too abstract; particularly at 
the level of the department. To what extent is a policy 
determined by committee recommendations, backbench pressure, a 
'push' by forces within the department or Cabinet? The Study of 
Parliament group, for example, suggests that departmental 
witnesses may consciously or sub-consciously implant ideas and 
recommendations in the minds of a committee. Can the opposite 
occur? Alternatively, policy may evolve as a result of a general 
community debate involving all or some of the actors which would 
or may be involved in policy formulation. But whatever the 
suggested or probable factors involved, they suggest that 'The 
close association between departments and Parliament usually 
means that ideas generated by committees find their way sooner 
or later into major policy deliberations' (Study of Parliament 
Group 1970: 27) .
Another cause and effect problem is in attempting to 
measure the effect reports have on government policy. What time 
span do we use to measure when a policy is announced and thus no 
longer under the influence of a report. Surely it would not be 
three or six months?
The effect of a committee report on a department cannot 
be measured realistically by the time taken before the 
government response appears. More often than not a delay in a 
response can be attributed to a Minister's procrastination or a 
delay in the Caucus committee, rather than a department being 
obstinate.
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Senators also questioned the reliability of using the 
response rate of the Executive as an accurate measure of the 
government's interest in the report. Some suggested that 
governments took reports seriously, but pointed out the 
difficulty of quantifying such responses. If the government, 12 
months or 2 years after the report was written, implemented 
certain policies which appeared to resemble a course of action 
that was recommended by a committee, who is to say that it was 
or was not influenced by the committee? (C, F, Q) . Given that 
committee reports and evidence are circulated widely within the 
rublic Service and are taken seriously, then the committee's 
influence may indeed be strong yet remain unquantifiable.
One Minister argued that 'it really is vanity on the 
part of Senators who say that unless you adopt our
recommendations then ipso facto you are ignoring us. That is non 
seguitur' (G) . In part, it is up to the authors of the report to
convince Ministers to read it. 'For example if on a certain 
subject a report made a significant input, then yes. But the 
point is, it will not be the only input on that subject. If I 
came down with a different finding, then it was because I felt 
that there were good reasons to do so. It is stupid to suggest 
that simply because the recommendations are not taken up then 
they are being ignored' (G).
Notwithstanding these qualifications on the difficulty 
of measuring the overall attitude of a government to committees 
and their reports, a large number of Senators were concerned 
with the way the Executive treated the committee system and they 
endorsed the comments that were made by their colleagues on the 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee.
However, where Senators differed with commentators was 
that they were equally critical of their colleagues for not 
supporting the committee system in the Chamber and in the party
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room. I f ,  f o r  some e x t r a o r d i n a r y  r e a s o n ,  t h e  com m it tee  sys tem  
sh o u ld  b r e a k  down, i t  would be b e c a u se  of t h e  l a c k  of  s u p p o r t  
g iv en  by th e  S e n a te  and S e n a t o r s  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  com m it tees  
r e c e i v e d  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  and s t a t u s  t h a t  would e n co u rag e  
S e n a t o r s  t o  d e v o te  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  e f f o r t  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t
co m m it tee s  r em ained  e f f e c t i v e .
I f  r e p o r t s  a r e  n o t  a lw ays  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  government  
and i f  t h e  governm ent  r e s p o n s e  i s  n o t  v i t a l ,  t h e n  does th e  
r e p o r t  m a t t e r ?  What i s  t h e  t a r g e t  o f  r e p o r t s ?
In  t h e o r y ,  a S e n a to r  or Member 's  p r e s e n c e  i n  P a r l i a m e n t  
' p r o v i d e s  a p o i n t  of  open a c c e s s  t o  t h e  whole p o l i t i c a l  sy s te m ;  
he p r o v i d e s  some minimum g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  government  w i l l  go on 
a c c o r d i n g  to  some of  t h e  methods of  r a t i o n a l  p e r s u a s i o n '  (Emy
1 9 7 6 :4 7 9 ) .  Thus a s  w e l l  as  e n c o u r a g i n g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by
S e n a t o r s ,  c o m m it tee s  a l s o  p r o v i d e  an avenue f o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n
f o r  i n t e r e s t  g roups  and c i t i z e n s  e i t h e r  th ro u g h  w r i t t e n  or o r a l  
s u b m i s s i o n s .  Simply b e c a u s e  a S e n a to r  i s  n o t  i n v o lv e d  i n  t h e  
im m e d ia te ,  and o f t e n  f r a n t i c ,  l i f e  t h a t  can swamp Members i n  t h e  
Lower House,  t h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  S e n a t o r s  sh o u ld  be any l e s s  
a fo c u s  of  community v i e w s .  Like S e n a t o r s '  c o u n t e r p a r t s  i n  t h e  
House, S e n a t o r s  a l s o  have  a r o l e  t o  communicate  th e  knowledge 
th ey  have a c q u i r e d  ( i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a com m it tee  r e p o r t )  t o  t h e  
p u b l i c .  S e n a te  co m m it tee s  a r e  no l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s .
That  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n  i s  o u t  t h e r e  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  
means t h a t  t h e r e  i s  more to  P a r l i a m e n t  t h a n  th e  b ig  w h i t e  
b u i l d i n g .  The e l e c t o r  s p e a k i n g  t o  a p o l i t i c i a n  s h o u ld  be t a l k i n g  
t o  a member of  P a r l i a m e n t ;  t h a t  i s ,  t o  someone of  i n f l u e n c e  a t  
t h e  F e d e r a l  l e v e l .  However, as so many com m enta to rs  have
la m e n te d ,  and so many p e o p le  i n  th e  community have come t o  
r e c o g n i s e ,  t h i s  i s  s im p ly  n o t  t r u e .  And so C a n b e r ra  (meaning 
P a r l i a m e n t ,  t h e  High C o u r t  and th e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e )  r em a in s  t h a t
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far away place where all the decisions are made in isolation
away from the real world. Thus the importance of parliamentary 
committees.
Parliamentary committees not only consist of a group of 
Senators who happen to provide sufficient numbers so as to
constitute a committee. They are seen as an integral part of 
Parliament. For many in the electorate, this will be the only 
time in their lives that they will see two Senators from
opposing sides sitting side by side in a friendly atmosphere.
While the contact may be superficial and naive (in the 
expectation by the witnesses of influencing policy) it is a far 
closer form of contact with parliamentarians than was available 
prior to the establishment of the committee system, and the 
behaviour of Senators is somewhat different to the image of the 
theatre atmosphere in the Chamber that is depicted by the media.
Going beyond this cosiness, however, the British Study 
of Parliament Group argues that their 'evidence suggests that in 
hearing witnesses, reading memoranda, and paying visits, the new 
committees (of the House of Commons) have established a pattern 
of work which is directed towards industry, pressure groups, 
local authorities and consumer interests' (Study of Parliament 
Group 1977:31). Thus whereas a member's parliamentary time 
primarily involves expending great effort in attempting to 
discredit the opposing side, which bears little relevance to the 
concept of governing, committee work has provided the 'point of 
open access' that Emy was referring to.
Yet, as we have just seen debate within and outside of 
Parliament in Australia is based on the assumption that the 
government and/or the Parliament is the primary focus of 
committee reports. Amongst the Senators that I interviewed, 
there were differences of opinion as to who constituted the 
audience for committee reports. Not all Senators agreed that
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reports were automatically directed to the government. Many 
Senators suggested that there could be at least three other 
audience targets other than the Executive and its 
administration.
Colleagues
For a number of Senators, their committee reports were 
aimed at their colleagues; both on the committee and in the 
Chamber (A, D, E, J, L, N) . For some, this was the primary and 
virtually only relevant use in presenting a report. That it did 
not influence government policy was not of particular concern to 
them as the report was not specifically directed at the 
Government anyway. The report here was seen as an educative aid 
for those senators who did not have the time to study the area 
under consideration.
The report was also seen as a statement to one's
colleagues that 'I' am now an expert in this area. Having 
established himself as an authority on the matter, opportunities 
would arise more easily to speak in debate, and importantly, the 
knowledge and respect that gained could be used to great effect 
in party committees and in the party room. Giles, the Chairman 
of the Chairmen's Backbench Committee until 1983, says that 
'wherever possible, government members of Parliament use their 
expertise and interest to assist the government and the party
organisations in planning and decisions' (Giles 1982:2).
Thus for these Senators, the inquiry and its report 
are for their own benefit and whatever they can gain from the
committee is sufficient to justify their presence on the
committee. Moreover, they can establish a creditability in the 
eyes of their collegues which can merely satisfy the ego or, 
more likely, signal to their colleagues that he or she is now 
ready for advancement. One Senator also said that in educating
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Parliament you thereby educated the public (K) . It was up to 
Senators and members to raise the consciousness of the 
electorate, but to do this, Senators needed to be informed. The 
problem with this, as Senators have said in the Senate and in 
interviews their colleagues were not promoting the report of 
committees in the Chamber, the party room or the electorate.
The Public
While Senators felt that reports may attempt to 
persuade a government to take a particular course of action or 
be directed at their colleagues, they also saw the report as 
being directed to the public at large. Reports were written 'to 
make them read intelligibly as they are intended to be a source 
of information for the public ... a standard document that can 
be used by everybody. The recommendations, however, are
particularly aimed at the government' (Q).
However, there was disagreement over the public as an 
audience. Some felt that even though it should reach the public 
it never did.
If the report is to inform the electorate 
then I don't think that it is succeeding. It 
is hard enough in informing the electorate 
that the inquiry is proceeding. Yet
committees are the only real forum for people 
in the community to have their say (0).
Others simply did not believe that the report was 
directed at the public. There is simply 'not much of a public 
education role' (J) in committee reports. 'Committee reports do 
not have much of an educative role. They are read by people who 
are well informed anyway. They are delighted to have the backing 
of such a report to support their own arguments. They don't get 
through to the general public. But you get down to what is the 
role of the legislature? I think it is the investigation of
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problems and policy formulation. The real role of the 
legislature is legislative and looking at what the government is 
actually doing which is Bills and not on what we think it ought 
to be doing' (D) . However, at least some of those Senators who 
did not see reports as being directed at the public may have 
been fatalistic and were generally in support of Senator (0)'s 
comment above. All Senators were in agreement that one of the 
main reasons the public did not hear of the activities of 
committees was because of the reluctance of the media to provide 
the coverage. Thus, in saying that there was not much of a 
public education role, the intention may not be that this should 
not be so but rather, that given the poor coverage of 
proceedings of committees, there is just no way that committees 
would educate the public.
The ex-premier of Tasmania, the Hon Doug Lowe, has 
argued that 'the Upper House (in the theoretical sense) should 
be a genuine House of Review having unfetted access to 
information on behalf of the community. It should also give the 
community a means by which policy input can be made on the 
variety of policy or administrative issues scheduled to be 
considered by Parliament' (Lowe 1982:12). We saw earlier that 
Senators did not believe that committees received submissions 
from a good cross-section of the community. Similarly, a number 
of Senators believed that reports were not directed at the 
public. If one accepts Lowe's role for an Upper House, then is 
the Senate a true House of Review?
Audience emerges
Some Senators were unwilling to commit themselves as 
they felt that when a reference was first received, it is not 
aimed at anybody. It was only when the inquiry was underway that 
the audience emerges. Also, it depends on what kind of report it 
was (M).
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For other Senators the audience of a commmittee was 
different at different stages (A, I, F, P) . They also supported 
the comments above that it was too difficult to generalise.
Obviously it is difficult to generalise on who the 
audience really is as it depends on the nature of the report. If 
it is a study of an area that involves an unexplored policy 
matter then it is directed at the public, particular groups, the 
relevant party committees and the government.
However, it is not my intention to locate with 
particular precision the audience for committee reports. The 
important point is that a large number of Senators did not see 
reports as being directed primarily at the government. Thus, 
while a great deal of energy is being directed at the 
implications from the attitude of governments to committees, 
little thought is being given as to what other purposes 
committees and their reports may have. Clearly few commentators 
appear to have discovered this nuance.
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CHAPTER 15
THE MEDIA
The role of the Media - The Committee Perspective
For parliamentary committees the media can serve a 
number of useful functions. It can:
1. Be an avenue to formally publicise references. This 
enables the committee to reach the broadest possible 
range of people in the community;
2. Write articles noting that a committee has undertaken a 
new reference and discussing what the committee or the 
journalist considers to be the key issues involved. 
This alerts people to the fact that the committee is 
inquiring into an area and amplifies what the committee 
wishes to examine;
3. Provide coverage of the case that witnesses are placing 
before the committee during public hearings. This 
enables the community to be involved in the committee 
inquiry, even if only from a distance. Also, it 
encourages others in the community who disagree with 
what is being presented to the committee to come 
forward and put alternative points of view.
4. Publicise and promote discussion in the community of 
the conclusions and recommendations in the report of 
the committee. The committee is largely dependent on 
the media for promoting such discussion (although
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Senators and in particular the chairmen, accept that
they should be involved in discussion of their report 
at the community level and in the parliamentary area);
5. Publicise the committee's activities and thus the 
Senators on the committee. Senators are more likely to 
be attracted to serve on committees and put in the
considerable time and effort that is required to
generate the kind of favourable media coverage which 
invariably can result.
The role of the press gallery is to report the 
proceedings of Federal Parliament. The problem for Parliament
and for backbenchers is that 'Just as Parliament House has 
become the house of the national Government and the focus of 
most Australian national politics, so the press gallery has
become at least as much concerned with the activities of 
national government and politics as it is with reporting
meetings in the House and the Senate' (Solomon 1978:152).
The main focus of interest by the press on
parliamentary proceedings is in those areas that involve 
confrontation and controversy. The problem is that whereas the 
media want politicians to be overt, parliamentary proceedings 
(especially committee hearings) can often be covert.
In the production of an item for television, there is 
the aversion to the presenter's 'talking head', so that
television producers want pretty pictures, not just heads 
mouthing meaningless words. Thus a good fire will always precede 
a new set of statistics. For a politician to have a better 
chance of television coverage, he has to think of something more 
imaginative than an everyday press conference. For example,
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Neville Bonner was assured of saturation 
television coverage in his campaign against 
imported boomerangs when he put on a throwing 
exhibition in the rose garden of Parliament 
House...He had the idea of presenting 
something visual for the cameras (Carlton 
1976:4) .
Bonner's actions would be considered a good news story. 
For the media, dull stories are simply not good material for 
publication. (For journalists this relates to politicians as 
much as any other section of the community). Journalists' 
definition of dull is anything that does not attract and 
entertain readers. Steele, in her study of journalists in the 
press gallery, argued that this need to entertain readers 
encouraged journalists to focus on conflict in reporting 
political news.
This focus on publicity was also promoted by their 
perception that 'politics causes conflict rather than resolves 
conflict'. Steele found that 'all journalists had an image of 
politics as conflict, with the source of this conflict located 
within the political process and with political actors' (Steele 
1977:37) .
Steele also found that there was strong pressure for 
journalists to use dramatic words - 'to beat up a story'.
Steele's journalists knew that such a style would particularly
please their editors and it would be good copy that would be 
guaranteed a run in the next mornings paper. That journalists'
perception of politics was based on conflict made 'beating up a 
story' so much easier.
As well as a story requiring an element of conflict,
another problem in attracting the attention of journalists was 
that journalists believed that 'Ministers are obviously more 
newsworthy than backbenchers because their decisions influence
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the lives of the innocent who pay for them and politicians are 
generally fairly unsavoury (Steele 1977:50). Steele did find
though, that two journalists from The Age said they were more
likely to take notice of backbenchers who 'worked diligently' on 
committees. The trouble is, how do journalists find out that
Senators are diligent committee members?
Other comments by journalists to Steele that may affect 
journalists' reporting of committee proceedings were:
. All journalists said that they were unable to persue 
any specialist interests that they may have (though in 
any case, most journalists are generalists). If they
had any specialist knowledge, it was treated by the 
news agency as an afterthought. Also, journalists were 
expected to write on a broad range of issues because of 
the tight budgets that news organisations operated 
within.
. Time had a strong influence on what determined news. 
Committee reports, for example, were read and written 
up by journalists only if there was sufficient time. 
All journalists complained generally about the 
pressures of work.
. Journalists were not encouraged to depart from what was 
accepted as the news stories of the day. There was 
strong pressure from editors to cover the same items as 
their competition. This ensured that the audience was 
maintained, for it was believed that if they did not 
cover what everybody else was covering, then that 
newspaper was seen to have missed the most important 
news of the day.
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Conflict or Concensus - The problem of Coverage
This problem of publicity is compounded for 
parliamentary committees. It was observed earlier that one of 
the reasons for committees being successful was because of the 
bipartisan work undertaken by all Senators. This is achieved 
mainly because the committees operate away from the heated 
environment of the Chamber where Senators are, inter alia, 
playing before the media.
However, this does not imply that they look
disdainfully upon publicity in the media when participating in 
committee activity. Far from it. It is simply that the 
prerequisites for gaining publicity, a split in the committee or 
government Senators criticising their Government's policies, are 
considered not to be conducive to constructive committee work.
Although local newspapers can be interested in a
committee when it visits their district this interest wanes 
quickly once the committee has left the district; then the 
coverage is little different to that of the major papers 
throughout Australia - which is poor. All Senators were very 
dissatisfied with the interest shown by journalists in committee 
work with a variety of reasons being put forward to explain the 
lack of interest.
For the media, committees drag out too much. Quite 
often at committee hearings Senators felt that they often 
received some very good answers but these were inadequately 
covered. Part of the problem as Senators saw it was that the 
media is too concerned with the immediate and that 'the media in 
this place live in their own closseted selfindulgent 
environment. What they perceive to be the major issues, no-one 
basically gives a stuff about!' (0). The only area that brought 
any favourable response was the provincial media where on 
interstate visits Senators felt that the coverage could be 'good 
to excellent' (F).
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These criticisms of the media ranged from the general: 
'the press are lazy and unsatisfactory'; to the observation that 
it was partially, at least, because of the high turn around of 
journalists in the press gallery. This prevented in-depth 
knowledge from developing in specific committee areas and 
journalists from getting to know the personalities associated 
with the committees. Also it was noted that the resources of the 
media organisations were not large enough to include a thorough 
reporting of committee life.
Many Senators spoke with a sense of frustration when 
talking about the media. As one Senator pointed out,
one of the most important parts of the 
usefulness of the committee system is the 
educative role of creating a community 
awareness of the nature of that problem and 
generating consideration of that matter and 
the expression of views and the forming of 
views in relation to it. Unless the media is 
willing to assist in that process, the
process becomes far more difficult. I don't 
think the media are nearly effective enough 
in doing that as they ought to be. They 
report an awful lot of bulldust that goes on 
in the Chamber and relatively little of what 
goes on in the committee area unless it 
happens to be presold as sensational! (A)
As well as generating public interest in the inquiry, 
publicity can also alert experts to the fact that their evidence 
may be of use to the committee and that they will be taken 
seriously. Bradshaw and Pring suggest that the publicity a 
committee receives allows, 'in a sense, witnesses to compete 
against each other, and so the committee is better able to weigh 
up the assertions' (Bradshaw and Pring 1972:247). As well, if 
witnesses know what has been said before them, they can frame 
their evidence in such a way that it will either support or 
question the evidence that the committee has already received.
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In this way evidence which critically examines previous evidence 
provides the committee with support that could only have been 
obtained by hiring consultants.
It was generally agreed that coverage of committee 
activity only occured when there was something controversial to 
report. Reporting of committees should involve following through 
an issue that had developed over a number of hearings. Yet in 
most instances this did not occur. This was particularly a 
problem with those sections of the media that appeared to be 
pre-occupied with the immediate.
A Minister though, was equally critical of committees. 
'A current weakness of committees is that there are too many 
references being made to committees that are of interest to 
minority groups in Australia but don't particularly affect the 
overall number of Australians. This means that there is little 
press coverage. There needs to be a greater focus of national 
issues. If the right issues are selected, then, yes you will get 
good press coverage! (I).
In terms of Senators receiving publicity and
recognition for the work that they carry out, then at least 
parliamentary committees are a better avenue than Caucus 
committees. While this may be a 'pretty round about way of 
achieving visability, at least to some extent it is there and 
you can qualify it' (J).
At the start of this chapter, I said that the media 
served five functions for committees. At times it may; but most 
often the media successfully fulfills only the first function; 
that is, it provides an avenue to formally announce that the 
committee is undertaking a new inquiry.
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However, journalists rarely follow up these 
announcements with articles in anticipation; normally offer poor 
coverage of public hearings and who appears before the
committee; do not follow up issues that are raised at committee 
hearings and rarely publicise these in feature articles; and 
tend to create the impression that the committee is a one off 
hearing rather than part of a system of on-going committees.
Clearly, Senators are dissatisfied with the press 
coverage that committees receive. These criticisms may arise 
because Senators are eternally optimistic that every speech they 
make and every activity they engage in will be covered by the 
media. However, such coverage rarely occurs and so attempting to 
gain press coverage is invariably a frustrating and futile
exercise. Striving to gain the attention of the media is part of 
justifying Senators existence as members of Parliament. 
Parliamentarians need to be seen to be doing things which will 
enhance their image in the electorate and among their 
colleagues. Thus any criticisms of the media is, at least in
part, due to self-interest. Their criticisms can not, however, 
be soley described as solipsist.
They are concerned that because of poor coverage, there 
is pressure to examine 'sexy' areas that will attract their 
attention. However, so far this has not occurred. More
importantly the poor coverage means that the proceedings of the 
committee are not being discussed in the public arena and this 
inhibits gaining the broadest possible cross-section of 
community views being presented before the committees. Issues 
that emerge and are criticised by other witnesses are not 
followed up. Not unexpectedly perhaps given the public's 
ignorance of the committee's inquiry, reports are not discussed 
nor used at a later stage in feature articles that cover the 
area of the committee report. Thus, as a number of Senators said 
in the previous chapter, the activities of committees or their
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reports or both are not aimed at the public, or, if the public 
is the audience, then the committee more often than not fails in 
reaching the public. For these Senators, this lack of 
communication is discouraging their participation in committee 
work in the sense that they see the role of committees as 
providing an opportunity for Senators to discuss an issue with 
the electorate; clearly this is not happening.
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CHAPTER 16
CONCLUSION
Given all the problems facing Senators on committees - 
lack of recognition from the media and the local branches of 
their parties, the conflicting pressures of work on their time, 
the clashes with the Executive, the staffing problems and the 
occasional quorum difficulties, why do Senators still remain 
active in committee work? Accepting that the answer may vary 
from Senator to Senator, the orthodox views take one of two
strands. Almost everyone accepts that Senators join committees 
with the expectation that they will be scrutinizing the 
Executive and producing a report that will have an impact on 
government policy. Certainly a number of Senators would agree 
that committees can scrutinize the Excecutive and the reports 
may have an influence on government policy. Thereafter the 
strands diverge.
There are those such as Odgers who have argued that
committees enable the Senate to 'discharge its functions fully 
and effectively' (Odgers 1976:467). Committees are seen as the 
best means of bringing accountability back into Parliament and 
of providing a structure 'equal in competence' to that which the
government can call upon. Also, committees are seen to create an
awareness within the Public Service that backbenchers believe 
certain areas deserving of consideration. Of all the
commentators, only Odgers really stressed that committees would 
provide an opportunity for individuals and groups to press their 
claims and points of view more readily to Parliament.
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Other commentators have also spoken in glowing terms of 
the new Senate that has emerged as a result of the creation of 
the investigative committees, but have tended to concentrate 
more on their possible impact on government. Indyk, Mckenry and 
Weller at times seem preoccupied with the impact that committees 
have on government and the response by government to such 
reports.
The second strand is more sceptical. While Odgers in 
particular and others generally in some of their articles see 
committees as heralding a new approach to Parliament, others 
have argued that committees are a fruitless excercise where the 
government ignores committee reports and so committees are 
powerless. As well, in their efforts to produce reports that do 
not comment on government policy, and so produce reports that 
are bipartisan, reports are invariably sterile documents that 
say nothing (see in particular Weller 1982) .
It is clear that the observations made by commentators 
who speak in glowing terms of committees fall far short of the 
picture painted. In reality, committees do not influence 
government policy, they have not put the work responsible back 
into government and Senators feel frustrated in their work.
On the other hand, those who describe committees as 
being nothing more than Portnoy's complaint, as Senator Evans 
described it, are also only painting half a picture. Senators in 
interviews painted a complex picture of why they joined 
committees and continued to work on them.
To suggest that Senators have one preconceived motive 
for joining and working on committees is simplistic and ignores 
a number of influences and variables that will determine what 
Senators get out of committees. In short, by focusing on the 
product, the process of the inquiry is ignored.
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The reasons why Senators and Committtees have been so 
misunderstood is because commentators have failed to come to 
terms a number of factors:
1. The Dominance of the Political
Weller sees politics to be at the heart of behaviour on 
a committee. 'Those who are most effective in committees because 
of their talent are also likely to be potential candidates for 
the ministry and to be using committees at least partly with 
that aim in mind. [Because of this,] reformers ... need to take 
the party political loyalties into their designs^ (Weller 
1979:64-65) .
In 1970, Hutchison in her study of the Australian 
Senate found that only two Senators 'cited that their state was 
their primary focus of attention'. Rather, 'Senators are 
expected (by themselves and by others) to be "party men". Their 
chief loyality is to their party (not to their State or to 
Chamber itself); and any occasions of role conflict ... will 
generally be resolved in favour of following party rather than 
personal judgement ... the party not only provides the 
objectives to be persued but also (through party discipline) 
prescribes the methods by which these goals will be achieved' 
(Hutchison 1976:309-311).
Twelve years and five Senate elections later, Senators 
are displaying similar loyalty. They join the Senate for purely 
partisan reasons hoping to promote the interests of the party 
and their own ideology. There is no sign of Senators wanting to 
join the Senate because of their concern for the state in which 
they live or for some longstanding interest in the workings of 
the Senate as distinct from the House of Representatives. While 
only three Senators openly admitted that they first sought 
pre-selection for a seat in the lower House, another three said 
that they were thinking of seeking pre-selection for a seat in 
the House of Representatives 'where the action is' (P).
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I n  summing up why co mmi t t e e s  were  u s e f u l ,  one s e n i o r  
S e n a to r  s a i d  t h a t  t hey  p r o v i d e d  him w i t h  a v e h i c l e  t o  ' g e t  me i n  
t ouch  w i t h  o t h e r  p e o p l e  I would n o t  have  o t h e r w i s e  met .  But i t  
must  be p l a c e d  i n  p e r s p e c t i v e ;  commi t t ee s  a r e  n o t  t h e  main t h i n g  
i n  a S e n a t o r ' s  l i f e .  They a r e  p o l i t i c a n s  f i r s t  and f o r e m o s t '  
(B) .
2.  D e c i s i o n  Making i n  Government
Given t h e  p a r t i s a n  n a t u r e  of  S e n a t o r s ,  i t  i s  n o t  
s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  t ime  and e f f o r t  i s  p u t  i n t o  
backbench  commi t t ee s  and t h a t  i s  t h e  a r e a  many S e n a t o r s  f i n d  
most  p r o d u c t i v e  i f  t hey  want  t o  i n f l u e n c e  p o l i c y .  They have  a 
d e c i s i o n  making r o l e  which i s  r e c o g n i s e d  by b a c k b e n c h e r s ,  
l o b b y i s t s  and i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s .  These commi t te es  s c r e e n  a l l  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  even b e f o r e  i t  comes b e f o r e  C a b i n e t .  I t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  i f  S e n a t o r s  want  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  and p o l i c i e s  of  
t h e  p a r t y ,  t hey  would work t h r o u g h  t h e  backbench  commi t t ee s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n v in c e  t h e i r  c o l l e g u e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
t h e  Chamber,  from th e  i s o l a t i o n  of  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m m i t t t e e s .  
The n a t u r e  of  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  government  and w i t h i n  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  e n s u r e s  t h a t  o p i n i o n s  a r e  
ha rd e ne d  and l i n e s  a r e  f i r m l y  drawn w e l l  b e f o r e  m a t t e r s  a r e  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Chamber.
Thus S e n a t o r s  s e e  t h e i r  r o l e  on p a r t y  commi t t ee s  
d i f f e r e n t l y  t o  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m m i t t e e s .  S e n a t o r s  make no 
a p o l o g i e s  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  backbench  commi t t ee s  a r e  p o l i t i c a l  
and a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  may i n c l u d e  t h e  v e ry  
s u r v i v a l  of  t h e  p a r t y .
One of  t h e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  commi t t e e s  a r e  b i p a r t i s a n  i s  
t h a t  most  S e n a t o r s  do no t  s ee  commi t t ee s  b e in g  i n v o l v e d  i n  t he  
d a y - t o - d a y  c u t  and t h r u s t  of  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  
do m ina t e s  t h e i r  l i f e .  As we have s e e n ,  commi t te es  a r e  a 
d i f f e r e n t  e x e r c i s e  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  a r e n a .
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3. The Process is as important as the Report
For most Senators, benefits from committee work do not 
necessarily have an immediate goal. They are content to work on 
committees for a longer term goal; the main areas being:
(i) Knowledge of the Public Service. Having gained a better 
understanding of the Public Service through their 
appearance before committees Senators gain a better 
appreciation of how departments operate. An immediate 
benefit from this is that Senators feel more confident 
in approaching the department for requests for 
information. But there is a longer term benefit, and
more important some Senators would say, from having 
public servants appear before committees. A number of 
Senators commented on the advantage that they would 
have as new Ministers having already had extensive 
dealings with senior public servants and their
departments.
(ii) Community Participation. For interest groups trying to 
put a case to the government and Parliament there are 
few opportunities to put their case directly to
backbenchers. Committees provide electors with the 
opportunity to meet face to face with their
parliamentarians in an atmosphere that is virtually 
free of the divisiveness that normally exists when 
politicans from opposing parties are brought together. 
This contact helps both Senators and community groups. 
Senators are able to meet those who are working in the 
area and thus develop contacts. This contact inevitably 
is used by Senators to help them in their work in the 
Chamber, the electorate and within the party.
(iii) The Acquiring of Knowledge. Depending on the Senator, 
this information will be used:
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(a) t o  improve t h e  knowledge of  members f o r  t h e i r  own 
e d i f i c a t i o n ;
(b) e d u c a t e  t h e i r  c o l l e g u e s  b o th  i n  t h e  S e n a te  and t h e  
House of  R e p r e s e n a t i v e s ;
(c) a l l o w  S e n a t o r s  t o  a d o p t  a h i g h e r  p r o f i l e  i n  t h e  
p a r t y  room, i n  th e  Chamber, on backbench  
c o m m it tee s  and i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ;
(d) f o r  a l e s s  d i f f i c u l t  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  t h e  m i n i s t r y .
Thus S e n a te  co m m it tee s  have r e g e n e r a t e d  t h e  S e n a t e ,  bu t  
by and l a r g e ,  i n  a way t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  t o  t h a t  p e r c e i v e d  by 
c o m m e n ta to r s .  Committees have p r o v i d e d  S e n a t o r s  w i th  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  f u l f i l  some of  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  by a more
e f f e c t i v e  means t h a n  would o t h e r w i s e  be p o s s i b l e .  However, t h e s e  
o b j e c t i v e s  do n o t  a lways r e l a t e  s o l e l y  t o  t h e i r  c o m m it tee .
S e n a t o r s  a r e  f a c e d  w i th  commitments t h a t  a r i s e  from
f o u r  a r e a s :  t h e  Chamber, backbench c o m m i t t e e s ,  p a r l i a m e n t a r y
c o m m it te e s  and e l e c t o r a t e  work.  A s tu d y  of  any one of t h e s e  
a r e a s  must acknowledge  t h a t  th ey  a r e  h e a v i l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e
o t h e r  t h r e e  a r e a s  and t h a t  each a r e a  w i l l  o f t e n  be used t o
s u p p o r t  t h e i r  work i n  o t h e r  a r e a s .  W ith o u t  t h i s  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,  
i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e y  would be w i l l i n g  t o  work a s  d i l i g e n t l y  
a s  most  S e n a t o r s  do on p a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o m m i t t e e s .  S e n a t o r s  work 
on c o m m it tee s  t o  enhance  t h e i r  p a r t y ' s  o r  t h e i r  own f o r t u n e s  or 
b e c a u s e  th ey  have a p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  a r e a .  They do n o t  
work on co m m it tee s  t o  enhance  t h e  s t a t u r e  of  t h e  S e n a te  or i t s  
com m it tee  sy s te m .
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I t  i s  o f t e n  c la im e d  t h a t  S e n a to r  Rae d id  much to  
improve th e  r e p u t a t i o n  of  t h e  S e n a te  and e s p e c i a l l y  i t s  
c o m m i t t e e s .  However, I would c o n te n d  t h a t  t h i s  was a b y - p r o d u c t  
r a t h e r  t h a n  o b j e c t i v e .  The S e n a te  and i t s  co m m it tee s  were th e  
b e s t  mechanisms a v a i l a b l e  t o  f u l f i l  p e r s o n a l  a m b i t i o n s  t h a t  
c o u ld  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  be a c h i e v e d .
Having redrawn t h e  p i c t u r e  of  S e n a t o r s  and t h e i r  work 
on c o m m i t t e e s ,  i t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how S e n a te  com m it tees  
o p e r a t e  and why th ey  a r e  s t i l l  s u p p o r t e d ,  in  s p i t e  of  th e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  s u r r o u n d  them.
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The method I chose to explore this topic was a 
structured interview. Thirty-eight questions were selected to be 
asked during interviews with Senators. These interviews ranged 
from short, to-the-point, 25 minute interviews, to over one-hour 
more discursive discussions, not all of which were actually 
relevant to my paper.
It was considered that one hour would be the maximum 
time that I could obtain from a Senator. In the end, a number of 
interviews went well beyond the hour. All interviews were 
conducted in Parliament House, Canberra and all were tape 
recorded.
While the format for the interview was a set of 
prearranged questions, Senators were allowed to answer as they 
saw fit. Thus, in some interviews, single answers covered up to 
10 questions. In terms of catergorisation of answers, this may 
be less than satisfactory. Nevertheless, it allowed for some of 
the subtleties and nuances to emerge which so often provide a 
truer insight into the workings of committees than would be 
possible in a more rigidly controlled interview.
I carried out one pre-test interview involving some 80 
potential questions with a (very patient and sympathetic) 
Senator in November 1981. Following this interview, I undertook 
a drastic revision of the questions. This exercise succeeded in 
reducing the number to 38 questions. In Feburary 1982, I 
interviewed a second Senator for a final and successful pre-test 
interview lasting some 50 minutes. Being satisfied with this 
interview, I commenced interviewing my sample in March 1982. All 
but 2 interviews were completed by October 1982. The final 
interviews were carried out in mid-1983. The questionaire is 
reproduced in Appendix 2.
Initially, I felt that a satisfactory sample could be 
achieved by interviewing some 10-16 Senators from all parties, 
covering a variety of backgrounds and committees. At the same 
time, I also wanted to include most of the Senators who are on 
two particular committees - one that was considered by the two 
pre-test Senators as high profile and the other as being less in 
the public eye. In the end, I interviewed five Senators from one 
Committee and four Senators from the other committee, including 
the chairman. This, it was hoped, would provide the basis for a 
good sample of Senators. The remaining Senators were chosen by a
1
number o f  methods and f o r  a number of  r e a s o n s .  As can  be s e e n  i n  
t a b l e s  A . - P  on page  3 , t h e  sample d o es  r e p r e s e n t  a good 
c r o s s - s e c t i o n  o f  S e n a t o r s .
Any a t t e m p t  t o  i n t e r v i e w  a S e n a to r  f o r  an hour  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  a t  t h e  b e s t  o f  t im e s  s im p ly  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  
o f  t h e i r  work (and m in e ) .  While  no S e n a t o r  r e f u s e d  t o  be 
i n t e r v i e w e d ,  i t  r e q u i r e d  up t o  t e n  t e l e p h o n e  c a l l s  e v e n t u a l l y  t o  
a r r a n g e  a t im e  t o  i n t e r v i e w  some of  them. T h e re  were  a l s o  t im e s  
when I would  j u s t  s t a r t  an i n t e r v i e w  when t h e  S e n a t o r  would be 
c a l l e d  away, or  w o rs e ,  I would a r r i v e  t o  f i n d  t h a t  he was n o t  
a v a i l a b l e  t h a t  day .
Some S e n a t o r s  c o u ld  n o t  be c o n t a c t e d  s im p ly  b e c a u se  
t h e y  were  so busy .  When S e n a t o r s  a r e  i n  C a n b e r r a  t h e y  a r e  i n  t h e  
chamber,  a t  p a r t y  m e e t i n g s ,  com m it tee  m e e t i n g s ,  i n  t h e  l i b r a r y  
or  v i s i t i n g  c o l l e a g u e s .  Thus i n  th e  end,  more t h a n  one  i n t e r v i e w  
was a r r a n g e d  s im p ly  b e c a u se  I met a p o t e n t i a l  i n t e r v i e w e e  i n  a 
c o r r i d o r .
The r e s p o n s e  by S e n a t o r s  t o  a r e q u e s t  f o r  an i n t e r v i e w  
ran g e d  from t h e  ' I  w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  much' ( t h i s  
was n o rm a l ly  t h e  c a se  w i th  new S e n a t o r s ) ,  o r  ' s e e  my s e c r e t a r y  
t o  o r g a n i s e  a t i m e ' ,  t o  b e in g  v e ry  f a v o u r a b l e .
£ppppnse_Ra£e
As a l r e a d y  s t a t e d ,  my r e s p o n s e  r a t e  was 100 p e r  c e n t  i n  
t h a t  no S e n a to r  r e f u s e d  t o  be i n t e r v i e w e d .  A t o t a l  o f  17 
S e n a t o r s  have p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  s t u d y .
D ur ing  t h e  p e r i o d  of  t h e  i n t e r v i e w s ,  ( t h e  32nd 
p a r l i a m e n t )  t h e  p a r t y  s t r e n g t h  i n  t h e  S e n a t e  was L i b e r a l s  28; 
N a t i o n a l  P a r t y  27;  A u s t r a l i a n  Dem ocrates  5;  I n d e p e n d e n t s  I .  
P a r t i c i p a t i n g  S e n a t o r s  by p a r t y  were L i b e r a l s  7 ,  ALP 9, and one 
Democrat .  I n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  number was a M i n i s t e r  and t h r e e  fo rm er  
M i n i s t e r s  f o r  which  a s e p a r a t e  s e t  o f  q u e s t i o n s  was p r e p a r e d .  A 
more c o m p le te  summary o f  S e n a t o r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  i s  p r o v i d e d  be low .
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JPAEML^
Length of Service of Senators 
Jas_at_1^2^8H
££natprs_Jntprvip# ed All_ Sena tp rp *
0 - 3  years 
4 - 6  
7 - 9  
10 -  11 
12 -
8
2
1
3
3
22
14
11
9
8
* Source: Parliamentary Handbook 1982
t ableJL
£enatorp_ intervipwpd_by_statp 
(as at 1.7.81)
£epaiprp_Interviewed A22_Senatorp
NSW 5 10
Victoria 3 10
Queensland 1 10
Tasmania 4 10
SA 3 10
WA - 10
ACT 1 2
NT _ 2
(Parliamentary Library 1982)
3
2&JBLEL.C
Parliamentary. Po_si£ipii 
(as at 1.7.81)
P^natprs_interyipwed All^naiprp
Backbencher* 
Ex-Shadow Minister 
Shadow Minister 
Ex-Minister 
Minister
10
3
1
•2
1
50
6
5
4
5
* Excludes Ministers, President, Chairman of Committees, 
Shadow Ministers Ex-Ministers, Ex-shadow Ministers, Source: 
Parliamentary Libruary 1982 and Whips.
1ÄBMJ?
Senators 
(as at 1.7.81)
^Batprp. interviewed A12_SpnatorP
30 - 34 
35 - 39 
40 - 44 
46 - 50 
51 - 55 
56 - 60 
60 -
1
4
2
4
2
2
2
3
10
5
17
8
2
9
(Source: Parliamentary Library 1982)
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2 .
3 .
4 .
5.
6 . 
7.
8 .
9.
10 . 
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
1 .
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENATORS
Did you have any particular ambitions when you first 
joined the Senate?
What led you to go onto parliamentary committees?
In what way have you found committee work different to 
your work in the Chamber?
If there was a clash of workload, would you give 
precedence to party committees or parliamentary 
committees ?
How would you personally go about having a reference 
referred to a committee?
Should there be discussion in the party room of topics 
that are sent to the Senate?
Are there areas that committees should consciously 
avoid examining?
Should there be a greater correlation between a 
Senator’s previous knowledge and the committee on which 
be serves?
Do you think that committee hearings should proceed 
while Parliament is sitting?
Do Senators sometimes feel intimidated by witnesses?
Are you satisfied that submissions and witnesses are a 
good cross - section of community views?
Is enough press coverage given to public hearings?
What is your overall impression of the printed and 
published material sent to you by organisations, 
embassies etc?
Does the fact that public servants are exempted from 
commenting on government policy detract from the 
quality of witnesses?
Would you expect a department’s submission to follow 
the department's line or the government's line.
Have you found that public servants have behaved 
differently at party committee meetings to 
parliamentary committee meetings?
1
1 8 .
1 9 .
20 .
21 . 
2 2 .
23 .
2 4 .
2 5 .
26 .
27 .
2 8 .
2 9 .
3 0 .
3 1 .
3 2 . 
33 -
3 4 .
3 5 .
17 . Are you satisfied with the quality of public servants 
appearings before your committee?
\What do you see as the role of committee staff?
Do you find committee members with ministerial 
experience different from other committee members?
Are there special advantages in having Ministers before 
committees ?
What do you see as the role of the chairman?
Would you raise matters that occur in the committee on 
your party committee and/or in the party room?
Do you meet informally with other persons to discuss 
the reference?
How much time do you spend on committee work?
On U.S Senate committees, counsel are permitted to 
question witnesses directly. Do you think this should 
happen in Australia?
Generally, do you feel that consultants are used:
. Too much
. . Not enough
. When needed?
What effect does a minority report have on the stature 
of a committee report?
At whom is the report aimed?
Are you concerned that governments do not always adopt 
recommendations of committees?
Do committees sometimes take too long to report?
Overall, how would you rate Senators' approach to 
committees?
Are your views likely to change because of your 
experience on committees?
Do you think that committees have been the best means 
of investigating the areas that you have studied?
Have committees enabled you to scrutinize government 
actions more effectively?
Have your duties on committees enabled you to fulfil 
your role as a Senator better than other means?
2
QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS CONCERNING SENATE 
LEGISLATIVE AND GENERAL PURPOSE STANDING COMMITTEES
1. Do you meet informally with the chairman or other 
members of committees?
2. Do you personally examine the evidence that a public 
servant gives before and after he has appeared before a 
committee?
3. If the need arose, would you raise problems that you 
have encountered with committees
in the party room?
Cabinet?
4. Do you personally read committee reports?
5. When you first became a Minister, did you find that 
your previous committee experience was of assistance to 
you?
6. Upon gaining a new portfolio would you examine 
committee reports relating to your Ministry?
7. Have you gained a different perspective to committees 
since becoming a Minister?
8. Did you find that your ability to deal with the public 
service was assisted by previous contact on committees?
9. Do you see any advantage in committees travelling 
overseas?
10. Do you feel that Ministers should appear before 
committees?
11. Are there areas that committees should avoid examining?
12. Should committees meet while Parliament is sitting?
13. Would you expect public servants to behave differently 
at back-bench committee meetings to parliamentary 
committee meetings.
3
